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ABSTRACT
Business location decisions play an integral role in determining the
physical form and economic function of an area. Until quite recently,
however, the ability to incorporate locational behavior into effec-
tive development planning policies has been all but precluded by the-
primitive state of theoretical and empirical understandings of the
phenomenon. This has resulted, in turn, on reliance upon hit-or-
miss, incentive-oriented firm-attraction strategies which typically
rely on publicity and other promotional tactics to cast a wide
"net" in the hope of bringing in the "big fish" that local
economies want or need.
The dilemma of locator identification is particularly germane to
problems associated with successful joint transit-real estate
development policy and planning, as past experience has indicated.
Here, the existence of a transit facility and the scale economies
resulting from agglomeration of activities can provide a uniquely
attractive combination of locational resources. Yet joint
development efforts have, on the whole, been less than successful
in fulfilling their mandate by capitalizing upon these assets;
a failure which can be attributed, in part, to their inability to
identify the firms which can exploit these resources in an appro-
priate and timely manner, by locating on the joint development site.
This thesis will describe the design and implementation of a pro-
cedure which provides one means of overcoming this problem, in
the form of a technique for identifying high-potential occupants
for specific development locations. This procedure is comprised
of three basic steps: In the first, empirical data are used to
2determine the factors which are most critical to the location decision,
on both site- and firm-specific bases. The results of these analyses
are then used in Step II to develop profiles of location-appropriate
industries and high-relocation-potential firms, respectively. In the
third and final step of the process, these profiles are merged and
operationalized into a filtering program, which sorts through over five
million firms to identify those which are most likely candidates for
location on the target site. The final output of the process is a list
of the names and addresses of these firms, which can then be contacted
directly by the user as a part of the latter's development strategy.
An application of the procedure, which was developed for the city of
Indianapolis, is presented as an illustration of the form which this
highly portable methodology took, in one specific case. This example
also provides the basis for an analysis of the procedure's technical
and theoretical strengths and weaknesses, as well as for an evaluation
of its potential as a general-use development tool.
Thesis Supervisors: Dr. David L. Birch
Titles: Senior Research Scientist,
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
Dr. Ralph Gakenheimer
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6CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION
Business location decisions play an integral role in the economic
and spatial development of a city. The placement of industry and
commerce on the cityscape influences, to varying degrees, demand for a
diverse range of infrastructure and goods - housing, utilities, public
and social services, transportation, and more business. An under-
standing of the business location decision, however cursory, is thus
critical to the success of both short and long-range public planning
and policy efforts; from those aimed at providing jobs today to the
provision of transportation facilities tomorrow.
Yet despite (or perhaps because of) the complex and critical role
which private sector location decisions play in public sector planning,
our empirical and theoretical understanding of the phenomena remain
poor. This basic weakness hampers our ability to target and to control
ongoing development, as well as to forecast long-term growth patterns.
As a result, urban development efforts, such as joint development plans,
are generally characterized by hit-or-miss strategies (e.g., "Make
it in Massachusetts") which rely on publicity to cast a wide net in
the hope of bringing in the "big fish" that they need. In the absence
of sufficiently specific tools and data, the planner lacks a credible
basis on which to identify and/or approach potential developers.
Instead, he can only throw out a few tax or zoning incentives as bait,
and then wait for the "right" developer to swim by. In practice, this
means that the best a development planner can frequently do is to
identify and attempt to court individual members of broad industry
7groups which might intuitively be interested in and appropriate for a
particular city or site. It also means that the success or failure
of even the best-planned development effort is ultimately left to the
vagaries of the very market which it is attempting to influence.
Nowhere is this more true than in the case of joint transit/land
development planning. The term "joint development" initially evolved
from efforts to minimize the negative effects of highway facilities.
Today, it is most commonly used to the multiple use of transit corridors
and station areas for real estate projects and transit facilities.I
It is thus characterized by real estate projects that are closely
linked to public transportation services and stations, and which rely
to a considerable extent on the market and locational advantages
provided by the transit facility.2 The benefits which can potentially
be reaped from joint development are therefore both significant and
obvious: economic efficiencies, improved returns on investment, and
enhanced property values can all be achieved through complementary
capital improvements.
But the implementational barriers to the type of private/public
partnership which joint development implies are equally impressive,
and prime among them is the problem of developer identification. Once
the type and scale of desired development have been determined,
suitable developers must be found, and means of attracting them to the
site(s) devised. As the BART experience indicated only too well,
however, the simple availability of developable parcels bordering
transport facilities is not a sufficient condition for development to
actually occur. Regardless of the physical structural relationships
between land use and transport, joint development requires close
8cooperation among private real estate developers, public transit
authorities, and urban development agencies. And before such
cooperation can possible be achieved, the "right" type and number-of
developers must be found.
1.1 An Introduction to the Finding-Firms Process
This thesis will describe the design and application of a business
location forecasting algorithm which can solve this primary barrier to
successful joint development plan implementation. By identifying
individual companies which have a high probability of being interested
in developing or location on a particular site, or in a particular
city, it relieves the planner of his uncomfortable position on the
waiting end of a "don't call us, we'll call you" relationship. In
doing so, it has the potential for increasing the workability of joint
development policies, to the extent that they can better result in
enhanced and efficient real estate and transport investment patterns.
Figure 1 illustrates the basic structure of the firm-finding
procedure which will be described in detail in Chapters Five and Six.
As this simplified flow chart indicates, the method, in its current
form, consists of three basic steps: 1) determination of critical
growth and locational factors; 2) identification of industries/firms
which compare favorably with these factors; and 3) operationalization
of these factors into a filtering and sorting algorithm. The final
output of the process is a list of the names of individual firms which
are likely candidates for location in the site/city in question. The
selection and order of the filters are critical to the output of the
methodology, inasmuch as they define the prioritized characteristics
9Figure 1
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which are used to identify and rank potential developers. Steps 1
and 2 are thus primarily analytical in nature, consisting of initial
sets of tabulations (of economic growth, industrial labor demand,
commuting patterns, etc.) which allow determination of the appropriate-
ness and relative importance of site-related factors in locational
decisions. Step 3, in contrast, is primarily computational in nature.
It proceeds, from the-background data provided in the previous
analyses, to the actual construction and application of the filtering
algorithms.
The technique's basic strength for generalized use lies in its
flexibility, and thus in its adaptability to the site-specific
characteristics of an almost limitless range of applications, through
the ability to set and reset the filters and sorts through which
potential developers are identified. As an indication of the degree
to which the firm identification procedure can be fine-tuned to the
demands of a specific planning context, the thesis will describe its
implementation in two quite different cases (as parts of the South-
west Corridor Joint Development Project, and the emerging economic
development plan for the city of Indianapolis). It will also examine
a range of possible alternative forms and settings of the process in
an effort to evaluate the potential for its generalized use as a tool
for joint development planning. *
A second strength of the procedure accrues from the extensiveness
of the data which it utilizes, and the resulting specificity of its
output (i.e., the names and addresses of individual firms). These
data will be described in detail in Chapter Five, but an overview of
them is useful at this point as an indication of the true power of the
11
filtering algorithm.
The primary data bases are provided by two versions of the Dun
and Bradstreet Market Indicators file which have been specially edited
for use in micro-economic analysis. The first file contains detailed
information (including the size, age, industry type, employment, sales,
location and corporate affilication) on about 5.6 million individual
establishments for the period from 1969 to 1976, and is used to
trace corporate growth and investment trends. The second file is a
subset of the first, and traces establishment affiliation and ownership
through "family trees" of firms. This file is used to identify the
growth and investment patterns of individual firms. Demographic
data with respect to labor pool composition and hiring patterns, as
well as transport usage, are drawn from two subsets of the 1970 Fourth
Count Census (pending availability of the 1980 Census), and from
information provided by project contractors.
1.2 Business- -Location in a Planning Context
Business location decisions impact transportation and economic
development planning from two basic angles: 1) given an expected
rate of business growth, where are firms likely to locate?; and 2)
given a specific commercial site or a city, what firms are likely to
locate there? The first question underlies the long-term dynamics
which shape the interplays between supply and demand for multiple goods
and which are, in turn, assumed to ultimately result in a redefined,
equilibrium-state urban system. It is thus an integral component of
any attempt to predict urban growth patterns, and concurrent changes
in demand for support services such as transportation. The second
12
question indicates a more immediate concern; the comparative static-
type problem of determining individual decisions within a given set of
physical, social, and economic relationships.
This thesis will be concerned with the second aspect of applied
business location and with the issues and possibilities raised by it,
through the technique of joint development. Joint development is a
concept which provides an innovative approach to transport planning,
in its concern with optimizing the economic impacts of transit invest-
ments through coordinated public and private decision-making. As such,
it implies a rather novel and unconventional (but not indefensible)
view of the role of transit planning; a view which reflects the growing
perception that the transportation "problem" is no longer merely an
issue of mode or technology. To quote Altshuler:
"...the broader shifts in political orientation have had
a marked effect on policy debate and planning in urban
transportation. Most notably, they have led to a
dramatic reduction in emphasis on the need for new
expressways and rapid transit systems and towards much
greater concern with means of improving the utilization
of existing highways, with allocation of scarce resources
among multiple claimants, and with devising low cost
strategies that promise to serve multiple objectives
simultaneously."
In our society of increasingly scarce resources, the ability to
make most efficient use of investments -- both past and future, private
and public -- will be paramount. Transportation planning can no longer
be simply synonymous with transportation system planning, but with
planning the entire range of integrated activities which transporation
enables and/or facilitates. This thesis will provide one aid for
achieving this objective.
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1.3 Contents and Structure of the Paper
This thesis begins with an overview of the general problems
associated with forecasting business location, specifically in the
contexts of joint development planning and the algorithm. Chapter Two
commences this effort by taking a look at the "macro" side of the land-
transport relationship -- to wit, the development patterns which have
historically been associated with particular transportation systems --
as a basis for understanding the sources of and prospects for joint
development as a generalized approach to transit investment planning.
Chapter Three focuses on the "micro" side of this relationship,
concentrating on the locational behavior of the individual firm in an
effort to evaluate the premises upon which the algorithm is based.
This chapter is thus primarily empirical in nature, although the
theoretical underpinnings of the business location issue are also
discussed. Chapter Four ties the "macro" and "micro" together in an
analysis of the joint development concept. This chapter evaluates
the approach's history and experiences, in order to develop a basic
planning methodology for joint development implementation, and to
propose an appropriate place for the finding-firms process within it.
The firm-identification methodology is, itself, examined in
Chapters Five and Six. Chapter Five serves an introductory function,
by presenting an overview of the procedure's sources and basic
structure, the premises upon which it is based, and characteristics of
the data which it utilizes. Chapter Six then provides a detailed
examination of the procedure's application in the Indianapolis case.
This being the implementation by means of which the process's current
14
generic form was developed, the Indianapolis example will provide both
an explanation of the process by which the current structure of the
methodology was defined, as well as providing an illustration of the
types of discrete tasks of which it is comprised. The thesis will
conclude in Chapter Seven, with an analysis of the finding-firms
process and its products, a look at the implications of these findings
for existing development techniques, and an examination of the potential
role which the procedure might play in the systematic coordination of
land and transit investment policies, through joint development
planning.
15
CHAPTER TWO:
TRANSIT INVESTMENT AND LAND DEVELOPMENT:
A REVIEW OF THE ISSUES AND
THE LITERATURE
[he fundamental nature of the land-transport relationship
would appear to make its existence an undisputed fact. One need not
be an expert in the field of spatial economics to notice that gas
stations and fast-food restaurants cluster at highway interchanges;
that the rents for central city apartments are higher than those in
the suburbs; and that "strip"-type commercial development seems to
occur anyplace where it is not prohibited by zoning. However, while
few would dispute the intuitive obviousness of the concept of access-
enhanced land values, continued research into the relationship between
transport and land investment patterns has made claims with respect
to the magnitude, form, and policy implications of the relationship
increasing arguable. In short, the concept is clear, but its components
are not; and it is the latter which provide the necessary ingredients
for useful public planning and policy.
The land-transport relationship is particularly problematic in the
case of fixed-guideway mass transit, the problems being a function
both of the mode -- its ridership, its historical role as a form of
urban transport -- and the methodologies used to measure its economic
impact. Yet it is clear that a better understanding of the influence
of public transit investments on private investment decisions could
provide the tools which are necessary to promote development patterns
which are more efficient, equitable, and/or aesthetic than those which
16
would occur naturally in the marketplace. The planner is thus con-
fronted by insufficient and inconclusive theory, on the one hand, and
by powerful incentives to take positive action, on the other. Under
these circumstances, the land-transport relationship presents a
challenging dilemma: a situation in which the "do-nothing" alternative
of a laissez faire land market would appear to be a cowardly, and
potentially costly, solution; but one in which an incomplete under-
standing of the underlying forces could quite possibly result in
weak or misguided policies.
The three chapters which follow will attempt to resolve some of
these issues through a discussion of the relevant literature. This
chapter will begin the survey with a review of the issues and research
regarding the land-transportation relationship. The following two
chapters will then examine the practical and policy implications of this
relationship in terms of the location decisions of firms (Chapter
Three), and the prospects of joint development planning as a value
capture strategy (Chapter Four), respectively.
2.1 Overview of the Issue and Approaches to Understanding It.
As indicated above, continued development of an understanding
of the land-transport relationship offers significant potential for
the design of methods for integrated planning of urban structure and
activities. In general, it can be noted that:
"...[for] possible solutions of the "Urban Problem", we
must first identify the elements of urban structure, then
ascertain their space requirements and their desired
relationships to one another and, finally, clarify how
the individual urban elements can best be aggregated
into a pattern or model which avoids most of the dis-
advantages of unregulated development."1
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But in order to complete this process of dis- and re-aggregation
of the components of urban structure, serious questions about the
nature of the relationships of the urban structures component parts
to each other, and to the whole, must be resolved. Many of the barriers
to developing an understanding of the land-transport issue are products
of the nature of the relationship, itself, and of its dynamic role in
defining the form of a functioning city. Clearly the supply of and,
demand for, land and transport services are but single elements in an
elaborate array of urban interrelationships. The potential for non-
transport impacts of transport decisions, as they reverberate through
the general urban structure, is thus too great to be ignored, making
the task of designing research methodologies which produce results
from which causal inferences can be made is a formidable one, indeed.
Of equal importance, however, is the fact that these impacts, by
their eclectic nature, demand an interdisciplinary approach to the land-
transport problem. This attitude is reflected in Altshuler's
previously-cited observation that transport problems can no longer
be considered merely issues of mode and technology, but must take into
account more general economic, physical, and social effects.2 It
indicates a view which is being supported by increasing numbers of
transportation professionals. For, while technological advances may
change the character of transport services, they do little to diminish
the complexity of transport's role in the urban structure as a whole.
Thus,
"[The importance of transport research to developed
industrial societies] lies not only in examining
transport's "nation-building" role (as with lesser-
developed economies) but increasingly with tackling
the conflicts it causes with activities, with other
18
claims on scarce resources, and with the intricate fabric
of the urban environment. Current social concerns -- e.g.,
the aftermath of the energy "crisis" of 1973, the
depletion of key resources, the plight of disadvantaged
groups within otherwise affluent societies, etc. -- lead
us away from the purely technological considerations
of transport into much more gomplex investigations of
social and economic impact."3
The range of relevant non-transportation impacts of a transport
investment (or pricing) decision can thus be nearly as wide as we
would wish it to be defined. In practice, then, the real issue lies
in the political and professional processes by which a minimum
acceptable range of relevant policy impacts is determined. Here again,
the issue takes on a conundrum-like form: Is transportation a cause
of planning problems or is it an effect? Or both? In any case,
it is too important a component of the urban structure to ignore:
"It is clear that there is not simply one urban
transportation problem, just as there is not one
urban problem. Transportation problems represent a
number of the constituent factors of a complex of
urban problems. In fact, in many respects transportation
may be considered one of the major causes of present
urban problems and also one of their symptoms... Because
of the central role that transportation plays in the
proper functioning of our highly industrialized and
commercialized society, it is deserving of a considerable
amount of attention, effort, and investment to improve
its performance in this vital role."4
Putting non-economic issues aside and focusing purely on the
land use question may thus do much to reduce the scope of the problem
at hand. However, as Figure 2 indicates, it scarcely improves upon
its analytical complexity. As this schematic diagram illustrates,
even a simplified representation of the land-transport relationship
implies a complicated system of feedback loops with multiple incidences
of impact, adjustment, and readjustment throughout. It therefore
comes as little surprise to note that attempts to identify (let alone
19
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measure or model) these impacts have presented researchers with
difficult (and often, as yet unanswered) questions with respect to the
causality, distribution, and magnitude of effect.
Some have taken the inconclusiveness of research on this topic
to be an indication of the existence of a non-relationship between
land use and transport investment. As the following sections will
indicate (more by omission than otherwise) this position, being
relatively recent in appearance, has yet to become well articulated
in the literature -- perhaps also implying that it is more a product
of discontent with previous methodologies, or of a frustration with
the unmeasurability of the relationship than the result of substantive
proof of its non-existence. In any case, this is a point worth
consideration prior to examining the literature in the field.
A more commonly held view with respect to the strength of this
relationship is represented by Ingram, who notes that:
"The role that transportation investments and transport
service levels play in determining land-use patterns
is subject to debate in many quarters. Some observers
believe that the transport system is the dominant force
shaping urban development; others argue that transport
investments are required to serve travel demands arising
from settlement patterns that are, in turn, determined
by other forces. Both theoretical models and empirical
studies suggest that the truth lies somewhere between
these two extremes. The transport system is one of
several important variables influencing urban land-use
patterns, and urban land-use patterns are one of sevegal
important variables influencing transport choices..."
If, for the time being, we continue to assume that a causal
relationship between transport and land use does indeed exist, what
can we say about its general form? Perhaps the most obvious
observation that can be made is that transport facilities, themselves,
constitute a land use, and a proportionally significant one at
21
that. As such, they are clearly bound to have effects upon the levels
of usage, intensity of activities, economic growth, and other features
of the remaining land uses in an urban (or, to a lesser extent, rural)
area. 6
With respect to the nature and strength of these effects, time
horizon begins to play a determinant role -- in effect, adding a
third (but often unrecognized) variable to the relationship (the other
two variables being land use and transport). As Altshuler notes:
"In the short run, the direction of influence is pre-
dominantlyfrom land use to travel. That is, trip-
making patterns, volumes, and modal distributions are
largely a function of the geographic distribution of
activities... What is more relevant in the current
context, however, is that accessibility -- both immediate
and estimated over the economic lives of real property
investments -- is a vital consideration as locational
decisions are made. Thus, over time, transportation
is a significant factor in shaping land use." 7
A fourth factor to add to this framework for understanding the land-
transport relationship is geographic scale. For as Meyer notes, while
the importance of transport's effect on land use at the site-specific
(or corridor) level is relatively clear, the impact of transportation
investment on development at a regional or metropolitan level is
8
much less obvious.
With these general observations regarding the context, importance,
source and direction of the land-transport relationship in mind, we
can begin to examine the relationship in detail through a review of
the literature. We will begin with an overview of theoretical
*For example, 25% of the surface area of Boston is taken up by
auto-related transport facilities (roads and parking), alone.
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approaches to the topic. The primary emphasis in this and following
chapters will be on the locational consequences of the land-transport
relationship, and thus on the empirical literature. This notwith-
standing, it is the theory which enables us to turn empirical obser-
vations into a conceptual model of the whole, and against which the
validity of applications such as the algorithm must ultimately be
weighed. Of course, the theory achieves this universalistic view by
assuming a form which is sufficiently abstract and aggregative as to
nullify its explanatory potential -- a necessary evil, perhaps, but an
evil just the same. An initial survey of the theoretical literature
will thus serve two purposes: 1) to aid the reader, by providing an
analytical framework for evaluation of the assumptions underlying the
firm-identification procedure's form; but 2) to caution the reader, by
making clear the explanatory weaknesses of economic theory which
necessitate taking a behavioral approach to the location issue,
through primary reliance upon the substance of the empirical literature.
2.2 A Review of the Theoretical Literature
Initial efforts to understand the relationship between trans-
portation facilities and land use or value patterns developed from
within the field that we now refer to as regional economics. True to
the historical context from which this branch emerged, the longstanding
focus of the theory has been on the spatial distribution of agricultural
producers. But as society has evolved, so has the theory; its setting
from urban to rural, and its subject from agricultural to industrial,
and most recently, to residential and non-manufacturing commercial
location behavior. A chronological approach to the literature thus
23
provides valuable insight with respect to the sources of the theory's
present form.
Ricardo was the first to deal explicitly with the issues of land
use and price, noting that the rent on the most productive land is
based on its advantage over the least productive plots, with competition
among farmers insuring that the full advantage go to landlords in the
form of rent. 1 Von Thunen added a spatial factor to this observation,
finding that the rent at any location is equal to the value of its
product less production and transport costs. Marshall refined the
relationship even further, defining the price of land in terms of its
"situation value" (the sum of the money value of the situational
advantages of the site) and "site value"' (the sum of situation value
and agricultural rent). He also drew the first direct parallel between
the markets for urban and agricultural land noting that, in both
situations, potential users of land make bids for alternative sites
based on their respective location advantages, with the highest
bidder capturing the land in each instance.12
It was not until the 20th century that the concept of spatial
economics, and its urban applications, began to develop into a
recognized field of study, culminating in Isard's Location and Space
Economy in the late fifties, and Alonso's residential counterpart
(Location and Land Use) in 1962. Again, while it is these works
which are of greatest interest to us, their conceptual sources should
not be ignored.
For example, Hurd was the first to clearly argiculate the
space-value relationship, with the seemingly simple observation that
land value is a function of nearness. To wit:
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"Since value depends on economic rent, and rent on
location, and location on convenience, and convenience
on nearness, we may eliminate the intermediate steps
and say that value depends on nearness." 13
Haig articulated upon this idea, developing the complementarity of
rents and transport costs into a conception of transportation as a
device for overcoming the "friction of space". Thus, while improve-
ments in transport systems work to minimize access cost, they may do
so by increasing land value since site rentals and transport costs
represent the cost of that friction which remains. 14
However, it was Isard who brought the industrial application of
the theory to its present basic form by adding the utility concept as
the discriminating factor in the location choice. His complex model
for developing an equilibrium distribution of land prices and uses
reduces to three basic steps: 1) for each potential land user, derive
a family of bid rent functions such that the user is indifferent to
his location along any one of the functions; 2) determine the
equilibrium price at any location by comparing the bids of the
prospective users and choosing the highest; and 3) determine equilibrium
quantities of land through selection of the proper bid rent function
for each user. In the solution, steps two and three are brought into
agreement simultaneously; thus, the bid rent rent curves guide the
"allocating hand" of the market through ,the interdependence of quantity
and price.15
Transport plays a role in this model's determination of the
equilibrium to the extent that relations to transportation facilities
and systems are critical to the definition of effective economic
distance.16 The primary factors determining the rent of an urban
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site are thus: 1) effective distance from the urban core; 2)
accessibility of the site to potential customers; 3) the number of
competitors, their locations, and the intensity with which they vie for
sales; 4) the proximity of land devoted to use(s) which is(are)
complementary in terms of both attracting potential customers and
cutting costs (i.e., the so-called "tertiary" sector producers).
Chamberlain, presenting a modification of Isard's model for the
retail case, focuses on the concept of market area, i.e., the extent
to which sales volume is a function of relative location, rather than
of distance. Drawing an analogy to the agricultural case, he
observes that the farmer pays for the productive ability, and the
retailer for the selling ability of land. He also adds fifth and sixth
factors to the list of those determining the rent of a site: 5) the
prices that are charged for the good being sold; and 6) the type of
business which can "best" be conducted on the location. 18  The major
implication of his analysis is thus that the different market concerns
of different types of firms imply inter-sectoral differences in location
behavior, as a product of the relative importance of access and market
share in determing the individual firm's profitability.
Alonso draws heavily on both Isard's model of industrial rent,
and Beckmann's mathematic model of residential land values to develop
an anlaysis of the process of residential land value determination and
household location.19 Using Beckmann's observation that each household
chooses its location so as to maximize the amount of living space that
it can occupy for its housing expenditure, and the constraint that
the average expenditure on housing plus commuting costs is a well-
defined function of income,2o he develops a bid rent model of
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residential location behavior not insimilar to Isard's industrial
version.
Finally, we must consider Wingo's attempt to deal explicitly
the land use-transportation issue, through a theoretical analysis
of traffic flows and land economics. He develops a model of the
residential land market in which rents and transportation costs are
viewed as complementary, their sum being equal to a constant defined
by the transport costs to the most distant residential location under
occupation. Noting the "the quality of location, or 'accessibility',
is the dominant factor in determining land uses and intensity,"21 he
conceives the analytical forerunner to operationalizable concepts such
as the "travel savings" hypothesis, which was tested by Boyce et. al.
in an attempt to measure the land use impacts of the Lindenwold High
Speed Line (see Section 2.3.2).
Before moving into an examination of the empirical literature,
it must be noted that the field of economics has not been the sole
source of insight into the relationship between economic factors and
settlement patterns. At about the same time as Haig developed his
concept of the "friction of space" urban sociologists, particularly
the "human ecologists" of the University of Chicago, developed an
extensive literature on the subject of urban structure focusing
on an entirely different source of friction -- social class. Using
a biological analogy, theorists such as Park and Burgess developed
a general model which viewed land values as the result of bidding
process by potential users, by which the pattern of location of
land uses in the city is determined. Thus, in contrast to the
economic models of that period, which saw price as a function of use,
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they viewed price as a given, therefore identifying use as the
22determining factor; an emphasis which is completely consistent with
their concern not with price per se, but with its manifestation
through settlement patterns of segregation by land use and social
group.
Most important, however, was the sociologists' recognition, in
light of imperfections in the functionings of the land market, of the
importance of non-economic factors in influencing the settlement
pattern. As Quinn notes, "... the concept of cost has a very broad
meaning... It embraces whatever of value is given up or is enjoyed
in lesser degree in obtaining any pattern of adjustment."23  This
expansive definition of cost implies that the location decision is a
compromise entailing consideration of not only economic costs (such
as travel and housing quality), but also a set of less easily
quantifiable social, cultural, and/or aesthetic factors. Thus, while
leaving unanswered the important question of land value determination,
the ecologists provide an interesting prelude to the economic
behavioralists' subsequent attempts to incorporate a modified "economic
man" into rational models of locational behavior, through their
recognition of the possibility that a "rational" location decision may
indeed be one which is economically sub-optimal.
2.3 Review of the Empirical Literature
As Ingram notes, empirical studies relating land use patterns
to transportation systems changes are typlified by comparisons of
development patterns before and after a particular highway or transit
investment has occurred. 24 In some cases, this means time series
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studies which span.even a century or more of urban growth. As the
problems inherent in this approach have risen to the fore, however,
more sophisticated techniques for examination of the relationship
have evolved. Today, we find four basic types of empirical study:
1) historical; 2) case study; 3) cross-sectional and inter-urban
comparison; and 4) simulation using empirical estimates of behavorial
parameters.
At this juncture, it bears mention that, in contrast to the
theoretical literature in which residential applications are relatively
lately come, empirical discussions of the interactions between transport
and land use have historically focused on residential location and
household behavior. This emphasis is quite likely the result of the
ends which such information has typically served, i.e., long-range
residential location forecasts which form the basis of urban transport
demand models.
But it can just as easily be argued that changes in the transport
system affect the locational choices of firms (see Chapter Three for
a detailed discussion of this issue), not to mention the fact that
employment location is itself an important determinant of residential
choice. So, while the major emphasis in this, and following chapters
will be specifically on the relationship between transport and
commercial land development, the paucity of literature in the field
necessitates examination of some of the more generalizable impacts
through residential examples.
2.3.1 Historical Studies
This historical case study seems to be the literature's most
29
pervasive approach to the land-transport issue. For while the
generalizability of these studies and their findings is highly
questionable, they have a basic attractiveness in that they reflect
the commonsensical qualities of the land-transport relationship
in its simplest form.
It was Warner's study of streetcar line construction and the
subsequent suburbanization of the southern portion of Boston which
set the tone for numerous subsequent studies. He introduced the
notion that the first suburbanization was not the result of some sort
of "natural" growth process (as per the Urban Ecologists), but the
product of a loose cooperation between public utility agencies and
private entrepreneurs. With the blessings of the utlity companies
(which were always interested in creating new markets), the private
developers first extended streetcar lines well beyond the existing
urban fringe of cities such as Boston (where pedestrianism was the
theretofore dominant form of transport). They the proceeded to create
demand for transit services (and public utilities) by constructing
residential developments along the streetcar routes, capitalizing
upon the proclivity of urban residents for rural residential
settings. 25
A number of subsequent studies have reiterated and expanded upon
this basic observation, in cases such as Los Angeles (Banham) and
Cleveland's Shaker Heights (Harwood). Some give the ultimate
catalytic credit to the Industrial Revolution, itself -- both
through its unprecedented demand for large numbers of urban workers,
and through its production of increasingly efficient forms of mass
transit.26 In any case, the common elements in these studies are their
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historical settings, their focus on transit as an expansionary tool,
and their resulting conclusions about the role of transit as a
determinant of post-industrial urban form.
The situation changed dramatically in the twentieth century as
the automobile, with its inherent and quickly-capitalized-upon
competitive edge over public transit, rose into position as the dominant
form of urban transport in the U.S. and other industrialized countries.
Perhaps the first to recognize the automobile's potential as the
impetus for a new urban form were the Italian Futurists, who combined
the speed and access offered by the auto with new architectural styles
(recently enabled by the invention and widespread availability of
structural steel) to create a then-radical conception of an urban
structure based on mobility.27
Although the Futurist ideal survives only on paper, it can be
credited with foreseeing more than a few of the qualities of urban
structure and lifestyle common to today's automotive cities. Thus,
we find those empiricists who would argue that the land-transport
relationship has remained more or less sacred through the years, but
that the auto has simply replaced transit as the determinant mode.
Their arguments are particularly persuasive in the case of the U.S.,
where a combination of factors -- a high standard of living, in-
expensive cars and gasoline, low-interest home mortgages, and the
decision to invest unprecedented levels of public funds in an inter-
state highway system -- created a situation of rampant expansion.
The result, as Altshuler points out, was that:
"...the coming of the automobile and truck, combined
with dramatic improvements in street and highway
systems, has permitted a filling in of the spaces
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between transit lines, a radical deconcentration of
commerce and industry along with residential settle-
ment, and a further extension of the settlement radius
as large numbers of urban resdents have found employment
in the suburbs and beyond."
This type of development, which has been referred to as having the
physical characteristics (and implied desirability) of an "oil slick"29
has spread, with the automobile, throughout the industrialized world.
To some, (e.g., Paschetto), the pervasiveness of the pattern would
indicate proof of the predominance of the auto as a determinant of
urban form. To others, it leaves unresolved such important issues as
that of causality -- in terms of both direction (e.g., the simultaneity
of employment and residential location decisions and mode choice) and
source (e.g., the simultaneous growth of highways and real personal
income).
The historical approach's ability to identify effect, but not
cause, become particularly apparent when the results of these studies
are considered in a policy context. In practice, far too many have
made the fallacious transition from observation to extrapolation without
consideration of the spuriousness of the "missing" third variable, time.
That is to say, while transit may have had a strong influence in the
determination of 19th century urban form, current transit investments
take place in an urban environment which cannot be considered a generic
equal to early industrial society. Thus, studies such as Warner's
This is not meant to imply that Altshuler, himself, falls in this
camp. His statement is purely meant as an explanation of the forces
and conditions which have led others to identify the automobile as
the pivotal factor in shaping current urban form.
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(which makes no pretense of being -anything but historical) which plot
the effect of transit investments in open countryside are misguidedly
used to rationalize the development potential of modern transit
investments being placed in heavily developed urban areas -- and
planners are surprised when the effects are not the same.
Not only has the urban context changed, however; so has the
relative importance of transit as a transportation mode. As DeLeuw,
Cather, and Co. note, the pre-auto situation was very different from
the current one, in one very important way: only in certain circum-
stances to today's transit improvements provide the kind of drastic
impacts on overall accessibility which were typically associated with
earlier transit investments. The auto provides a superior competitive
alternative for most travelers in all but a few American cities.
Consequently, despite what others may claim, in today's world the
lesson of the past is that the potential for transit-induced land use
impact can only reach pre-war proportions in two ways: first, through
now-unforeseen innovations which create major improvements in transit
accessibility (or deterioration in auto accessibility); and second,
through increased coordination of transit with other complementary
market forces. 30
2.3.2 Case Studies
The 1970's saw the emergence of a number of before-and-after
type case study analyses of the land use-transportation relationship.
By that time, recognition of the predictive weaknesses of the
historical approach had made obvious the fact that a new methodology
was needed if the relationship were ever to be satisfactorily under-
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stood. These case studies thus differ from the historical ones in
two ways: 1) with respect to the temporal context of the case under
study; and 2) with respect to the techniques used to measure cause
and effect, these case studies being more quantitative (rather than
observational) in nature. Earlier studies of this type do exist,
most notably Spengler's 1930 analysis of value capture potential in
New York.31 However, the situation in the seventies developed in a
manner such as to facilitate both completion of, and sensitivity to,
the conclusions of studies of this genre Specifically, a series of
massive rail transit investments (Washington, San Francisco, Montreal,
etc.) created the opportunity for in-depth time analyses, while the
dramatic and highly publicized findings of a few initial studies,
in combination with a resurgence of general interest in transit per se,
brought the issue and the approach to political and professional
attention.
The four best-known cases give a good indication of the
development of the method, its approach to and revelations about the
land-transport issue, and the controversies surrounding each. Initial
interest was spawned by reports of significant land use impacts
resulting first fromthe Yonge Street subway in downtown Toronto, and
then from Philadelphia's suburban Lindenwold High-Speed Line. Some-
what later, Montreal's Metro and Place Bonventure development rose to
attention as an example of highly successful joint development, and
thus of a "capturable" land-transport relationship, while the San
Francisco region's disappointing experience with BART offered what
some considered to be substantial evidence to the contrary. A brief
discussion of each of these cases provides the basis for understanding
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the sources of the tandem rise and fall of expectations with respect
to the case study's approach to and conclusions regarding the land-
transport issue.
Several authors (Heenan, Kearns, Wacher) have written about the
pre- and post-transit development of Toronto. They note, in particular,
the effects of the radial Yonge Street line upon commercial development
in the city's central business district. Over the five-year period
which is generally acknowledged as the beginning of Toronto's transit-
related development period (1959-63), over 48% of all high-rise apart-
ment development in the city occurred in four planning districts
(of 24) which are all centered on the subway line, just north of
downtown.32 Heenan (whose writing have been quoted most frequently
with respect to the Toronto case) summarizes the impact by asserting
that "... two-thirds of all new development in a five-year period was
put in place within five minute's walk from the Yonge Street subway...
There is no doubt that a subway has a tremendous impact on land use
and consequently land values."33 Although quite likely true in
principle, in fairness this dramatic conclusion must be tempered by
several factors not mentioned by the author. These include the fact
that the Yonge Street corridor had been heavily travelled and populated
prior to the transit development and that, subways aside, Toronto had
been growing rapidly ever since the end of World War II.
Following studies have thus reiterated the trend, although not
necessarily the magnitude, of Heenan's initial report. Kearns, for
example, focused on the fiscal significance of the new development,
finding that incremental tax growth along the line exceeded the
carrying costs of the line's construction bonds.34 Abouchar (1973)
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and Dewees (1973) completed regression analyses of residential values
(similar to the type developed by Boyce for use in the Lindenwold
Line anlaysis) with inconclusive results, while Davies' 1972 study
of residential density changes indicated a significant impact in the
initial years of transit operation.35
Perhaps the best-known studies of this type are those which have
examined the land use impacts of the Lindenwold High-Speed commuter
line, which runs from.downtown Philadelphia through Camden to suburban
New Jersey. Here, the focus was not on the line's development impact
in the two major urban areas through which it passed -- apparently,
only one formal study has attempted to deal with this issue (Gannon and
Dear), doing so by looking at employment and office construction in the
region36 -- perhaps as a reflection of the multi-causality complaint
weighed against the earlier Toronto analyses. Instead, the emphasis
in this case has been on the transit line's effect upon suburban
residential land values.
Specifically, these studies (which emerged from the Wharton
School at the University of Pennsylvania) sought to test the
appropriateness of the "travel savings" hypothesis of land value,
which states that savings in journey-to-work costs afforded by the
transit improvement will be capitalized as value added to the
residential property. Mudge used a cross-corridor regression model to
find evidence not only of the existence of a positive impact on
residential properties in the transit corridor (in conformance with
the travel-savings theory), but also both spatial and socio-economic
variations in the impact's magnitude. In particular, he found that
the impact appears strongest among lower- and middle-income neighbor-
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hoods -- i.e., among those neighborhoods in which the journey-to-work
trip is more likely to be made by transit -- although he also found
evidence that at least a portion of the impact was the results of intra-
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regional transfer (vs. net increase) in residential property values.
Boyce, et. al. reaffirm Mudge's finding that the degree of benefit is
an inverse of function of distance from the Central Business District
(CBD), estimating that each dollar of travel savings converts to
increases in the residential sales price of $2,000 and $3,000, during
construction and after the initiation of service, respectively.38 Both
studies also found that the market adjusts very quickly to this one-
time value increase, clearing within six months after the commencement
of service.
As awareness of the potential for value capture increased (due,
in large part, to the publicity received by these early cases), so did
efforts to include such benefits into the planning and evaluation of new
transit construction projects. The Montreal and BART experiences
present an interesting comparison in terms of their success in doing
so; not so much because the latter system has "failed" to realize
significant benefits, but because of the circumstances which made
their experiences so different. At face value, there would seem to be
a great similarity between the systems -- both were built recently
with advanced technology, high budgets, and the primary objective
of easing auto congestion. But beyond these superficial similarities,
the cases diverge sharply: a comparison of them thus becomes a study
in contrasts in terms of both effect, and cause.
While the primary objective underlying the construction of the
Montreal Metro was to ease congestion in the city's densely packed
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downtown core, decisions related to the design of the system were also
predicated on the desire of the city fathers to support and promote
the continued economic viability of the city center.39 The BART
system, in comparison, had no such clearly articulated development
goals -- it was built for the main purpose of easing rush-hour
freeway congestion, along with ta set of more general equity, access,
and environmental objectives. In terms of design, these goals
translated into a short, dense, high frequency system in the Montreal
case, and a far-flung BART system with operation problems that have
left current frequencies at only half the intended level.
When we look at the differential development impacts of the two
systems, the sources of such become quite clear. In the Montreal
case, not only was economic development an explicit objective of the
transit investment program (whereas in the BART case it appears to have
been more of an afterthought), but it was supported by a consistent
package of system and station design configurations which facilitated
the occurrence of desired types of investment. That is not to say
that the BART system has had no land use impacts -- Webber's sharp
critique of the system and its effects aside, Gruen, Gruen and
Associates have completed a series which highlight the positive
41development effects which have occurred at some stations -- or, even,
that any (latent or manifest) land use impact could be identified as a
product of improved access, given the poor track record of this
beleaguered system. In comparison, what these two cases make clear is
that one of them intended to spur development through transit, and did,
and one didn't really, and was rewarded in kind.
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2.3.3 Cross-Sectional and Intra-Urban Comparisons
The DeLeuw, Cather and Co.'s comparison of case studies is
not a cross-sectional methodology in the strict sense of the term,
and thus differs from the other research efforts which will be
discussed in this section. But since it is basically comparative in
nature, and differs so significantly from the single-case studies
cited above, it bears being treated here.
This study, which was published in 1977, is generally regarded
as being the most definitive anlaysis of land use impacts of rapid
transit, to date. It is a survey of historical (i.e., pre-World War
II) and modern case studies of transit investments and their resulting
land effects, in the U.S. and Canada. The objectives of the study
were two-fold: 1) to identify the nature and extent of new development
potentially influenced by a given transit improvement; and 2) to
identify the strength of influence of the various factors involved.42
Figure 3 presents a schematic representation of some of the basic
relationships which they found with respect to the determination of
land use impact.
The study's basic finding was that major rapid transit (i.e.,
conventional rail) improvements have been important inducements to
intensified development near stations, with several qualifications.
The first of these qualifications is that such development can, and
will, occur only when supported by other favorable forces (i.e.,
economic, political environmental) and conditions (i.e., zoning,
taxes).43 This is a point which was clear to Spengler, as early as
1930. As he notes in his study of transit investments in New York,
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"Rather than be considered a cause of land value changes, a transit
facility should be more properly be regarded as a construction which
permit or facilitates, under certain circumstances, an emergence of
land values, the values being determined largely by other factors." 44
The key, it would seem, thus lies in identifying and operationalizing
those facilitating factors. For while transit investments are quite
likely to enhance the prospects of development in nearby areas, they
are not a sufficient condition for such. This finding is perhaps
best illustrated by the BART experience, which indicated quite clearly
that "value" has no meaning in the abstract; like the tree that falls
in the empty forest and therefore makes no noise, the land use
impacts of transit occur, by definition, only through the movement
of capital.
The second major qualification to the general finding, and an
important observation in itself, is that the land use game appears to
have a "zero sum" form. To quote the report, "Recent experience
provides no evidence that any rapid transit improvements have led to
net new urban economic or population growth."45 This finding is
consistent with Mudge's observation about land value changes along
the Lindenwold Line,46 as well as Spengler's conclusion in the case
of New York that transit investments are apt only to accelerate existing
development trends, thereby operating to transfer rather than to
increase values.
Other cross-sectional studies have been more quantitative in
nature, attempting to relate the differences in land use patterns among
urban areas to transport and other variables. Most have focused on
residential, rather than commercial land use, so will be mentioned only
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briefly.
Harrison used a series of transportation, household, and urban
characteristics in an effort to relate these factors to residential
growth in 65 cities. His study found that the density of newly built
units increases with city size but decreases with street railway track
miles per capita, lending support for a Warner-like model of streetcar-
motivated low-density suburbanization in early periods of urban
growth. 48 Kain and Fauth reversed Harrison's assumed direction of
causality, using the 1970 Census data to look at how auto ownership
and commuter mode choice of white single-worker households varied across
the largest 125 SMSAs in the United States. Thus, whereas Harrison
focused on how household characteristics, housing stock, and transport
systems affect incremental changes in land use, Kain and Fauth examined
how household characteristics, transport supply, and existing land
uses affect the transport choices of households. The major finding of
the study was the rather unsurprising result that land use patterns
have a significant impact on household transport choices, and mode
split in particular. 49
On the industrial side, two studies are of note, Struyk and James
used cross-sectional data for four cities to perform a time series
examination of changes in manufacturing employment during the 1965
to 1968 period. They found a remarkable degree of mobility among the
corporate population -- slightly over 12% of the firms existing in
1965 relocated during the three-year period -- but little evidence of
transportation effects, apart from some clustering near airports and
highways.50 Hamer used cross-sectional survey data to study manufac-
turing location in Boston (one of the cities covered by Struyk and
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James). He also found a high degree of mobility among manufacturing
firms (nearly 45% of those located in the suburbs reported having
relocated within the past ten years, for example), and identified
the major reasons for relocation as being the needs for more space
and suitable labor. Since revenues and non-land input costs appeared
to be quite insensitive to location within the region, but land costs
varied significantly, he concluded that either substantial changes in
transport or input good prices would be required to eliminate the
preferability of suburban locations for these firms. 5 1
2.3.4 Simulation Studies
Two major simulations will be discussed here; ones which assume
structurally-comparable cities (monocentric with all workers commuting
to the CBD), but emerge with quite different approaches, results, and
conclusions. Other simulations exist which include transport
components -- it could be difficult to construct an urban model which
did not include a transport equation of some sort. However, the two
which will be discussed here speak most directly to the issue at hand,
i.e., how the form of a transport system influences land use patterns
and values.
Mills used a linear programming model (which was originally
developed for the purpose of computing optimal urban size) to test
three aspects of the land-transportation relationship: 1) how optimum
densities of production and housing vary with distance from the center;
2) the optimum level of congestion on the transportation system; and
3) the sensitivity of urban structure to changes in the transportation
system. The major implication of the simulation was that urban
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structure is quite insensitive to changes in transportation costs
and technology. The author then notes three reasons why the model
might, in actuality, be understating transport's structural effects52 __
an issue which is picked up by Rothenberg, who states that the "manifest
insensitivity of the model's spatial allocation to hypothetical changes
in transportation cannot confidently be generalized to real world
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systems". Nonetheless, as Mills points out, the simulation does
suggest that planners and policy-makers should not preclude the
possibility that urban structure is actually quite insensitive to the
parameters of its transportation system.
Using quite a different approach, Andersson developed a model to
determine, for a given population size, demand for residential space
and number of commuting trips per household, the transportation struc-
ture, population distribution and overall city form, subject to the
constraint of minimizing total (housing and transportation) costs.
Transportation costs are assumed to be a function of distance from
line haul service, and from the center. He performs the simulation
first in the case of a pedestrian city, and finds a densely-packed
concentric form to be optimal. When he adds a system of radial bus
routes, the emerging form is quite different -- i.e., a starshaped
configuration of pedestrian-resident blocks between the arms of the
bus routes, which are bordered by various densities of riders. (Fig. 4)
Similar, although less dramatic, results are produced when auto
commuting is considered, the particular configuration being in each
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case a function of the number of radial highways. These results
are hardly surprising, but do provide an interesting image of household
location within the context of a simplified transport system and cost-
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Figure 4
City with 100,000 inhabitants
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minimizing behavior.
2.4 Conclusion
The preceding review has provided an array of postulations and
conclusions regarding the land-transport relationship which are almost
as varied as the methodologies which have been utilized in efforts to
understand this complex and elusive phenomenon. Clearly, no definitive
statement has been made to date regarding the strength, sources, and
direction of this relationship, let alone to affix it with a dollar
value. On the other hand, as inconclusive as they may, in aggregate,
be, the findings of these studies bear out a number of consistencies
in the relationship's effect. Thus, for example, while no monetary
value can be placed upon fixed-rail transit's impact upon the land
market in a praticular case, it is clear that such investments do have
a positive impact on land values. And while it is debatable whether
the effects of a transit investment are significant to the city as a
whole, and fairly clear that they do not result in any net economic
gain, it is equally clear that the corridor-level impacts of a
transport improvement are apt to be substantial. Obviously, more
and better findings are required before we reach the point of being
able to manipulate the land-transport relationship in a consistently
effective manner -- if doing o is, indeed, deemed to be an appropriate
action to be taken by transit and/or economic development planners.
In the meantime, continued attention to the relationship can facilitate
a more integrative approach to transit investment planning while, at
the same time, improving our understanding of the issue and its
pratical implications.
46
The following two chapters will take a more applied approach
to the land-transport relationship -- in essence, to determine how
well the issues raised here have been borne out in practice and in
fact. This will be done firstly through an empirical examination of
business location decisions, and secondly through an analysis of joint
development planning. Only in applications such as these does the use-
fulness of the land-transport concept become truly clear, thereby
providing a general context for evaluation of the sources and prospects
of the finding-firms methodology per se, and as a tool for aiding joint
development efforts.
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CHAPTER THREE
TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING
OF THE BUSINESS LOCATION DECISION
Business location choices affect urban land use and value
patterns in two ways: firstly, through their own consumption of land
and secondly, to the extent that they affect the location decisions of
dependent and supportive activities and infrastructure (housing,
transportation facilities, other business, etc.). It is the second
aspect of the phenonmenon which is of particular interest to planners,
being the source of activities and investment patterns which, in turn,
influence the demand for a wide range of urban services. The conse-
quence is a situation in which private and public individuals,
authorities, and agencies participate in a continuous game of loca-
tional "blind man's bluff", under a constantly evolving set of rules
and power relationships, the characteristics and outcomes of which
define the physical and economic form of the city.
Amid an increasing scale of geographic concern -- from a site, to
a city, to a state, region, or nation -- the significance of the purely
physical aspects of business' locational impact begin to pale. This
tendency is exaggerated even further during periods of economic
hardship and/or upheaval, wherein the short term objective of pros-
perity overwhelms societal concern for the long term distributional
and environmental impacts of private investment decisions. Hence we
now find political entities, at levels of geographic aggregation
ranging from neighborhood to nation, competing for seemingly scarce
private investors, in a contest where survival goes to the solvent.
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The amenities offered are often physical (e.g., endless supply of
water, cheap power), and the inducements fiscal (e.g., tax credits or
breaks). But, in our increasingly urban and industrialized world, the
bottom line is jobs.
Under these circumstances, our ability to understand the motiva-
tions underlying the business location decision, and to draw upon this
understanding to design effective job-creating policies is of paramount
importance. Unfortunately, in practice this problem-solving paradigm
has all but stalled in the first stage. Considerable effort has gone
into the development of theoretical models of location behavior; models
whose abstractness precludes their predictive capacities in any but a
parenthetical manner. Only quite recently has our empirical under-
standing of business location behavior begun to reach a level of
concreteness from which explanatory inferences, and thus policy, can
be confidently drawn.
This chapter will use the empirical evidence to develop a
behavioral model of the business location decision, and of its role in
urban economic development. The chapter will begin by examining the
sources of local employment change, with the expectation that consider-
ations motivating the decision to open, close, expand, contract, or
move a firm are significantly different in character, and thus in
policy implication. With these observations in mind, the factors
influencing location decisions will be examined. This will, in turn,
provide a model of locational behavior and a framework for understand-
ing the microeconomic forces which consitute and underlie the spatial
distribution of economic change.
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3.1. Sources of Net Employment Change.
Recently, the media has paid considerable attention to two
phenomena of industrial change: plant migrations and plant shut-downs.
However, in fact these occurrences only explain one side of the
employment change picture -- the negative one -- and only part of it,
at that. Six characteristics of investment behavior can be identified
which, in aggregate, produce what we observe as being net employment
change. They are: births, deaths, expansions, contractions, in-
migrations and out-migrations of firms. Thus, while the movement of a
corporate headquarters to the 'sunbelt' (e.g. Georgia Pacific from
Portland to Atlanta), or the closing of a factory which is the major
employer in a particular town (e.g., the General Motors plant in
Anderson, Indiana) may make good press, such publicity provides an
incomplete and often-distored view of the forces contributing to econ-
omic growth and decline.
What, then, can be said about the sources of employment change?
What are the relative contributions of the six change components
mentioned above? How do they vary, across cities and industries? And
what does it say about strategies for employment enhancement policies?
How can we, in essence, begin to "introduce a greater degree of
rationality into the processes by which communities and growing
businesses get together?"1
Only one research operation has been successful in accumulating
the data and computive powers necessary to perform, on a nation-wide
basis, the types of tabulations implied by these questions; to wit,
to be able to tract the location decisions and employment growth
patterns of individual firms. Another researcher has been able to
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perform similar computations for the state of California, only, with
results which are quite consistent with the aforementioned.2 Efforts
are also being made to develop the tools necessary to do this type of
analysis in other states and urban areas, as well as for the nations
of Canada and England. Suffice it to say that, at this point, general
knowledge and expertise with respect to this issue are in their
naissance. But as preliminary and incomplete as the results of these
pioneering studies are, they do offer valuable information which, being
contrary to many working assumptions about the processes of economic
change, provide a provocative starting point for the design of new,
more effective, development policies.
What, then, can be said about the sources of employment and
economic growth? We can begin by looking at the relative importance
of the six change components with respect to their contribution to
the net. To begin with, Birch observes that very little employment
change occurs as the product of firm migration. At the national level,
of course, the net effect of domestic movers is nil. Even at the local
level, however, the few firms who migrate account for an insignificant
portion (about 3%, plus or minus) of the local employment change at
either the origin or the destination. In addition, those firms which
do move tend to do so for relatively short distances; rarely do
businesses leave one area, and relocate their operations in a completely
different one.3 This finding is supported by those of Schmenner, who
observes that 80 to 90% of all moves of manufacturers take place with
in the metropolitan area.4
Secondly, he finds that there is very little geographic variation
with respect to overall job loss rates. Noting that about 8% of the
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jobs in an area are lost annually (either through firm shutdowns, or
contractions), he attributes this turbulence to a natural "churning"
in the industrial population. In fact, contrary to conventional wisdom,
areas with higher net growth rates (such as Houston) achieve such amid
higher rates of employment loss than do areas which, in the net, are
faring much less well (such as Worcester and New Haven). 5 Granted,
this loss rate is not completely consistent over time (varying about 1%
in each direction with the business cycle), industry type (higher among
firms in the declining manufacturing sector than among growing service
industries), and firm size (small firms dying at a faster rate than
large firms, but being much less apt to contract).6 All in all, though,
the critical factor in determining aggregate employment growth is not
the rate at which jobs are lost, but the rate at which lost jobs are
replaced. As Birch states:
"The story of net employment growth is thus the story of
where businesses choose to start up new facilities and
expand existing ones. By choosing some places over
others, they cause a redistribution of employment to
take place. The migration is thus one of capital (and
perhaps management skill) rather than one of existing
facilities."
Turning to the particulars of these replacement sources we find
that, unlike loss rates, the positive side of employment change does
vary considerably with location. Thus, "more often than not, the
start-ups and expansions take place in different kinds of places". 8
Some locations are particularly prolific incubators of small new firms
(Raleigh, Indianapolis, Houston, Reno, etc.), while others experience
especially high levels of small business expansions (Memphis, Fort
Wayne, San Antonio, Portland, etc.). There are some exceptions
(Savannah, Nashua/Manchester, Dallas, Phoenix), but in general the
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groups are not the same. That is to say, while a small number of
cities offer conditions which are conducive to rapid employment growth
from both sources (births and expansions), most areas offer an
environment which is unusually hospitable to one of them, at best.9
Similar differences arise when the growth rates of different
industries are compared. We thus find a set of areas (usually rural)
experiencing unusually high levels of manufacturing growth (startups --
rural Memphis, Great Falls, Sacramento; expansions -- rural Billings,
metropolitan Abilene, and Bangor as a whole), others (usually metropol-
itan) experiencing similarly high rates of service growth (startups --
Buffalo, Indianapolis, Detroit; expansions -- Nashua/Manchester,
Raleigh, Billings), and very few which excel in more than one of these
respects (Atlanta and Macon, with services growth from both sources;
Wichita with both service and manufacturing expansions). 10
From these results, Birch develops a dichotomous model of places
that are prone to economic growth, and those places which firms, for
one reason or another avoid. A number of businesses seem to prefer
metropolitan areas and, among them, those with large college populations
that manufacturers are now avoiding the older industrial-revolution
cities within which they once flourished.11  Specifics aside, however,
two major conclusions can be drawn: firstly, that no magic growth
formula will work for every area, hence "...knowing thyself involves
knowing both what your possess that is appreciated and knowing who
appreciates it";l2 and secondly that, thanks to the internationaliza-
tion of the market and the growth of America's service sector, the
future most certainly will not look like the past, thus "...in a far-
flung but closely-knit world economy, the making can go on thousands
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of miles away from the thinking that went into the design of what was
made, and thinking per se can become a very valuable export good upon
which healthy local economies can be built".13
3.2. Overview of the Nature of the Problem.
Given these observations about the sources of net growth and
decline, we can move on to develop a predictive model of business
location behavior. In order to do so, a number of analytical dis-
tinctions must be made.
First and foremost among them is the difference between the intra-
metropolitan versus the inter-metropolitan location decision. The
distinction is important, because the type of growth (birth vs.
expansion vs. migration), and industrial emphasis (domestic vs. export
goods producers) which an inter-metropolitan focus would imply are
quite different from those of its internal counterpart. For example,
an intra-metropolitan emphasis (e.g., Struyk and James) would necessi-
tate consideration ofnew firm births and in-house expansions as contri-
butors to overall change, while an inter-metropolitan study (e.g.,
Birch) would imply concern with firm migrations and expansion through
branching activity. In a sense, both types of location may be relevant
to the finding-firms process, depending on the particular application,
so the following discussion will not be completely limited to one or
the other. The inter-metropolitan business location decision provides
the basic analytical framework for the algorithm, and is thus of
primary importance here. But factors related to intra-metropolitan
location prediction might also arise in cases where locators are being
identified for a particular site, rather than on a city-side basis.
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A second distinction can be made with respect to the firm's
industry type, in particular between manufacturing and non-manufac-
turing firms. As Ingram notes, the heterogeneity of the corporate
population creates analytical problems which are typically solved by
focusing a study on a particular employment sub-sector, such as
manufacturing or retail.14 For a variety of historical and political
reasons, most research and policy efforts have concerned themselves
with the locational decisions of manufacturing firms.
This is true with respect to theoretical , as well as empirical
investigation of the location question. The conventional spatial-
economic model of manufacturing location is thus one whereby businesses
choose a location so as to minimize freight transportation costs,
subject to given raw materials and market locations. Additional
distinctions can be made .between 'weight gaining' and 'weight-losing'*
production processes, thus weighting and relative importance of loca-
tion near the market or the materials. Other considerations, such as
linearity of transport costs and the existence of competition have been
incorporated into models of increasing complexity, ranging from
relatively simple equilibrium and cost-minimization formulas to the
elaborate linear programming solution of the so-called "Transport
Problem" (which models an inter-regional allocation of industries). 15
*'Weight gaining' production processes are those in which the final
product is heavier (or larger, or bulkier) than are the raw materials
from which it is made. Conversely, 'weight losing' processes are those
which produce goods which are lighter or smaller than the materials
from whence they came (e.g., finished lumber). From a locational view-
point, the distinction becomes relevant through the consideration of
the relative transport costs of the raw materials and goods, and thus
the incentives to favor a locations correspondingly.
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Empirical studies of manufacturing location have typically borne
a heavy-industries bias, with variations in focus which can be quite
easily tied to the changing tides of policy concern. Hence, the
decline of textile manufacturing in the New England area and the sub-
sequent growth of the same in the South led to a number of studies on
interregional capital movements in this industry group.16 In the late
sixties and early seventies, concern with the effects of not only
residential, but also industrial suburbanization produced a number of
manufacturing location studies framed within a city-vs. -suburb
dichotomy. Within the current context of an internationalizing
market, industrial location studies have returned to a broadened scale
of geographic emphasis with concentration on te perceived pattern of
pan-national industrial capital flows. 18
On the non-manufacturing side, few studies have dealt with any but
the locational decision of retail trade firms; the locational decisions
of wholesale trade, construction, transport and public utilities, and
service firms having been theoretically relegated to subordinance,
either to that of manufacturing firms (i.e., 'tertiary sector location'
a la Isard) or to technology and geography (i.e., "Central Place'
theory). Attempts to theoretically determine retail location patterns
have conventionally taken a market-area orientation, postulating that
with market share as the ultimate objective the number and distribution
of firms is thus a product of price, distance, and density of consumers.
Defining location in terms of a spatial competition for buyers, they
vary in complexity and spatial configuration from Hotelling's "hot dog
stand" analogy19 (implying central-location agglomeration) to the
honeycomb-like distributions of firms in a hierarchical pattern of
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spatial monopoly which are the outcome of detailed interregional
allocation models which are often oriented towards Developing Countries
applications.20 More recently, with respect to the retail case in
particular, attention has also been paid to the informational aspects
of clustering and the relative importance of transport costs when
they are independent of the consumption of the good (i.e., every
purchase does not require a trip to the car or home). 21
Although the increasing decentralization of retail activity, and
the "de-industrialization" of the American economy have provoked
increasing interest in the issue of retail location, the literature
in this field remains sparse. Studies of this genre typically bear an
intra-metropolitan emphasis, also, with the sum result of only marginal
applicability to the issues being addressed here. Still, the sub-
stantive differences between observed patterns of manufacturing and
retail location behavior do bear implications too significant to be
totally ignored.
Miller's case study of 181 retail clothing stores in the greater
Boston region is not unrepresentative in this respect. He used
telephone listings to identify the existence and location of clothing
retailers in seven major retail centers within the metropolitan area,
in order to develop and test a disaggregate choice model of establish-
ment location. In a test of simple central place theory, he plotted
the relationship between number of stores in a community and the
community's total income. Finding that the regularity of this
relationship was broken in five cases -- i.e., those cities or places
which serve as specialized "shopping centers" -- he developed a
hierarchical model of local vs. regional activity location concentra-
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tion. 22
3.3. Methodological Considerations With Respect to Locational Analysis
With the foregoing distinctions, and the implications thereof in
mind, some mention must be made of the methodologies which have
typically been associated with locational analyses, and the resulting
limitations of their findings. Regarding the theoretical side of the
literature, it can be noted that the vast majority of studies (includ-
ing those cited above) are the product of neo-classical economics and
therefore subject to the weaknesses inherent in that type of analysis.
Most important to the business location case are this approach's
assumptions regarding the rationality and optimalityof the location
choice. Numerous authors (particularly those of the 'behavioral
economics' school) have articulated the flaws in these assumptions, 23
so there is little reason to dwell on the issue here. Suffice it to
say that the "satisficing" nature of empirically-observed location
decisions is fundamentally contrary to the absolutely rational behavior
of theory's ubiquitous "economic man"; that locational decisions are,
in practice, made on the basis of adequacy rather than optimality. To
quote one source,
"... normative models of decision-making and industrial
location may be conclusively rejected as inappropriate.
Instead, the major parameters of the choice of a general
location were found to be 'satisficing' in nature. Firms
appear to avoid risky locations and prefer to find a
site where costs, profits, and continued operations can 24
be guaranteed to broadly conform to prior expectations."24
Similar flaws, though ones of a different sort, are found in the
attitudinal survey techniques most commonly used for empirical investi-
gations of business location. Being quite subtle in origin and pro-
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ducing intuitively attractive results, these studies raise possibili-
ties which are potentially even more problematic than are those which
result from the direct application of theoretical models to develop-
ment policy. The root of the problem here lies in the survey method's
reliance upon the ability and willingness of the respondent to
accurately describe his or her motivations and decision processes.25
In a manner indicative of the common problem of 'psyching' the inter-
viewer, interviewees will often mention reasons for doing things simply
because they are perceived as being the right or rational answer, not
because they are true descriptors of the decision-making process,
thereby often producing self-fulfilling prophecies with respect to
pnstulated theories of cause and effect. By answering this way,
respondents hope (though perhaps unconsciously) to lead the researcher
into the fallacious conclusions that 'rational' decision-makers with
'rational' reasons for site selection thereby imply 'rational' location
decisions, since the former do not want to appear irrational any more
than they wish to appear immoral or uninformed. As Birch notes, taxes
are a good example of this phenomenon. Many business respondents (who
have presumably had some experience in location economics) will mention
property tax differences as a factor in the selection of a site. Yet
most empirical analyses of the importance of property tax differences
have found that they are virtually insignificant inputs into actual
location decisions.26
Problems arise not only from what is said in interviews of this
sort, but also from what is not. Respondents will often neglect to
mention important locational factors, such as the existence of markets
or materials, simply because they are believed to be so obvious as to
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be taken as givens. By the same token, other factors are ignored
because they arise ethical and moral issues which are not comfortably
discussed. The issue of race is a good example. In a survey con-
ducted on over 900 households in three cities, not a single respondent
mentioned race as a factor in their residential location choice; this,
despite the fact that none of these households had (or intended) to
move to a neighborhood whose population was dominated by another racial
group. Race was either so ingrained and implicit that no one through
to mention it (despite over an hour of in-depth interviewing) or --
perhaps more likely -- citing race as a locational determinant was a
taboo that none of the respondents was willing to break, despite its
apparent dominance in the process.27
As this example illustrates, many important factors may (because
of their perceived sensitivity) be omitted by the respondent, while
other less critical factors will (because of their perceived importance
be brought to the fore. The results of this self-censoring-and-
selecting behavior on the part of the interviewee is data which, by
their omission of the most important factors, lead the analyst to
dwell, instead, on subtle differences between unimportant issues and
unrealistic behavior.
As these considerations indicate, the business location issue
necessitates an approach which is both behavioral in nature and micro
in detail. Perhaps most importantly, it must analyze locational
behavior "...in terms of actions rather than through the subject's
interpretation thereof",28 avoiding the simplistic assumption that all
businesses choose their location on the basis of a universally-defined
set of rules. At the same time, the approach must be highly disaggre-
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gate in nature since it is through individual decisions that net
economic change takes place, and only through them that the decision
process of a firm can thus be understood. As Birch states, the firm
location process is a phenomenon which demands that actions be defined
not on the basis of the characteristics of the array of existing
locational choices:29  in short, through what firms do, not through
what they say they do, what theory says that they should do, or what
everyone else does.
3.4. The Location Decision of Individual Firms
Cooper's 1975 study of the location choices of British manufac-
turers provides and appropriate analytical framework from which to
consider the location decision-making process. He identifies this
process as having two conceptually and substantively different compon-
ents: 1) the decision of the firm to consider locational alternatives
to its present site; and 2) the decision to, in fact, locate on a
particular new site. These decisions are based, in turn, on the rela-
tive importance of factors which "push" a firm to leave an existing
site, and those which "pull" it towards a new site. An examination of
the characteristics and policy implications of these factors is there-
fore in order.
3.4.1. 'Push' Factors and the Relocation Decision
As opposed to the presumed rational model of location theory,
experience would indicate that a problem-solving, rather than optimiz-
ing, model of decision-making is more appropriate, in the business
location case. Hence:
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"...the need for the firm to consider locational
alternatives to its present site is found not to
originate in a comprehensive review of the relative
advantages of different locations, but from a recog-
nition of major problems or 'push' factors that 30
cannot be easily solved in its existing premises."
The divergence of actual behavior from theoretical models is
further evidenced by the apparent lack of financial evaluation under-
taken by firms which are considering a locational change. Cooper
finds that decision-makers appear not to consider costs and profits
in relation to the selection of a response or the subsequent search for
sites, saving questions of this nature until the location decision has
been made and its implementation requirements have become obvious,
although larger firms appear to have both the resources and the
motivation to approximate economic rationality.31
Instead of an ongoing, comprehensive strategy for continued
existence on an optimal location, these findings suggest that a picture
of "locational inertia" tempered by environmentally induced "parametric
shocks" (e.g., failure to renew a lease) and personal perceptions of
the firm's performance at its present location is more appropriate.
Hence, we find a situation in which few firms suffer from transport,
market, or supply problems serious enough to disrupt production at any
specific location; greater problems (and thus the decision to relocate)
can be expected to arise from restrictions on expansionary space or
problems in retaining hold of their present site.32
Virtually all of the empirical studies surveyed by Cooper, as well
as those found elsewhere, identify the first problem -- lack of space --
as the critical factor in relocation decision. For example, in a study
of the location decisions of manufacturers in Cincinnati and New
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England, Schmenner found that 80% of the firms which had recently
relocated had done so in order to secure additional sapce.33 Since the
space problem most likely implies relocation through the establishment
of a new branch, whereas the less powerful 'push' factor of space
retainment problems (e.g., termination of lease, public taking of land)
implies a migratory reaction, his conclusions in this respect are quite
consistent with the relative importance of these two change sources
(branching vs. migration), as reported by Birch (see Section 3.1).
This discussion raises a definitional issue with respect to
characterization of the branching decision. Birch refers to new
branches as 'births', because they entail the establishment of a new
operation. Others, such as Cooper, refer to such behavior as 'reloca-
tion' because it implies a migration of capital, if not of physical
plant. It is the latter (i.e., capital movement) aspects of location
which bear sigificance for the firm-identification process. So in
order to emphasize this relationship, to separate capital from physical
migrations, and to differentiate between branch openings and entre-
preneurial start-ups, branch start-ups will be referred to as 'relo-
cations'. Physical movements will be referred to as 'migrations'
and independent start-ups as 'births'.
Given that branching activity is the primary source of firm
relocation, what more can be said about this phenomenon? Figure 5
provides a breakdown of employment gain -- by source, firm ownership
region, and period -- from 1969 to 1976. As these tables indicate,
about half of the total job replacement is due to births, and half to
expansions. It is in the former category where branches make their
biggest contribution, being bested only by the birth rates of
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independent firms. In comparison, the employment gains reaped by
branches through in-house expansions are quite modest. These obser-
vations are supported by Schmenner, who notes that the prevailing
practice of the largest corporations is to establish a number of
branch plants, rather than to expand existing operations.34 Since
Schmenner's study was based on manufacturers, only, the generalizability
of his observation is tempered somewhat by Birch's finding that
branching is more important in the manufacturing sector than it is
elsewhere in the economy.35 Even so, in light of the fact that
branches appear to be playing an increasingly powerful role as a deter-
minant of economic development patterns, the reproduction-vs. -reinvest-
ment paradigm is clealy one of significant, and increasing, policy
importance.
Following establishment of the fact that branching is an economic
phenomenon of considerable importance, the obvious question to ask is:
Where are these new branches being located? Schemenner provides some
initial clues, through his observation that the tendency in branch
location is one of geographic diversification, since it is only in rare
cases that a firm will locate more than one plant in the same city.36
The more general effects of this behavior are again evidenced by
Figure 5, which indicates that disproportionate numbers of branches
(or, more precisely, jobs in branch operations) are being attracted to
the South. This, combined with relatively high levels of employment
expansion in out-of-state branches (in exception to the pattern of
stability noted earlier), implies that definite geographic patterns of
capital flows do exist. In light of the negligible impact of outright
migrations we can therefore conclude, as does Birch, that it is
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Figure 5
Status of Firms vs Employment Gains by Region, 1969-72, 1972-74, 1974-76
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differential branching, not migration, that causes many of the
regional differences in employment growth.37
3.4.2. 'Pull' Factors and Location Choice
In terms of character, 'pull' factors can differentiated from
'push' factors in that the latter are generally products of the firm
and its activities, while the former drive from attributes of the
location site. This is a distinction which bears important analytical
implications with respect to the form of the algorithm.
In'terms of relative importance in the location decision, Cooper
notes that attraction or 'pull' factors appear to be matters of
secondary concern, arising only after the decision to move has actually
been made. In most cases, pull factors serve to enable a firm to
decide between locational alternatives, rather than to promote the
locational change, itself.38 Hence, they represent the stage at which
a conventional 'rational' model of decision-making becomes most
applicable. Deciding between locations is the point of the locational
decision-making process at which a comparison of costs and benefits
may first be taken in a comprehensive manner.39 In comparison to the
problem solving nature of the relocation decision, then, the process of
location selection can better be seen as one of optimization within
constraints.
In a survey of British manufacturers, Cameron and Clark found
that the choice between locations is affected by labor supplies,
accessibility, social factors external to the firm (i.e., 'quality of
life'), the availability of premises, and the amount of local coopera-
tion available. Of these, the overwhelming requirement is for adequate
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supplies of labor, with 80% of their respondents mentioning this
factor.40
The importance of labor's availability, as compared to its costs,
is supported by Birch, who states that what really matters to a firm
is labor's availability and caliber, not its cost. Observing on the
one hand high levels of growth in both high and low wage firms and, on
the other, inconsequential variations in land, transport and capital
costs,41 he concludes that some businesses are, indeed, willing to
pay a higher price in order to gain a better worker.42 Hence, while
various sectors or firms may have different wage structures and defined
levels of acceptable labor cost, on balance the wage differentials
incorporated within them are fairly consistent with the productivity
levels of varying qualities of workers. This implies, in turn, that
the critical link which must be made between a potential developers
and those offering a site for development lies in the achievement of a
match between the quality of the local labor force and the respective
requirements of a particular industry or firm.
That is not to say that other factors, such as transport and land
cost, degree of unionism, tax rates, etc. are of no consequence to the
location decision-maker. Rather, that these factors, being subsidiary
to the labor availability issue, may in general serve a toleranceing,
rather than discriminating, function by defining minimum acceptable
levels within which a firm can make a "satisficing" location decision.
For example, Cooper finds that unless a particular move happens to
exploit a new market or source of raw material, most firms do not
appear to be at all concerned with the incidence of transport costs in
their comparative costings of various sites. 43 Cost considerations
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aside, Mandell found that the existence of minimum levels of access
were of primary concern to potential locators in the Atlanta and
Chicago areas.44 However, the strongest inference which can be drawn
from this latter study being that firms are most concerned with the
factors which are most problematic in their existing site (i.e., push
factors) the role of pull factors,and non-labor ones in particular,
seems most fairly characterized (in the general case) as a filtering
one. So although a specific site may offer an amenity or set of
amenities which is particularly attractive to a certain locator (e.g.,
coal for steel plant), the general role of site-specific pull factors
lies in enabling a firm to choose among an array of acceptable sites
rather than to define a optimal site, the identification and procure-
ment of which then becomes the objective of the locational selection
process.
3.4.3. 'Negative Filters' and Location Avoidance
Beyond the issue of better or worse sites lies that which
distinguishes between locations towards which a firm is attracted, and
those which it avoids. That is to say, there exist sites which are so
completely inappropriate that they are never even brought to consider-
ation in the location selection process. For any particular firm
many, if not most, sites fall into this category. Yet while they may
do so by their omission rather than by their presence, these sites and
the factors defining them therefore play a significant, though often
unrecognized, role in the location decision.
Hence, we can add to our "push/pull" model the concept of a
"negative filter"; a site-related factor, or set of factors which
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differentiate between those places which are, and are not, acceptable
candidates for location. Among the acceptable sites are those which
are more or less optimal, and thus subject to the "pull" factor-based
analysis described above. Using only these attraction factors to
characterize sites, however, ignores the vast majority of locations
which are filtered out even before they reach the stage of conscious
consideration of their relative merits. A firm location model which
did not incorporate avoidance factors into its analysis would thus
omit the basis on which all sites but a few are rejected, by focusing
instead on the reasons why one is chosen. Empirically, the existence
of "negative filters" is illustrated in various ways, although as often
by inference as not. For example, the fact that almost all enter-
preneurial start-ups are located in the same city as the entrepreneur's
residence would, at the basest level, indicate a negative filter based
on proximity to home. On a more general basis, Birch distinguishes
between areas which certain types of firm are attracted to and those
which they avoid. Noting that the characteristics which make a loca-
tion attractive to one type of firm may make it equally unattractive
to others, and that different types of change (i.e., expansions, vs.
births) generall take place in different types of places, he develops
matrices of attraction and repulsion on the basis of firm and location
type.45
3.5. The Role of Public Policy in Determining Location Choice
What conclusions can be drawn from the above discussion, with
respect to the merit and potential for business attraction policies?
The general consensus is that to date, few public policies or programs
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have been successful in achieving their developmental goals, i.e.,
by attracting firms to sites where development is necessary or desired
As one source points out, "There undoubtedly are ways to promote
economic development. The state agencies just haven't been very
creative up to now... "146 Hence, "What we need, and have lacked, is
the ability to focus our incentives on those who will make good use of
them without wasting taxpayers' monies on those who will not". 47 And
most would agree that the "smokestack-chasing" mentality which is
characteristic of current and past governmental prospecting efforts
are of the latter -- i.e., ineffective -- type.
Part of the problem is political in nature. As on observer
notes:
"Politicians love to get their pictures taken doing
good things... It is easier to show up at the
opening of a new branch plant with 100 employees
than it is to visit 100 companies that have each
added one employee -- even though the economic
impact is the same."48
The real problems arise, not from the political mileage which can
be gained from a successful job creation program, however, but from
the incidental and indirect effects of policies which are designed
towards the achievement of that end. Picking on what is perhaps the
worst case of misguided economic development policy to come along in
quite a few years -- whereby the city of Detroit demolished and entire
neighborhood (known as Poletown) in order to create space for parking
lots at a General Motors plant which has yet to materialize -- may not
be very fair. But it does illustrate, through its extremity, the type
of counter-productive outcome to which ill-conceived development
policies can lead.
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The use of tax incentives provides another, less extreme, case in
point. It is fairly common practice for cities and states to offer
property or payroll tax breaks to firms, as an inducement for locating
within them. In reality, however, for most firms taxes constitute a
small percentage of the cost of doing business, with non-federal taxes
constituting a trivial portion of the total tax burden. Even in a
high-tax state, the state tax burden may amount to only one or two
percent of the cost of operation making the benefits of locating in a
low-tax state marginal at best, ceteris paribus. This particularly
true in the case of the type of high-technology company which everyone
seems particularly anxious to attract, due to the high value added to,
and export orientation of, their goods. 49 So although the typical
policy approach is for a city or state to use such incentives to push
firms in their direction, experience would indicate that tax policies
are, in general, ineffective devices for firm attraction; at best,
they can be expected to operate as 'pull' factors with respect to a
particular site, providing a source of locational leverage for the
largest firms and little benefit to anyone else.
Further, when push comes to shove, the usefulness to tax breaks
as bargaining chips may be even less important to the firm than is
the extent to which characteristics such as high taxes are indicative
of other, more important, factors which affect the firm's ability to
do business at a particular location. As Birch points out, the most
rapidly growing areas in the country tend to be those with higher than
average tax rates. This is not to say that there is some intrinsic
value in high taxes per se, but that they may often be indicative of
quality of labor and life of factors which are of greater concern than
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are local tax burdens, to the relocating firm. 50 As long as the high
taxes takes in these areas are reciprocated by high-quality public
services, the price thereof is apparently one that a large number of
firms are more than willing to pay in order to be able to attract and
maintain a high-caliber labor pool. To quote Miles Freidman, the
executive director of the National Association of State Development
Agencies:
"The traditional belief was that a state with high
taxes could not attract business...But that is no
longer true. You can't rule out a high-tax state.
Or a state with expensive labor. States that have
high taxes and high labor costs tend to have more
skilled workforces and higher productivity. What
you have when you look at the incentives and disin-
centives of doing business in a state like that are
a lot of things that tend to cancel each other out.'
Apart from the problems of misguided policy, however, other
sources of difficulty do exist; ones where the major problems lies
in the manner of the policy's implementation. As Schmenner notes,
many of the economic develoment programs advanced to date by state
and local officials have not reached their intended targets simply
because the programs are not marketed well enough. This is parti-
cularly true with respect to smaller firms, which often consider
themselves (or are considered by government officials) to be too in-
significant to merit the attention of city hall or the state house
while government, in turn, has been slow to advertise its capabilities
to the businesscommunity.52 (The new wave of promotional programs,
such as "Make it in Massachusetts" and "Business Loves New York'', which
offer catchy jingles but little substance, notwithstanding.) The
implications of this problem are particularly apparent when we con-
sider the fact that the majority of new jobs are created by firms with
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fewer than twenty employees. 53
The ultimate policy implication to be drawn from these obser-
vations is that little is to be gained by throwing public funds
after firms which are, in the first place, unlikely to move and, in
the second, even more unlikely to be interested in a randomly (or
self-) selected location. At the very least, these facts support an
urban development policy of "tending one's own garden" 54  by concen-
trating efforts on facilitating the birth and expansion of local firms
(since entrepreneurs tend to locate their businesses in the area of
their residence, and smaller companies tend to establish branches
within a few hours of the home plant).
In cases where this is not enough -- when external sources of
investment must be sought -- the ability to develop effective,
accurately -targeted policies becomes essential. As Birch notes,
"Nobody's landing any plants" by casting out side 'nets' in the form
of promotional packages or across-the-borads tax breaks, because
"they're all fishing for whales and whales are practically an extinct
species". 55  In the long run, the difference between growth and
stagnation therefore lies in an area's ability to identify its unique
resources, to identify those industries (or even better, firms) which
have needs consistent with those resources, and to develop workable
policies for getting the two of them together. In the competition
for scarce investors, the victors are determined not by their budgets,
but by their brains.
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CHAPTER FOUR
JOINT DEVELOPMENT: THE PROSPECTS FOR
COORDINATED PUBLIC/PRIVATE INVESTMENT PLANNING
Planners have long recognized the inherently interdependent and
iterative nature of public and private investment decisions. This is
particularly true in the case of transportation planning where, as
Chapter Two indicated, the interplay between transport facilities'
location and technology, on the one had, and land development, on the
other, can be identified as a major determinant of urban spatial
structure. Within this structure, and contributing to it, are the
location decisions of individual firms which are, as Chapter Three
pointed out, influenced by a set of factors which includes the
availability and cost of transportation for their employees, customers,
and products.
Attempts to translate these relationships into a general-purpose
urban development planning methodology have, however, been constrained
by insufficient empirical evidence and limited pratical experience
with respect to the land-transport relationship and its components,
including business location behavior. Over the past twenty years,
considerable progress has been made towards the rectification of this
situation, from which has emerged the concept of joint transit-land
development planning ("joint development"). However, joint development
efforts to date have been only partially successful in overcoming
implementational impediments. It is thus an approach which is still
in the process of evolution, operating under constraints which
originate in the complexity of the relationships which it attempts to
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address and the forces which it seeks to control.
These problems aside, the promise of joint development is
sufficient to warrant continued effort toward perfection of the
approach, and thus toward our ability to manipulate transit investment
so as to influence urban development in a positive manner. This goal
implies not only an increased understanding of institutional barriers
to joint development program implementation, but also an awareness of,
and sensitivity to, the economic factors which are the ultimate
determinants of a project's developmental success. Most analyses of the
joint development concept have focused on the former issue, relegating
the latter to secondary concern treating "the market" as an uncontroll-
able and unpredictable, yet inevitable, element in the development
process. Here, however, the emphasis is on the distributive implica-
tions of public investment, and thus on the economic factors which
determine behaviors such as business location. That is not to say that
political and institutional considerations are not important; only that
they are, in essence, only one side of the joint development coin, and
that failure to recognize this fact will serve only to retard the
formulation of effective joint development policies and plans.
This chapter will begin with a definitional overview of the joint
development concept. It will then proceed to discuss the strengths
and weaknesses of the approach, before examining the techniques and
problems which accompany joint development implementation. It will
conclude with a brief discussion of the timeliness of the joint
development idea, given the political and planning environments of
the day.
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4.1 Sources and Definitions of the Concepts
As Foster notes, perhaps the most interesting aspect of the land-
transportation relationship is the extent to which transport improve-
ments and policies redistribute- income towards owners of land. Joint
development is, in effect, an attempt to predict such redistributions,
and to target them toward socially optimal solutions by maximizing
the public benefit (transport and non-transport) accrued from such
investment. However, the conceptual simplicity of joint development
belies an operational complexity which is fairly well illustrated by
the variety of ways in which the joint development idea has been
defined, implemented, and evaluated.
At its most expansive, the concept is defined as "...a process
of conceiving, designing, and carrying out a combination of urban
development activities in a unified way, to the end that benefits are
greater than if each individual activity were separately planned and
executed. "2 A more specific definition is one which describes joint
development as "real estate development that is closely linked to
public transportation services and stations, and one which relies to
a considerable extent on the market and locational advantages provided
by the transit facility".3 What this definition ignores, however,
are the historical sources of-the joint development concept, the
intent underlying the transport investment decision, and the planning
and implementation techniques which such intentions imply with respect
to encouraging complementary private and public investment. Thus, for
planning purposes, joint development is better defined as "the multiple
use of transportation corridors and stops so as to maximize the
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economic return on public investment and to achieve an improved
environmental relationship between transportation and related land
uses. "A
As the above definition indicates, the effects of and objectives
served by joint development are not limited to -- or even necessarily
dominated by -- physical revitalization alone. For it is the under-
lying economic forces controlling the land market which are ultimately
responsible for the determination and distribution of the non-transport
benefits of a transport investment. Joint development may thus
provide the means for serving multiple public objectives -- from
increasing transit ridership to encouraging private investments in
blighted areas and strengthening city economies, to providing
additional transit financing sources through value capture
5
techniques -- in a manner consistent with prevailing philosophies
regarding the role of transportation planning in modern urban society.
Neither is the concept of joint land-transport development, or
multiple use of transport facility rights-of-way particularly new,
although the terminology used to describe it may be. For example,
enactment of early enabling legislation (Section III, Title 23 of
the Public Roads Act of 1961) led to over 350 requests from 46 states
and the District of Columbia for the permissive joint use of highway
6land for non-highway uses. And although the concept formally
originated within the context of highway investment planning, less
formal applications with respect to transit considerably predate the
automotive alternative. As Warner notes:
"... the wide extent of settlement in the outer residential
area [of Boston] was made possible by the elaboration
of a new street railway transportation system, and a
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parallel extension of city services. Here the course
of building reflected the movement of successive waves
of people out from the center of the city. Here the new
houses and neighborhoods demonstrated the economic
progress of half of Boston's families and their
aspirations for a satisfactory home environment."7
The federal government's formal participation in transit-related
joint development efforts began much later, with the enactment of the
Young Amendment to the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964. This
participation was realized primarily in the form of financial (and
secondarily, through technical) support from the newly-formed Urban
Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA) in conjunction with the
Department of Housing and Urban Development -- a partnership which
continues to represent the federal role in local joint development
activities (i.e., demonstration or Urban Development Action Grants
[UDAG] as financial support, limited technical assistance, a permissive
use of right-of-ways). Subsequent legislation, most notable the Federal
Public Transportation Act of 1978, had the result of expanding the
federal role of promotion and support for joint development planning
and implementation efforts, culminating in President Carter's Urban
Initiatives Program.
The current administration has yet to develop a clear position with
respect to the approach; when asked about current interest in and
attitudes about joint development within the Department of Trans-
portation (DOT), an administrator replied that his response to the
question depends on the day he is asked. But experience would indicate
numerous good reasons for developing a clear federal policy with
respect to the coordination of transportation and urban development
planning efforts, if not regarding joint development, in particular.
78
For although the political and administrative legitimacy of a primary
federal role in urban transit policy and planning may be open to debate,
the importance of transportation investment and policy decisions in
determining the quality of urban life is not. To quote one source:
"The conclusion to be drawn is that it is most important
to try to improve the quality of the transport investment
decision. If these are often seriously wrong, in relation
to their transportation and environmental effects, then
the role of policies and regulations will always be sub-
optimal -- they will simply attempt to make the best of
a long-run disequilibrium situation. Moreover, a city
will probably never be able to afford to reverse these
investment decisions. In a very real sense, it will
have to live with its mistakes." 8
4.2 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Joint Development Approach
The historical contextual shift of joint development from highway
to transit applications led to a corresponding change in planning
emphasis which was consistent with the very different physical qualities
and environmental impacts of the two modes. Thus, joint development
has evolved over the past twenty years from being primarily a means
of minimizing the negative externalities of highway overpasses,
intersections, and bridges (e.g., Phoenix's Papago Freeway, Interstate
Five through Seattle) to being a tool for maximizing the positive
externalities of transit station areas (e.g., Montreal's Place
Bonaventure, Boston's Washington Station). In the most ambitious
programs (e.g., Boston's Southwest Corridor Transit Line relocation),
it has been used for both.
The changing role of joint development is reflected both in the
types of development which have been proposed or undertaken (e.g.,
commercial and residential development vs. parking and outdoor
recreation areas), and in the type of benefit which they are designed
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to achieve (e.g., urban economic revitalization vs. minimizing
environmental disruption). In any case, the basic premise of the
approach is the same: that coordinated decision-making and investment
will lead to more effective and efficient development patterns than
would occur in a laissez faire market.
The idea behind the joint development concept is thus very simple
and commonsensical. At the very least, for example, joint development
could be expected to produce certain types of scale economies, such
as in the construction of commercial space in transit stations.
Considering this, it would be difficult to weigh the theoretical
advantages and disadvantages of joint development and fail to conclude
that the positive impacts of the approach far outweigh the negative.
Hence we find in practice, as Section 4.3 will indicate, negative
impacts of joint development which are sufficiently slight that it is
the inability to fully achieve the theoretical benefits which constitute
the method's major stumbling block.
Issues of implementation aside, however, some costs must be
entered upon the joint development ledger. The major drawbacks of the
method derive from the additional time, and therefore cost, which will
generally be associated with the more integrative approach which joint
development planning implies.
At the same time, experience (and the citation which closed the
preceding section) would warn us that the long-term benefits of a wisely
made transit decision, no matter how heavily discounted, are likely to
far outweigh the costs of short-term precaution. The strength of joint
development, in this respect, was noted over a decade ago:
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"...One of the basic concepts, of course, of joint
development is that the same public dollar will be
made to do double or triple duty. The concept is
that if we engage in joint development of multiple
use we will be able to construct two or three or four
different types of uses together a a lower aggregate
than if we did them individually."
So although the expectation expressed in this reference with
respect to the magnitude of joint development's economic impact may,
in hindsight, seem overly optimistic it is not totally unrealistic.
As this example begins to illustrate, the key words in understanding
the positive impacts of joint development planning are conservation
and cooperation. In short, it is its conservatory nature which is
the source of joint development's primary strength -- i.e., the
possibility of avoiding sub-optimal social outcomes by increasing the
benefit from public and private investment, while simultaneously
lowering the cost -- and its cooperative nature which enables its
conservatory potential to be realized.
Given the apparent inverse relationship between the amount of
public dollars available and the expected impact of each, the real cost
of investing extra time and money in joint development planning can
thus be expected to decrease in parallel with declining public coffers.
Thus, the less money is available, the more necessary integrated
planning approaches, such as joint development becomes:
"Increasingly, joint development is receiving attention
because of its potential as a contributor to urban
economic health and vitality. As the nation enters an
era of limited public resources, it becomes more urgent
that public investments in cities have the greatest
possible beneficial effect.,"10
Our celebration of the benefits of joint development must be
tempered, however, by the previously-cited observation that transport
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investments act to transfer land value increases or investments from
one part of the urban area to another, rather than resulting in net
increases in economic development (see p. 36 ). Upon closer inspection,
though, this observation serves less to diminish the sources of joint
development's economic benefit than to define them. For apart from
the obvious net benefit accruing to a city from 90% federal financing
of transit capital and construction costs, the primary economic benefit
which can probably be expected to result from a joint development
project is the product of the efficiency of the investment pattern
which it promotes -- i.e., the money not wasted in continued investment
in inefficient and/or inappropriate development forms; the future
mistakes not made. To quote Owen:
"The root of the problem is that location decisions are
based on the economic feasibility of individual structr es,
and not on the total costs incurred by the community."
To the extent that market failure is a function of imperfect in-
formation, joint development can avoid such failures by providing the
information and total-cost viewpoint which can facilitate a more optimal
market solution. Joint development is therefore not a replacement for
the free market, as antagonists might argue, but instead a means of
improving upon the efficiency of its operation with respect to urban
investment patterns.
The benefit described above is a fairly subtle concept, both in
nature and in effect. It is thereby one which is -- given present
levels -- nearly impossible to quantify, and which is thus ripe for
political ambivalence (making the current administration's indifference
understandable, if not defensible). Such problems of benefit
quantification are common to most public goods, public transit being
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(if, indeed a public good) the rule, rather than the exception.
On the positive side, however, it is true that public goods share
other characteristics which are applicable to the transit case;
specifically, that their benefits involve society-wide external
consumption effects.12 As the Urban Land Institute points out:
"Both public and private participants can benefit from
joint development. These benefits may include a boost
in the economic development of the community, increased
returns on investment to the developer, greater use of
the transit system, enhancement of urban design, cost
efficiencies in the construction of both private and
public facilities, a limited recovery of transit capital
costs, and the pportunity to manage and control
urban growth."l
It can thus be noted, to joint development's credit, that while the
distribution of its benefits may be as subtle as their sources and
magnitude, the former is much more ubiquitous. In fact, the crux
of the problem of. placing a dollar value on the benefits of joint
development may well lie in the universality of its beneficiaries.
4.3 Joint Development Techniques
It is one thing to determine that joint development is good;
it is quite another matter to determine exactly how good joint
development is done. It is axiomatic that transport and land use
patterns are in large part functions of one another. As Chapter Two
indicated, however, there is little certainty regarding the strength of
their mutual influence relative to the many other environmental forces
which bear upon each, and upon land use in particular. And while there
is increasing consensus that policy makers should consider the land
use consequences of transportation decisions, there is no agreement
with respect to the degree to which they should endeavor to shape
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development that they should consider desirable.14
Putting philosophical considerations aside for the moment, the
success of any joint development program is dependent upon the degree
to which the planning agency is aware of, and responds to, critical
characteristics of the decision-making and investment environment. In
practice, joint development efforts are comprised of two distinct but
15
related activities: 1) policy-making; and 2) deal-making.
Planning and development policy-making encompasses the activities
of the transit authorities, other public agencies, and possible private
entities in preparing for joint development from the beginning stage
of route selection and station location, through the selection of
station designs and entrance points, to the acquisition of land and the
construction of stations and entrances.16 In essence, this is the
coordinating stage of the joint development process. The Urban Land
Institute (a primary proponent of the concept) identifies four factors
which are critical to the success of any joint development effort
within this initial phase: 1) coordination of zoning and land use
planning; 2) station location and access considerations; 3) land
acquisition and transfer policies; and 4) institutional powers and
arrangements.
Looking at these factors individually, we can begin by noting
the obvious importance which the coordination of zoning and land-related
planning efforts have with respect to the success of any joint develop-
ment policy; the BART experience (see p. 36 ) illustrates this point
only too well. On the one hand, increased investment in the vicinity
of stations was perceived by BART planners as one of the desired
outcomes of investment in the transit system, and thus became a factor
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determining the particular configuration of system design and station
location. On the other hand, however, uncoordinated implementation
enabled the residents of at least one area in Oakland to down-zone
land adjacent to the station, thus effectively precluding any
significant development from occuring.1
Tied to zoning and land use considerations are those related
to station location and access, and route alignment. As Witherspoon
notes, transit will be most effective as an economic development tool
when improvements build upon, and are closely linked to existing
economic strengths of the community served.18 Rather than trying to
change the context of an area, a joint development effort should (and
may be able to do more than) build upon the community's existing
economic foundation. In practice, though, transportation planners
and political decision-makers have tended to ignore this consideration,
and have thus chosen least-cost or politically beneficial solutions
in their station and route alignment decisions -- solutions which,
from a total cost/benefit perspective, may be very expensive for a
community's economy. For example, the use of existing highway or
rail rights-of-way for transit arteries is a common practice. But
though this approach can reduce land acquisition costs (in terms of
money and public opposition to takings), it may at the same time
preclude significant station area development because of weak market
conditions (including blighting influences from the initial right-of-
way), or fragmented land ownership. 9 The lesson to be learned here
is thus that the long term benefits of joint development should not be
sacrificed for, or measured against, short term opportunity costs and
returns.
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In the same vein, joint development efforts may be helped or
hindered by particular land acquisition and transfer policies. Zoning
problems aside, joint development effort may still be doomed to failure
if the implementing agency is unable to assemble the necessary parcels
of land. When state eminent domain laws allow, land acquisition
policies can endorse takings beyond rights of way and station sites to
include incremental acquisition for joint development.20 In other
cases, such actions may be illegal or politically infeasible, hence
leaving the joint development process at the mercy of individual
market decisions. Under circumstances such as these, the willingness
of landowners to cooperate with the joint development effort could
easily effects as detrimental to the process as do unconducive
zoning or market conditions.
The ability of planners to overcome these three barriers is, in
large part, a function of the political and administrative environment
of the joint development process. Hence, the arrangement of political
and institutional powers and jurisdictions plays a critical role
throughout the planning, implementation, and management stages of a
joint development effort. Without institutional cooperation and/or
political assent, the coordination of zoning, financing, and legal
powers necessary for joint development cannot be achieved. This
issue is particularly germane to planning efforts within the trans-
portation sector, as a whole, where institutional fragmentation,
interagency hostility inter-modal competition and community distrust
of public officials have hindered previous policy, planning, and
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implementation efforts.
Implicit in this issue are further questions related to the
distribution of political and economic power within an urban planning
setting, and the implications of these factors with respect to the
objectives of the joint development process. It has already been
pointed out that joint development has the potential to serve multiple
objectives. The questions which must be asked at this point, then,
are: whose objectives are they? What do they imply about joint
development efforts?
Perhaps the most obvious flaw in the current body of literature
in the joint development field is its insensitivity to the political
and distributional implications inherent to public investment decisions
of this type. To begin with, planning decisions such as are necessary
for joint development are unquestionably political because they
determine the allocation of scarce public resources and the burden
of payment thereof. Secondly, and most importantly, the common senti-
ment which underlies virtually all joint development literature is
the typically middle class assumption that such development is
inherently and universally good. This assumption is, quite obviously,
very questionable, especially with respect to joint development
*
As evidence of this Meyer cites a 1974 study of the political and
planning processes of 12 North American and European cities which,
conducted urban transportation planning and programming efforts and
concluded that the institutional fragmentation of responsibility and
influence had created a decision-making structure which was un-
responsive to the needs of urban areas.21 Given the high degree of
inter-agency -- not to mention public/private -- coordination necessary
for a joint development project to succeed, this is a condition for
serious consideration.
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policies in lower-class and/or minority neighborhoods. The BART
example previously cited illustrates this point well, because while
BART planners simply assumed that everyone would find station area
development a desirable by-product of the system, the action of the
Oakland residents completely disproved this belief. As Meyer, et. al.
point out, assume that the resident population in the surroundings
of an investment action would benefit first and foremost from that
decision. Alternately, it might be assumed that there has to be
a progressive distribution pattern of benefits over all income groups
for the effect to be a positive one. The distinction is important,
because many revitalization efforts have the consequence of
gentrification -- that is, they improve the urban infrastructure to
the advantage of higher income (usually white) people, who displace
lower income (often minority) families at the same location.22 It is
thus representative of a whole range of distributional consequences
which, whether intended or not, must be explicitly considered in the
design and evaluation of any joint development plan.
Once the public policy has been designed, "deals" must be
struck in order to bring the plans to fruition. This, then, is the
implementation stage of the joint development process, and the one
in which we are most interested. For, plans and architectural models
and value capture financing schemes aside, it is the act of develop-
ment which determines the ultimate outcome of a joint development
effort. And instrumental in this process is the role of the developer;
the locator whose behavior the algorithm attempts to foresee.
At this point, it will be useful to define exactly what is
meant by the term "developer" and, in doing so, to draw a distinction
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between those who prepare a plot of land for occupancy, and those who
do the occupying. In some case, they may be one and the same; in many
they are not. Regardless, the differential objectives of the land-
developer vs. the land-occupant make it necessary to distinguish
between the two in order to design an appropriate and successful
development policy. For example, size provides a good indicator of
which role(s) a firm will be willing and able to fulfill -- larger
firms being more apt to have the resources and particularistic space
demands necessary to assume the developer role -- and which will be
left to the joint development agency. The policy implications of
considerations such as this are fairly obvious: zoning or tax
incentives would probably thus be insufficient to attract small
businesses to a transit station area, while the provision of commercial
space within the station would probably be of little consequence to a
large manufacturer who might be considering location nearby.
In the course of joint development implementation, the public
agency often fills the role of land-developer -- whether out of
necessity or of desire. In instances where this is the case, the
overriding objective is then to identify firms which would be interested
in occupying the site, in the quest for achievement of some defined set
of social objectives (providing jobs or services, subsidizing the cost
of the transit operation, etc.). The implications of this scenario are
clearly different from those of a situation wherein the occupant
assumes the locator role himself (developer as equity holder) or leaves
it to a third party (developer as landlord, speculator, or colonizer --
depending on one's perspective). In any case, the developer/occupant
definition underlies important distinctions and distributional
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consequences with respect to the ability and intent which become factors
in the identification of participants and designation of responsi-
bilities within a joint development process. For as subtle as the
distinction may seem, it is one with significant implications regarding
the objectives and powers embodied in both the public and private ends
of the joint development partnership.
Like the policy-making stage, the deal-making phase of a joint
development process is constrained by numerous factors. Primary among
these constrainst are: 1) the often-conflicting objectives of the
major participants; and 2) site-related factors which influence the
development potential of the site. Together, these constraints
constitute the deal-making environment, and dictate its form in any
particular development effort. They create an environment which
consists, in sum,. of the legal, financial, physical, political and
social constraints faced by developers, permanent lenders, transit
authorities, and other public and private parties which may be involved
in the planning and implementation of a joint development project.
The major site-related factors influencing the joint development
process are: 1) market conditions; 2) land ownership situations; 3)
station access conditions; and 4) other incidental site conditions
(e.g., abutters, soil quality, environmental effect, etc.). The
effects and implications of these considerations are fairly obvious,
given our preceding discussion of the factors influencing business
location decisions, as well as the policy-making aspects of joint
* In this thesis, the term developer will be used to refer to those
who assume the land-improvement function. The terms "occupant" and
"relocator" will be used to designate those who actually locate on a
site.
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development. With regard to their substance and impact, it can be
noted that site-related factors such as these can have either positive
or negative land use effects, that they may be alterable or completely
intransigent. In the case of the algorithm, to extent that they
represent identifiable "pull" factors, characteristics of this type
will be incorporated into the site-specific filters of the firm
selection process (see 5.2 ). In the abstract, however, little more
can be said about these factors than that they exist -- in combinations
which are unique to each development site -- and that, in accordance
with their market influence, they must be taken account of in the
design and implementation of a joint development program.
The second factor which is critical to the deal-making environment
is the interaction between the principal parties which are involved
(formally or informally) in the joint development process. This, again,
raises the types of institutional and political issue which were touched
upon in the preceding discussion, for it is within the deal-making
stage that all of the assumptions, objectives, etc. underlying the
project planning process and predicating the plan's final form are
brought to the test. Ultimately, for a joint development effort to be
successful, it is important that the principal (and latent) participants
in the process be identified and that their objectives be understood.
The essence of dealmaking is to arrive at deals or compromises which
simultaneously satisfy the objectives of all parties.23 Thus,
"The degree of orginality and complexity in joint development
deals depend largely on the environment in which the deals
are made. The more challenging a development environment
for J project, the more intricate the deals will generally
be. "2
Underlying this statement, again, is the implicit assumption that
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joint development is inherently desirable and thus, that a well-planned
joint development process is bound to be successful in the sense of
motivating new investment in the transit corridor. To reiterate, this
assumption may or may not be valid, depending upon the specific
environment of a particular joint development effort. And secondly,
what this approach further ignores is the fact that it is the joint
development planning process which is ultimately that which determines
the success or failure of the develiopment attempt because it is the
output of the policy and deal-making processes (i.e., the joint develop-
ment plan) which must tie together the constraints of the planning and
implementation phases into a salient, workable project.
As mentioned earlier, an important step in this process, and one
which has been all but ignored in the literature, is that of developer
identification. Joint development provides a context within which a
wide range of public-private and public-development-motivating deal
types are possible. But how does the joint developer go about the
business of identifying the organizations, and the people within them,
to whom, incentives can be offered with any reason to believe that
they will produce the desired types and amount of development?
As we know, the major stumbling blocks to successful joint
development planning occur within the implementation, or deal-making
state. Most observers have focused their efforts on the institutional
problems of administration and divergent goal orientation among the
participating parties in a joint development program. But, as the
following quote indicates, the sources of implementational failure
are much more diverse and problematic than we might want to admit and
are certainly not limited to, or necessarily dominated by,
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organizational disharmony:
"...the main problem in the execution of joint develop-
ment appears to be that both the private and public
sectors lack sufficient knowledge of the complexities
of joint development... In short, practitioners are
beginning to realize that joint development is not
an inevitable result of the establishment of transit
facilities. Rather, the successful implementation of
joint development depends upon initiatives taken by
public and private parties who are aware of a wide
variety of techniques, some of whij are only now
being identified and appreciated."q
Table 1 outlines a number of the techniques utilized by joint
developers, in terms of their usefulness in varying market conditions.
They present a wide variety of inducements to the potential developer,
but share one major characteristic -- they are all passive techniques
in the sense that, as many attractions as they may offer, it is still
left to the developer to make the first move towards a deal. The joint
development literature portrays the market, through the actions of
private developers, as an active, self-motivating participant in the
development process. The result, in turn, is a self-selective process
of developer identification which casts the joint developer in a role
which is, at best, passive. Under such circumstances, it is thus hard
to expect results which are anything but sub-optimal: without a means
of identifying potential developers in any but the most general of
senses, joint developers are precluded the possibility of marketing
their assets most effectively. That is not to deny the fact that the
long term perspective of a joint development offers significant
potential for improving the functions of the characteristically short-
sighted land development market, but rather to simply indicate a re-
maining weakness in the approach which offers substantial room for
improvement.
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Appropriate Public Actions in Different MarketSituaton
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User financing X
Public improvements (e.g. Conven-
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Public garages) X X
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The algorithm which will be presented in the following chapters
provides one specific technique for doing so. In more general terms,
if the public developer is to compete successfully against the rest of
the market for commercial investment, she/he must first begin to
recognize, understand, and develop tools for taking advantage of the
critical role which private capital plays in the economy of the city.
The first step in this process is to realize that land develop-
ment -- let along socially beneficial forms thereof (however they be
defined) -- is not the inevitable result of transit investment per se.
As previous discussions have indicated, while it is fairly clear that
transport facilities do influence development patterns, the extent and
causes thereof remain indeterminate. Under such circumstances, the
role of transportation-related.actions in encouraging urban development
is limited. For example, the most significant encouraging action that
can be taken, according to private developers interviewed by one
author, is the provision of parking facilities for new office or retail
space.26 This is hardly an encouraging observation, considering the
types and extent of development which a joint development program might
be expected to produce.
The second, and more challenging step in this process lies in
moving beyond the stage of problem identification to that of problem
rectification. Hence, once the public developer has recognized the
degree to which transit facilities do not influence investment, and
the degree to which other factors do, his/her real challenge lies
in combining this knowledge into a repertoire of techniques for
marketing and selling the joint development concept. One means of
doing so, which is facilitated by the approach's public/private
96
partnership, is to employ the latter's expertise with respect to land
development. Thus, we find "public agencies looking more often to the
private sector's technical and resource capabilities, its understanding
of the real estate development process, and its entrepreneurial
skills."27  A second and more permanent means for resolving this
technical discrepency is for the public agency to develop some of these
self-same skills; not for the purpose of assuming the developer's role,
but as a basis for understanding it and manipulating it to their best
advantage.
Returning to the problem of developer identification, for example,
we find that the basic criteria which determine a developer's invest-
ment decision are risk and return. 28  The public developer (whether
it be a transit agency, or elsewise), on the other hand, operates under
a political mandate which may prescribe an agenda of objectives ranging
from beautification, to equity, to economic revitalization. The
critical skill which is missing from joint, and other economic develop-
ment policy portfolios is thus the ability to tie the often-conflicting
objectives of the public and private participants into a sphere of
mutual concerns, upon which universally beneficial development patterns
can be based. With these recognitions and skills, the joint developer
can begin to play a more comprehensive and aggressive role than is
currently afforded by most transportation bureaus, or by local
governments in general.
Granted, this is a role which many such agencies -- and the people
of whom that are comprised -- may find troublesome. For as Altshuler
points out, the unifying characteristic of most public policy bearing
upon the transportation system has been an orientation towards
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accomodating rather than shaping market trends.29 Joint development,
being a policy of the latter sort, thus implies a fairly significant
change in the strategic orientation of transportation policy; perhaps
moreso in this respect than in terms of day-to-day operations.* As
uncomfortable as the transition may be, however, it is one which may
well be unavoidable if transportation planners are finally to begin to
derive satisfactory solutions to the interdisciplinary range of highly
interrelated urban problems among which transportation issues lie, and
which joint development is an initial attempt to address.
4.4 Joint Development in the Current Political and Professional
Environments
Current economic and political climates are particularly conducive
to the philosophy and effect of joint development planning. Today,
only one thing is missing -- federal funds for the types of transit
capital improvements upon which joint development efforts are anchored.
However, since alternative funding sources do, and will in the future,
exist to varying degrees, the topic is far from moot. For not only
does joint development speak to the increasingly-important issue of
scarce resources; it also incorporates into its design the potential
which private/public partnerships offer as an alternative to financial
and technical reliance upon the federal government. The concept's
relevance is further bolstered by the economy-wide growth of employment
As a recent survey of transit officials indicated, for example, most
participate in land use-related decisions in the course of present
planning practices, although such participation is more likely than
not quite informal in nature,30
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and capital in non-manufacturing sectors of the economy, through the
service and trade sectors' continued greographic concentration in the
high-density downtown areas that transit serves best. Unlike much of
the rest of its legislative inheritance, the joint development concept
would therefore appear to be a policy which offers little to which the
current federal administration could object. A number of substantive
issues with respect to administrative and financial responsibility
and the federal government's role in local decision-making are still
open to debate. In sum, though, the combination of common sense and
resource conservation which underlies the joint development concept
would appear to warrant continued effort and attention towards it --
the costs are low, the potential benefits high, and as the Urban Land
Institute argues, "the time is right" .3
Neither is joint development inconsistent with the philosophy
of "comprehensive, coordinated, and continuous" transportation planning.
Changes within the economic and political environment within which
transportation planning takes place (e.g., oil price fluctuations,
central city revitalization) have, during the past decade, led (at
least temporarily) to escalated levels of transit use and intensified
policy concern regarding urban transport services and their dis-
tributional consequences. Together, these factors provide support for
the joint development approach -- in terms of both philosophy (based
on the fact that it sustains the "3C" planning approach) and intended
results (to the degree that it is a useful means of coordinating of
the constituent elements of urban change into a technique for
ameliorating the problems created by the ebb and flow of private invest-
ment in the city). The corridor-based planning emphasis of which it is
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indicative is, as Meyer et. al. point out, a powerful mechanism for
fostering economic development through its explicit treatment of
transport and development factors. 32
Finally, as was noted earlier, the interdisciplinary mode of
decision-making the problem-solving which the joint development concept
dictates is not one which is totally incongruous with present
practices; joint development simply obliges more explicit and consistent
assumption of the tasks and strategies implied thereby. As such, it
provides a provocative, although far from perfect, alternative to the
haphazard results of non-integrated planning approaches to the problems
which can result from the interactions between access and activity,
and which makes only too clear the structural deficiencies of pre-
vailing urban patterns and development policies.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
OVERVIEW OF THE PROCEDURE,
ITS DATA, AND APPLICATIONS
The preceding chapters have described current approaches to
understanding the land-transportation issue, in terms of both their
"macro" (citywide) and "micro" (individual firm) impacts, as well as
in respect to the concept of joint development planning. In doing so,
they have introduced the empirical and theoretical knowledge upon which
useful applications must be based.
This chapter will, for the time being, put aside theoretical
concerns such as these, in order to present a general overview of the
firm-identification methodology, the objective being to provide the
reader with a basic understanding of the process' form and flow, from
which the method's strengths, weaknesses, and future potential may be
ascertained. The chapter will begin with a brief discussion of the
short history of the approach, in order that the evolutionary nature of
its form, and the improvements thereupon which were enabled by the
second (i.e., present) application of the procedure be understood. This
will be followed by a description of the methodology's basic generic
form. The third and fourth sections will then describe and analyze
the data which the process utilizes, so that the degree to which they
influence the form, limitations, and outputs of the process may be
established.
5.1 A Brief History of the Approach
As prior discussions have indicated, the finding-firms procedure
102
has been used to identify prospective occupants for two locations,
to date. The first application of the process was undertaken in 1976
as part of the Southwest Corridor Orange Line Transit Relocation
project in Boston. At this time, an initial, relatively rudimentary
version of the procedure was developed as part of an effort to identify
potential developers for a marginally attractive urban renewal site
coterminous to a new transit facility.
The second case in which the methodology was used was initiated in
June of 1981, as part of an economic development effort on the part of
the city of Indianapolis. The version of the procedure which was
developed for this application was quite different from the first, in
terms of its focus, its substance, and its form. The first of these
differences is perhaps the most obvious, but certainly the most in-
consequential, since a major advantage of the method is its ability
to be adapted to a wide range of applications. This quality leads, in
turn and be necessity, to substantive differences in the particular
actions and decisions of which the procedure is, in the most detailed
sense and in each case, comprised.
More important, however, are the refinements and additions to the
procedure's form which a second implementation allowed. In particular,
the analytical capability of the second version of the procedure is far
superior to that embodied in its initial form. Specifically, these
improvements consisted of incorporation into the methodology of a
number of new tasks and analyses, as well as the explicit separation
of the processes by which site- and firm-related location criteria
are identified. These additions and refinements were, in turn, enabled
by an improved understanding of business growth and location behavior
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which research conducted since 1976 had, in the interim, provided.
Chapter Six will render a more detailed discussion of the con-
textual differences between the Southwest Corridor and Indianapolis
applications of the procedure, as well as a detailed description of the
tasks of which it was, in that latter case, comprised. From an
analytical, as well as a practical viewpoint, however, it is much more
important that the "how" and "why" of the differences between the two
versions of the procedure be clearly understood, than it is that the
reader have a complete grasp of the substance of the process in
particular applications. That is to say, the firm-identification
approach taken by the finding-firms procedure provides a dynamic, and
still-evolving tool for development planning: by definition, its
computational structure and content will be redefined, to a certain
degree, with each application, while still retaining a consistency
of approach and general form which makes it a uniquely structured
methodology. The following sections will address this claim, through
an introduction to the procedure's basic generic form.
5.2 Basic Structure and Intent of the Procedure
The purpose of the procedure is to identify individual firms
which have the greatest chance of being interested in locating in a
particular community, or on a particular site. Its approach is based on
two primary premises: 1) that the unique combination of characteristics
offered by a praticular site or city is conducive to the location and
growth of particular types of firms; and 2) that particular
businesses -- those with growth trajectories which indicate imminent
expansion or relocation -- are likely to be looking for development
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sites at any given point in time. In short, not all industries, and
not all firms within a given industry, are equally attracted to a
particular site. The key, then, lies in identifying individual
firms which are in both the "right" industries, and the "right" condition
to be considering relocation, at the "right" time.
For a diagram of the basic form of the procedure, the reader is
again referred to Figure 1 (page 9 ). As this figure indicated, the
firm identification process consists of three basic steps: 1) identi-
fication of critical locational/growth factors; 2) identification of
industries/firms which compare favorably with these factors; and
3) operationalization of the- preceding steps (I and II) into the firm-
selection algorithm. The first two steps are thus analytical in
nature: their tasks are to identify the factors which influence
locational decisions and patterns with respect to a particular city or
site, and to use these factors to define the types of business which
have an apparently high probability of locating in the given area.
The third step (III) is, in contrast, purely mechanical in nature.
For it is the point at which the analytical findings of Steps I and II
are used to construct a series of filtering programs which then perform
the actual task of identifying individual high-potential firms.
With this general overview of the purpose and design of the
procedure in mind, we can begin to look at the process in somewhat
greater detail. Turning to Figure 6, we see firstly that Steps I
and II of the procedure consist of two parallel sets of operations:
A) those which identify critical locational factors, and favorably
comparable industries; and B) those which identify critical growth
factors, and favorably comparable types of firm. The rationale under-
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lying this bilateral approach to location prediction becomes quite
clear when we refer back to the behavioral model presented in Chapter
Three. Hence, the objective of the first -- i.e., site related -- of
the twin flows (Path A) is to identify and define the "pull" factors
which determine the attractiveness (or, conversely, the "negative
filters" which determine the repulsion) of the location to firms within
particular industrial sectors. Complementarily, the objective of the
second -- i.e., firm-related -- flow (Path B) is to identify and define
"push" factors, in order to develop reliable indicators of individual
firms' relocational potential.
The convergence of the "push" and "pull" factors and firm types
occurs in Step I where they are incorporated into the firm selection
process. Step III is also composed of two major tasks, but for reasons
and in a structure quite different from those underlying Steps I and II
In brief, the purpose of this step (3) is not to identify two groups of
moderate-potential firms (one group being likely to be interested in the
location, and the other being likely to open a new branch), but to
blend these two groups into a hybrid selection of high-potential,
growing and site-compatible firms. The results is thus a two-stage
filtering process which selects firms in terms of their characteristics
and growth performance in two periods (1974-76 and 1976-82) through
sequentially, rather than simultaneously, performed tasks.
The flows, modules, and tasks outlines above are further broken
down into hierarchical series' of manual and computational operations
of increasing specificity and detai-1. Chapter Six will describe and
analyze the form that these operations, and the firm-finding process
as a whole, took in the Indianapolis case, as an example of the
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possibilities and problems which are raised by an actual application.
Leaving such specifics aside for the time being, it will be useful at
this point to present a more detailed description of the procedure's
general structure and flow. This approach -- one by which the process
is explored in a gradually more detailed and specific manner -- is
aimed at making the interrelations between the various actions, and
between the actions and their theoretical and empirical bases more
obvious to those who are unfamiliar with it, without obscuring the
sources and implications of each. At the same time, presenting a
farily specific explanation of the process's structure at this point
provides the reader with an understanding of it which is sufficient for
consideration of its application (proven and potential) and data
requirements, and for precursory evaluations of the appropriateness of
each, in Sections 5.3 and 5.4.
5.2.1 Identification and Definition of Site-related "Pull"
Factors (Path A)
In terms of their general structure, the two analytical portions
of the firm identification process (Paths A and B) are quite similar.
That is to say, they both begin by determining critical location-
related factors (Step IA with respect to sites and Step IB with
respect to firms), and conclude by using these factors to develop a
profile of high-potential types of firm (defined, in Step IIA by
industry group, and in Step IIB by firm characteristics). Beyond this
general similarity, however, the two paths of anlaysis and their
products assume very different-forms, ones which are consistent with
their quite separate, though complementary, roles in the definition of
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high-potential firms.
Of the two paths, that which focuses on identifying site-related
factors (Path Al is the most computationally involved. Being, by
definition, a direct function of the location in question, it is also
the less generalizable of the two. That is to say, the combination of
factors which is determined to influence the decision to locate in a
particular place will quite likely be different from that affecting the
decision to locate elsewhere. For example, it may become obvious that
a certain environmental factor (e.g., the availability of limitless
fresh water, or dustless air, or sun) has an overwhelming influence on
locational decisions with respect to a particular site, while fiscal
(e.g., property or business tax rates), capital (e.g., the existence of
an appropriate building or equipment), market (e.g., distance to, or
density of consumers of the product), resource (e.g., raw materials,
energy), transportation (e.g., accessibility with respect to freight
and/or passenger movement), or labor (e.g., quality, price and supply
or degree of unionism) concerns may be paramount in others.
Chapter Three discussed empirical and theoretical approaches to
understanding the relationships between such factors as these and the
locational decision of the firm. The objective of this module, in
turn, is to take this knowledge and to use it to determine the
characteristics of the project site which are most likely to play an
influential role in attracting business to the location, and which can
thus be used to identify industry groups which are likely to be
interested in this particular place-; As Chapter Six will indicate in
greater detail, the two existing applications of the procedure both
focused on the labor aspect of the location decision, but with different
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points of emphasis. In the prior (i.e., Southwest Corridor) case the
issues of race and accessibility were deemed to be of greatest
importance. The version of the algorithm developed there thus
evaluated the locational "pull" of the site in terms of the demographic
characteristics of the labor pool ("person types") at various distances
from the site ("commuter rings"). The present (i.e., Indianapolis)
application, in contrast, focused on the distribution of labor
characteristics at a city-wide level, ultimately identifying two very
different trends in demographic and economic growth.
The so-called "critical factors" can be identified either
inferentially (through empirical tests) or politically -- or through a
combination of both -- depending on the agenda of the client and the
availability of data. From an academic viewpoint, the empirically-
based method is to be preferred. But experience would indicate that
some sensitivity to the political concerns and intents of the client
is also a necessity, and that the eventual solution is usually a
compromise combination of the two.
Once the critical location factors have been determined (Step IA),
these factors are utilized in Step IIA to identify the types of firm
which can be considered to be high-potential candidates to occupy all
or part of the project location. This step thus produces a set of
industry (5.I.C.)* codes (output IA) which are used in Step III to set
Standard Industrial Classification (S.I.C.) code. This is a set of
standardized definitions, identified by numbers of up to four digits,
which are used to categorize businesses in terms of their productive
functions. At the single digit level, the definitions are quite
inspecific, defining general sectors such as "manufacturing" and
"trade"; increasing specificity is achieved through second, third, and
fourth level refinements of definition. For example, S.I.C. code 4
represents the transportation and public utilities sector, 42 is
trucking, and 4231 refers to trucking terminal facilities.
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location-related criteria in the firm-selection filters. In the
Indianapolis case, for example, tabulations were performed in Step IA
to determine employment growth by industrial sector in the city, and
in places "like" it. In Step IIA, these tabulations were juxtaposed
with comparisons of industrial hiring patterns and characteristics of
the local labor pool. The result was a ranking of industry types in
terms of the similarity between their labor demands and Indianapolis'
labor supply, from which desirable prospects could be selected on
the basis of their apparent appropriateness for the location in question.
5.2.2 Identification and Definition of Firm-Related "Push"
Factors (Path B
The firm-focused module, like the site-related one, consists of
two steps, i.e., identification of critical factors (IB) and in-
corporation of them into criteria for identifying high-potential
locators (IIB). The objectives of this analysis is to identify the
factors which provide the impetus for a relocation decision; its
focus thus lies on the characteristics of a particular firm, rather
than on the generic characteristics of its industry group as a whole.
As the preceding chapters have indicated only too well, the
locational decision-making process at its most extreme level of dis-
aggregation -- that of the individual firm -- is inherently complex,
qui.ckly made, and may ultimately rely on no more than a .personal
preference of the chief decision-maker. The task of the firm-related
analysis is thus to take what we know of the "rational" or predictable
aspects of the relocation decision, add in any factors which may be
particularly relevant for a particular case (e.g., the fact that small
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businesses start-ups in Indianapolis exceed the national average), and
mold them into a predictive model of decision-making from which a
profile of the high-potential relocator may be derived. The operational
definition of the archetypical firm, as incorporated into the filters,
may include variables such as business size, geographic location of
the headquarters or branches, number of new branches opened recently,
etc.
The basic assumption underlying this analysis is that the future
behavior of individual firms can be predicted on the basis of past
experience. The approach which has been taken in this module, as
conceptualized to date, is very extrapolative in nature; i.e., it
assumes that firms which have shown consistent growth patterns of a
desirable type are likely to continue such behavior in the present
and near future, and are thus likely candidates for relocation. This
is obviously a very simplistic assumption with respect to firm health
and behavior, and one which could well be improved upon in the future.
In fact, since one of the major findings of Birch and MacCracken was
that the firms most likely to expand in a given period are those
which had contracted in the preceding period, one could foresee the
incorporation of a sinosodal, rather than extrapolative, growth model
into this part of the analysis (although the problems one could be
expected to encounter, in trying to convince a client that the most
attractive firms are those that have been declining, raise logistical
and political issues regarding this more radical -- though perhaps
more realistic -- approach).
Assumptions related to the shape of growth tragectories aside, this
module defines its high-potential expansionary firms by asking three
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basic questions: which firms are the most dynamic job creators? Which
firms are the most dynamic locators? And which firms are likely .to
have an interest in doing either of these things in the general
geographic area of the project site? The answers to these questions are
used to select firm-identification criteria, based on the following
premises: 1) that firms with rapid employment growth will have
expanding space needs; 2) that the decision to open a new branch bears
implications which are very different from that to merely expand an
existing facility; 3) that plant migrations play a negligible role in
regional investment patterns; but 4) that regional patterns and pre-
ferences do, to a measurable extent, exist and influence locational
behavior. The result is thus a list of criteria (output 1B) which can
then be incorporated into the filters (Step III), setting standards
for firm performance and growth potential in preceeding periods and
thereby separating prospective relocators from the less attractive
bulk of the business.
5.2.3 Setting Criteria into Filtering and Sorting Programs
The final two modules of the procedure (Steps III-1 and 111-2)
put the findings of the prior modules into operation, through the
construction and application of the filtering algorithm. Whereas
earlier phases of the process were anlaytical in nature, these modules
produce the actual results -- they identify the firms. In the
Indianapolis case, two sets of filters were used -- one for the 1974-6
period (111-1), and a 1976-82 update (111-2) -- primarily because
of the existence and costs of various forms and amounts of data (See
Sections 5.4 and 5.5). As the Dun and Bradstreet files are made more
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current, one set of filters may, alone, be deemed sufficient (as was
the case in the Southwest Corridor version). In practice, through, the
issue of whether one or two (or three or four) filtering programs is
used to select the firms is analytically unimportant -- the only
factors which the number of filters affect are the time and cost
involved in implementing the procedure. For whatever their number,
the filters ultimately do one essential thing, and one thing only --
they select firms. And they do it on the basis of the location and
growth criteria developed in preceeding stages of the analysis.
The final output of the filters, then, is a list of unique
numbers ("Dun Numbers") which are used to identify the data records of
particular firms (Output 2). The name, address and chief executive
officer of the company, along with any additional sectoral, size,
geographic, or sales information which may be of use, are then provided
to the client for incorporation into its development efforts. The final
product consists, in short, of an extremely detailed and data-rich
list of firms which have a high probability of expanding in the near
future, and very good reasons to be interested in the project site.
As such, it gives the client an unprecedented level of detail and
degree of confidence with which to approach potential locators: it
enables him, in a sense, to pick the needles out of the haystack, and
to do so at a reasonable cost.
The procedure bespeaks, through its ability to access and analyze
extremely disaggregate (i.e., firm-level) data, a wide range of
potential applications. For example, it can be used to identify firms
for geographic areas ranging from census tracts to states, for
purposes ranging from joint development to job creation. Its order
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can also be shifted so that it identifies sites for developers, rather
than vice versa. The firm-identification approach has the potential
to do all of this, and for one very simple reason; through its
ability to manipulate highly disaggregate data, it begins to put the
market into the marketer's hands.
5.3 Data Requirements and Descriptions
The quality of a conclusion cannot surpass the quality of the
information upon which it relies. Before considering the detailed
substance of the firm-finding procedure, an examination an evaluation
of its data demands is therefore both useful and necessary. Figure 7
illustrates the sources and incidences of the process's data require-
ments. One observation is initially obvious: the demands are sub-
stantial. Not only does the algorithm require several data sets (or,
more precisely, several versions of two primary data sources); the
files which it utilizes are extremely disaggregate and, as a result,
usually very large. The details of how the procedure manages these
data from a computational standpoint will be set forth at a later
stage; our primary interests at this point are in their availability
and quality.
As noted earlier, the method relies primarily upon two data
sources: 1) the 1970 Census; and 2) the Dun and Bradstreet Duns Market
Indicators (DMI) file. The former, household-level, data are used to
determine employment, travel, and similar types of behavior, along
with demographic characteristics of the local population. The latter
is used for tabulations of individual firm behavior. Each of these
two major files enters the filtering process in the form of extract
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filters which have been edited for particular uses. The Census file
appears primarily in the form of a regional extract of the Fourth
Count 5% Public Use Sample. The Dun and Bradstreet data is utilized
in a wider variety of forms, most notably the 1969-76 Region file
(an extract of the U.S. file), the 1974-76 Headquarters/Branch
"Squashed Hierarchy" file, and an update file which is created from
raw 1982 D.M.I. records for the firms passing the initial filters. A
hybrid of data from both sources appears in the form of the 1970
"Property" file. In accordance to their unique uses, these files offer
a diverse selection of data and computational properties; individual
review of them are thus in order.
5.3.1 The 5% Public Use Census File
We can begin with an examination of the Census extract, a subset
of the 1970 5% Public Use Sample file, which is used in the industry-
identification phase of the firm-identification process. The file is
used to compute standardized distributions of the labor pool by
specified characteristics (defined as "person types"), and to tabulate
sectoral employment patterns in order to determine the appropriateness
of particular industries with respect to the composition of the local
labor force. That is to say, these are the primary uses to which these
data have been put in the two prior applications of the procedure:
however, this source offers a range of information sufficient to
approach the business location issue from numerous other angles. For
example, data on car ownership and commuting time could be used for
an approach which focused heavily on worker access considerations (as
the Southwest Corridor case did, to a certain extent), while income,
117
occupational and other socioeconomic information could be used for a
market-area approach.
The source file is, itself, an extract of the national 1/100
Public Use Sample; one in which selected fields from the household
record and the person record have been merged into a single record for
each respondent. Containing over 2 million individual records, the
national file is a random sample of 1% of the U.S. population in 1970.
More specifically, it is a 20% sample of a randomly selected 5% of the
total population, who were asked a series of special questions in
addition to the basic census queries. In provides detailed socio-
economic, geographic, and demographic data on. the respondents, for a
total of 56 variables. For the Indianapolis application, a special
subset of this file was created containing only the records of Mid-
western respondents (416,500 records); in the Southwest Corridor case,
a New England subset of the file (108,610 records) was used.
5.3.2 The Dun and Bradstreet Files
As the above discussion indicates, the Census files offer a wide
variety of household data, implying an equally diverse range of
approaches in determining factors which influence the locational
decisions of particular industries. But since the real power of the
methodology lies in its ability to single out for analysis the behavior
of individual businesses, it is natural that it is the firm-level
data which most directly affects the structure and output of the
algorithm. A clear comprehension of the substance and format of the Dun
and Bradstreet data is thus c cial to one's ability to understand and
evaluate the procedure's processes and products.
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The raw Dun and Bradstreet D.M.I. file provides extraordinarily
detailed data including the employment and sales sizes, geographic
location, age, industry type, and corporate affiliation for individual
firms, in both the U.S. and abroad. Its conception and primary uses
have long laid within the private sector; the file is commonly used by
investors to determine the credit-worthiness of potential clients,
and by market analysts to identify potential customers. More
recently, researchers have discovered the wealth of information which
this massive file (which covers over 80% of all formal, private-
sector firms in the U.S.) offers for microeconomic analysis. But it
is the size of the file which creates both its problems and its powers;
thus, few have been able to overcome the barriers of cost and manage-
ment which are inevitably associated with any attempt to use it for
large-scale (i.e., nationwide) economic research.
A group of researchers at the Program on Neighborhood and Regional
Change at M.I.T. have succeeded in overcoming these barriers,
however, and in doing so have created a version of the file which is
both extensive and relatively easy and inexpensive to use. In order to
do this, data covering the years 1969, 1972, 1974 and 1976 (about 12
million records on over 120 reels of magnetic tape) were reduced into
a relatively compact set (9 reels of tape). The records for individual
firms (identified by unique "Duns Numbers") for each of the four years
were merged into single records to permit analysis of changes in the
status of each of the 5.6 million firms which existed on the file at
some point during the 1969-76 period. The edited U.S. files thus
offer not only the year-specific data derived directly from the raw
D.M.I. file, but also several new "change" variables which were
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computed and added to the file as part of the merging process. 2
Three main subsets of this file are used in the finding-firms
process: 1) an extract of the U.S. merged file for selected metro-
politan areas; 2) a regional extract of the U.S. merged file; and 3)
the 1974-76 Headquarters/Branch "Squashed Hierarchy" file. In
addition, raw 1982 D.M.I. data on selected firms is acquired from Dun
and Bradstreet for the computation of updated performance measures.
A fourth subset file, an extract of the original 1976 D.M.I. files, is
used to retrieve alphabetic data (such as names and addresses of
firms) which have been deleted from the merged U.S. file.
The metropolitan-area extract file was created in order to do
tabulations of employment change in Indianapolis and comparable areas
as part of the industry-identification analysis. It is a subset of
the U.S. file and includes data for all firms which were located either
in Indianapolis, or in a set of comparable cities (21, in all) at any
time during the 1969-76 period. It contains complete merged records
for nearly 500,000 (497,258) firms, including D.M.I. geographic
indicators, employment and sales measurements, S.I.C. code and corporate
affiliation as well as the special employment and status change
variables. The regional files, which are also used to do background
tabulations for the industry-selection process, contain similar data,
considering the nation in terms of five geographic regions. The
North Central file was thus used in the Indianapolis case, while the
New England file (a subset of the Northeast region file) was used in
the Southwest Corridor application.
The 1974-76 Headquarter/Branch "Squashed Hierarchy" file is
employed in the filtering modules of the algorithm. It is an extract
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of the 1969-76 U.S. file which has been specially edited for use in
analysis of firm behavior by corporate affiliation. This particular
version contains data for all headquarters and branches which existed
in the U.S. file during the 1974-76 period. Individual firm records
have been sorted and organized into hierarchical "families" of branches
("children") and headquarters ("family heads"). Each record in the
file contains not only firm-specific data, but also a set of specially
computed variables which provide information about the behavior of other
members of the family, and the corporate family as a whole.
Specifically, it provides five types of data regarding an establishment
and its family: 1) information about the individual establishment
(age, geographic location, employment, etc.); 2) information about the
headquarters of the family; 3) information tying the individual
establishment to its family (e.g., status); 4) information describing
the individual establishment's contribution to the family's change
during the period; and 5) aggregate information about the family
(number of members and employees in each year, number of establishments
gained or lost by source of change, etc.). This file thus provides
a powerful tool for looking not only at the behavior and performance
of an individual firm, but a means of tying its actions, together with
those of its "relatives", into a picture of the investment and location
decisions of a corporate whole.
5.3. 3 The 1970 Migration Area Property File
The so-called "property" file is used in an early phase of the
industry location module to identify cities/sites which have
characteristics similar to those of the project site, in order to do
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comparative analyses of employment and investment trends. As
mentioned previously, this file is a hybrid of sorts, containing data
from several sources: the 1970 Fourth Count Census of Population
Summary file; the 1960 County Components file; County Business
Patterns, the Social Security Continuous Work History Sample, the
1956, 1967, and 1972 City and County Databooks; and 1972 and 1974
Dun and Bradstreet D.M.I. files; and the U.S. Census Bureau's 1975
"County Population Estimates". It contains a large number of variables
(135) which outline pertinent characteristics of 317 "migration
areas". 3 As per the sources from which they were derived, each
record contains a majority of 1970 data, in combination with lesser
amounts of information with respect to earlier and later years. Each
record thus presents a fairly detailed profile of the physical, social,
economic, and fiscal characteristics of a particular settlement area.
5.4 Evaluation of the Data
In order to evaluate the quality of the files used in the firm-
identification procedure, we must return our attention to the two
primary sources of data -- the 1/100 Public Use Sample (Fourth Count),
and the Dun and Bradstreet U.S. merged file. For, apart from any
random editing or recording errors which may have entered the extract
files in the process of their"creation, any errors within these data
may be assumed to be consistent with those in the original files.
Just as the natures of the data differ, however, so do the natures
of their problems. The particular weaknesses of each data source will
thus be examined in turn, and before we consider the more general
issues of timeliness and availability.
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5.4.1 The U.S. Census of Population Files
Since the Census Public Use Files are so commonly employed as a
data base for social science research, errors in their content and
problems associated with their use have been documented extensively.
The primary sources of error within these data are of four types:
1) sampling; 2) misrepresentation; 3) non-reporting; and 4) clerical.
The Census Bureau provides detailed descriptions of the sampling
method used and resulting degrees of error, by variable and by size of
sample, in its technical documentation and the reader is referred
there for particulars of the issue.4  For our purposes, it is
sufficient to note that the variables used in the algorithm are among
those which are least prone to sampling distortion. Further, the
1/100 file contains the largest sample available to the general user.
Since the proportion of total error which is attributable to sampling
discrepencies is an inverse function of sample size, this source of
error can therefore be considered to be at its practical minimum.
Other errors in the data can be attributed to the reporting
techniques used: respondents are formally obliged to return their
census forms, but by a law which has not been enforced for over a
hundred years (thus, leading to non-reporting errors); they have even
less obligation to tell the truth (misrepresentation). The issue of
whether these two collection-based problems result in random or
systematic patterns of error (and therefore, the steps that can be
taken to rectify them) remains open to political and statistical
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debate. What is important, for our purposes, is to note that they do
exist.
Finally, we can consider the issue of clerical error, and again
conclude with little more than an acknowledgement of its existence.
Scrutinous editing and logical testing of the data have been used to
minimize this potential source of trouble. But as long as interviewers
and keypunch operators exist, so will the possibilities of random
clerical error.
5.4.2 The Dun and Bradstreet Merged Files
The Dun and Bradstreet file provides a remarkable degree of
coverage, and highly detailed disaggregate data on firm characteristics
and behavior. But how good a file is it?
Problems associated with using this file for economic analysis are
also quite well documented.5 The first issue which can be raised is
that of the quality of the data. With respect to this problem, it
can be noted that the Dun and Bradstreet Corporation has strong built-
in incentives to insure that the information contained in its file
is accurate, for it can be -- and frequently is -- sued if the
information is wrong. The data are collected by a full-time staff of
1700 reporters assisted by 500 part-time employees (in comparison to
the Census Bureau, which employs most of its workers sporadically), and
*
Although observations such as: that income is overreported, on
the average, by $3,000 and that two-thirds of the people who migrate
within the country never report it to the Census Bureau;6 and that
significantly lower percentages of Hispanic and Black residents receive
(let alone return) their forms would imply some degree of predict-
ability in collection error patterns.
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are updated on monthly and semi-annual bases (depending on the
particular data field). In addition, to help minimize its legal
vulnerability, the Dun and Bradstreet Corporation has established an
extensive centralized quality-control system to monitor the reports
filed by their reporters prior to entering the data into the file.
Extensive logical testing is also done at M.I.T. when the raw
records are received as a final measure of quality control. The result
is thus a file which, if used properly, is one of the more accurate
and extensive in use for economic reaearch.
The potential for improper use of the file does exist, however,
primarily because it was simply never intended to be a census of the
corporate population, nor a tool for economic analysis. Difficulties
which the researcher must therefore be aware of when using the file
fall into five general categories: 1) coverage; 2) biases *inherent
in the reporting system; 3) misrepresentation; 4) geocoding below the
county level; and 5) clerical error.
The coverage problem is perhaps the most important, and has
several component issues. To begin with, the user must be aware that
the file makes no pretense of covering all businesses, although it
does in actuality make reports on an extremely high percentage (>80%)
of all formal, legitimate operations in the U.S. Thus, "What is re-
markable is that the file is as large as it is, not that it is
incomplete." Apart from overall coverage, it must also be noted that
certain patterns of underreporting do exist. For example, coverage in
the trade, service, transportation and utilities sectors has
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historically been much poorer than that in manufacturing, although
Dun and Bradstreet is placing increased emphasis on expanding coverage
in these areas. At the extreme, coverage of establishments in the
governmental S.I.C. range (9000's) has been (and remains) so poor that
the researcher is wise to ignore firms in this sector when doing
industry-specific tabulations.
To test the file's coverage of Indianapolis, tables were
generated -- one each for firms and for employment in 1974, by size
class and 2-digit S.I.C. code -- and compared to figures for Marion
County in the 1975 County Business Patterns. The total counts for
firms and jobs were, in this case, remarkably accurate; overall,
the Dun and Bradstreet data ran about 2% low, and as such represented
about 85% of total employment in the SMSA,(313,000 vs. 320,000).
At the level of specific industries, the file's coverage of manufact-
uring was equal or superior to that of County Business Patterns (CBP)
at the 2-digit level of industrial aggregation, but tended towards
expected levels of underreporting in the trade, service, and finance
sectors. Since these patterns were consistent with previous obser-
vations about the reliability of the data, and at the same time offer
the greatest accurcay in the city's historically dominant industry
The file's coverage of manufacturers is exceptionally good, and often
exceeds that of governmental business censuses, such as County Business
Patterns (CBP). Page 6 of D. Birch, Using the Dun and Bradstreet
Data... provides sample coverage comparisons for these two data sources.
**
Marion County is the central county of Indianapolis, housing about
71% of the SMSA's population and 87% of its jobs.
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group (manufacturing), it was felt that the file showed no troublesome
deviations which might hamper its use in the Indianapolis case.
Two final coverage issues are those of size and items reported.
With respect to the former, it can be noted that the file's coverage
of smaller firms is quite high (contrary to what many might believe),
probably because these businesses generally pose such high credit risks.
In terms of data coverage, the user should be aware that systematic
weaknesses in the file do exist. The data which are most likely
to be absent from a particular record are those of a financial nature:
sales estimates are available for only about 80% of firms (thus, any
filter using a sales criteria would drop about 20% of all firms from
consideration, simply because the data were not available); net worth
estimates are sufficiently infrequent and unreliable that they have
been dropped from the file altogether.
Bias problems in the file are of two basic types: under-reporting
of new firms, and intervals between reporting measurements. The first
creates problems in identifying the births of new firms, and is
particularly troublesome for any attempt to identify the births of new
branches (see next paragraph). To compensate for this weakness,
special calibration algorithms must be used to impute firm births,
using a variety of variables and tests. Without any such adjustment,
30-60% of all births may not be captured, leading to employment
estimates which are similarly inaccurate. The second problem, that
*
One exception was S.I.C. #43 (U.S. Mail), which is just for the
process of being added to the file. The tests indicated inconsistencies
in the records within this sector, and the decision was made to delete
it from further tabulations.
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of the time interval between measurements, has the result of under-
reporting the births and deaths of short-lived firms. Fortunately,
this problem is of minimal consequence for the uses to which the data
is put by the algorithm.
Of much greater consequence, however, are the problems presented
by branches, since the pattern of branch openings is an important
measure of the locational preferences of a particular firm. Branches,
in general, present particular problems for the user of these data.
Since the accounting and financial functions of corporations are
typically centralized in the headquarter establishement, the Dun
and Bradstreet file variously omits certain variables from branch
records, lags in capturing records of new openings, and generally
understates them in terms of both number and employment. (See next
page) Conscientious attempts have been made, of late, to rectify this
situation, but it is still one which presents significant difficulties
for the unwary user.
Just as in the case of the Census files, respondent misrepre-
sentation poses problems for the Dun and Bradstreet data user. However,
in this case a powerful incentive -- i.e., the possibility of legal
recourse -- for truthful disclosure does exist, and can be expected to
help minimize fraudulent reporting. Unfortunately, there is virtually
no practical way of measuring the patterns or degree of misrepre-
sentation which are present in these data. One attempt to check
*
For example, the record of one of Indianapolis' largest firms had to
be corrected when we discovered that it had credited the entire
company's employment to the headquarter.
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coverage found an extraordinary degree of correspondence between what
is in the record and what can be found by an on-site review. But the
test sample was far too small (40-50 firms) to draw any statistically
valid conclusions about the data's reliability in this respect.8
The two final problem sources, clerical error and incongruities
in geocoding warrant only passinq mention. Since present versions of
the algorithm make no effort to identify business location below the
county level, the geocoding problem is of little concern. It must be
noted, however, that this characteristic of the file could become more
important in the case of an application of the algorithm to a single
site, rather than a city. And finally, we must again confront the
problem of clerical errors. The issues and impacts of this error
source are basically the same for the Dun and Bradstreet file as for
the Census Public Use data although the margin of error is, in the
former case, potentially larger. Specifically, the coding system used
by Dun and Bradstreet to record employment and sales data is such that
a single-place error in the first digit (say, entering a three instead
of a two) would result in an error to the power of ten. However,
conscientious efforts have again been made, through a series of
logical tests and improvement of data input procedures, to lower the
probability that any such errors succeed in entering the merged files.
5.4.3 Timeliness and Availability
Particulars of these files aside, two major data-related issues
still confront an attempt to implement the algorithm: timeliness and
availability of the data. The preceding sections have discussed
various factors which affect the reliability of the data; the issue
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of timeliness speaks to the question of its validity, and is a function
of availability. In short, the data are not as up-to-date as we would
like them to be. Their age thus presents validity problems, but
ones which are more or less correctable depending upon the timing and
geographic concentration of a particular attempt to identify firms.
Existing versions of the Dun and Bradstreet data to which we
have access, are at least 5 1/2 years old for any particular record.
Under more ideal circumstances, more recent data would be incorporated
directly into the Dun and Bradstreet merged file and thus be available
for use by the algorithm. In the absence of such, however, the use
of a second filter on 1982 data for a selection of firms provides a
satisfactory, although more time-consuming and less cost-effective,
means of temporarily updating this file to meet the demands of a
specific application.
Problems of a potentially more significant nature are posed by
the obsolescence of the Census file, especially in cases where demo-
graphic changes in the city/site over the past ten years have been
drastic (e.g., "Sunbelt" cities, which have had rapid influxes of
population; travel behavior which is sensitive to gasoline prices).
Pending availability of the 1980 Census (now scheduled for next fall at
the earliest), more recent data, acquired from other sources, can
be used to update the 1970 Census data in the labor profile phase of
the procedure. Unfortunately, such data are often either unavailable
or unreliable at the lower levels of geographic disaggregation (i.e.,
city or county), leaving the researcher with little choice but to rely,
in the meantime, on a combination of old data and common sense in the
selection of site-appropriate industries (Path A).
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5.4.4 Final Evaluation of Data Issues and Implications
It is virtually impossible to affix a numerical value to the
"margin of error" which is implicit in the output of the firm-
identification procedure. This is true, not only because it is quite
often difficult to estimate how inaccurate the data are (since none
better exist, in many cases), but also because of the site-specific
character of the procedure. That is to say, the flexibility inherent
in the process's firm suggests, by way of the particular choice and
chronological incorporation of variables in a specific version of the
procedure, an error variance which precludes generalized assignment
of value. The multiple permutations of the procedure's form, in
essence, belie a complementary combination of error possibilities.
Although quantification of the data's effor impacts is not
possible at this time, their general effect can, at this point,
be ascertained. Since the tabulations which are the most rigorous,
and the most critical to the process's output, are those which are
performed upon the Dun and Bradstreet data, it is this data source
which is the most potentially problematic.
The characteristics of this data set which are most relevant to
these concerns relate to its coverage: 1) of non-manfacturing sectors;
and 2) of branch firms. The most troublesome type of error which can
be expected to result from the procedure's extensive use of this data
is thus one of omission; of being unable to identify certain high-
growth firms, either because they don't exist on the file, or because
their branching behavior cannot be clearly tracked. A fairly complex
algorithm is undertaken in order to overcome the problem of new branch
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identification. But nothing can be done about a firm which has, for
one reason or another, been excluded from the file altogether. To
reiterate, however, the objective of the finding-firms procedure is
not to identify every "perfect match" occupant for the location in
question. Rather, its goal is to identify, and eliminate from
consideration, those firms which are apparently inappropriate for,
or not in need of the special resources of the target location,
thereby producing a list of some -- but by no means all -- high-
potential prospects. What makes the procedure notable is not the fact
that it will fail to identify all of the "hot" prospects for a
particular location, but rather that it can identify any such locators,
at all.
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CHAPTER SIX:
FINDING FIRMS FOR INDIANAPOLIS
The previous chapters have provided a framework within which we
can now examine the substance of the finding-firms procedure, through
its application in the Indianapolis case. Through this example, not
only will the detailed form of the method become more clear; so too
will the problems associated with its use, whether they be a product
of the data, the assumptions, or the theory upon which the process'
structure and function are based. At the same time, this discussion
will make more obvious the procedure's flexibility, and hence the
potential which it offers for different contexts and types of appli-
cation. An examination of this most recent and advanced version of the
process will thus provide us with the final pieces of information
which are necessary in order to proceed with an overall evaluation of
themethod and its merits, particularly with respect to joint development
planning.
This chapter will begin with an introduction to the Indianapolis
application. It will then proceed to take the reader through the firm-
identification methodology in a sequential manner, via a discussion of
the discrete actions and outputs of which it was, in this case, com-
prised. It will begin with the presentation and analysis of the tasks
involved in the industry-selection process (Path A), and the results
thereof. It will then discuss the rationale underlying the selection
of firm-based criteria (Path B), and the high-potential locator's
profile which it produced. The filters, themselves, will then be
examined, along with samples of their output. Finally, some general
134
observations will be made regarding the process of implementing the
procedure, and the implications of such with respect to its future form
and uses. A number of political and philosophical issues underlying
the objectives and assumptions implicit within it -- many of which
became particularly evident during the course of the Indianapolis
experience -- will be discussed by way of illustration.
6.1. The Contexts of the Procedure's Applications.
As prior discussions have indicated, the finding-firms process has
been applied in two instances, to date. The first application, in which
the procedure was originally developed in 1976, was part of the South-
west Corridor Orange Line Relocation project in Boston.1  Under the
auspices of a local community development corporation, a group at the
M.I.T. Program on Neighborhood and Regional Change was given the task
of identifying potential tenants for a large parcel of land in Boston's
South End. This parcel had been marked and cleared as part of an
earlier urban renewal effort, but attempts to find occupants for it
had failed. When the decision was made to relocate one of the city's
rail rapid transit lines in a railroad right-of-way (which had been
previously cleared for the construction of a now-cancelled interstate
highway) quite near the parcel, it was formally slated for development
into the "Crosstown Industrial Park" as part of the Southwest Corridor
Joint Development Project.
One of the major goals of the. industrial park development was to
provide employment for some of the area's many economically-disadvantaged
residents (most of whom were black or Hispanic) by bringing much-needed
investment into this physically and economically blighted area.
135
Potential locators in the service and manufacturing sectors were
identified through the algorithm, and contacted by the local community
development corporation. While several indicated interest in developing
portions of the site, one of the companies (Digital) decided to construct
a plant which would require the parcel in its entirety. Today, the
plant is in operation, and employs several hundred local workers. And
although it is hard to claim that the algorithm was solely responsible
for this successful outcome,. it is probably safe to say that it did
succeed in identifying several potential candidates for location on
a marginally desirable site, one of whom eventually did locate there.
The second implementation of the procedure was undertaken in 1981
as part of an economic development effort on the part of the city of
Indianapolis. Indianapolis is a relatively typical example of a middle-
aged, middle-sized, manufacturing-oriented Midwestern city, in terms
of its characteristics as well as its problems. Preliminary tabulations
indicated slight increases in total employment in the city in recent
years, despite decreases in manufacturing employment in both absolute
terms and as a percentcf the metropolitan total.
As Figures 8 and 9 indicate-in greater detail, the slack created
by the industrial sector's decline has been more than filled by
employment gains in the service and trade sectors. Thus, for a
number of reasons -- e.g., the fact that the city's largest employer
(Lilly Pharmaceuticals) is still economically sound, and that the
city has been an above-average generator of small businesses,
especially in the service sector2-- it has not fared as badly as some
of its neighbors. On the other hand, it is also quite apparent
136
Figure 8
THE CHANGING JOB MIX IN INDIANAPOLIS
~SERVICE
SMANUFACTURING
ZZTRADE
TRANSPORTATION & UTILITIES
CONSTRUCT ION
550 -
500
450
400
350
300
0
m:mw
200
150
100-
50- 5.5 .0%
7.6% 6.8%
0
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
137
Figure 9
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this situation could easily change; i.e., that it could quickly
become worse (e.g., Lilly's current tendency to invest outside of
Indianapolis could turn to one of divesting from its home city altogether),
that it could always be better and that, for better or worse, it is
undeniably changing. As part of an overall development strategy, then,
the city became interested in identifying potential locators. It was
through this application that the firm-identification procedure was
expanded and refined into its current form.
6.2. Identification of Site-Compatible Industries.
Figure 10 presents a flow chart of the industry-identification
process developed for the Indianapolis application. As can be seen,
it consists of two primary paths (IA-1 and IA-2) which identify
high-growth and labor-compatible industry groups, respectively. The
lists of industries which these two processes independently produce
are then compared, in Step IIA, and merged into a selection of industry
types which appear to be the highest-potential candidates for location
on the site. Each of these processes will now be examined.
6.2,1 Analysis of High-Growth Industries in Indianapolis and
Comparable Areas.
The general objective of this analysis was to develop an under-
standing of the forces and trends in employment and economic change
in Indianapolis, and in comparable places, in order to target the
city's firm attraction efforts toward those industry groups which
show the highest potential for continued economic vitality and employ-
ment creation in that location. Historically, Indianapolis' employment
has been concentrated in manufacturing, and in the production of heavy,
Figure 10 139
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durable goods in particular (the major exception to this rule being the
pharmaceutical industry, as Eli Lilly Co. is the city's largest single
employer). The city's "specialty", for example, is thought to lie
in the production offabricated metals products.
Clearly, however, the long-term prospects for these industries --
in America's post-industrial economy, and in an internationalizing
world market -- and for the economic vitality of a city whose employ-
ment base is maintained by them, are not particularly promising.
Given this context, the primary goal of the growth-industry analysis
was thus to determine in which directions Indianapolis' economy might
best be led,
Detailed tabulations of employment growth in Indianapolis in
the most recent period available (1974-76) were undertaken with two
goals in mind: 1) to develop a general understanding of the strengths
and weaknesses (i,e., sources of growth and decline) with the Indianapolis
economy as a whole*; and 2) to identify specific high-growth industries
for use as a filtering criterion. Two tables were generated, each
categorizing firms in terms of employment size and two-digit S.I.C.
code**, from an extract of the 1969-76 Dun and Bradstreet U.S. file
(See Appendix A). This first table (Table A-1) tabulates percent net
change in employment over the period, thus indicating rates of growth
and decline; the second (Table A-2) counts absolute employment gain and
loss, thereby providing an indicator of the significance of the net
changes, in terms of actual jobs gained and lost.
*Thereby also producing site-specific economic growth data which
could be incorporated into the firm-selection analysis of Path B, also.
**Several S.I.C. groups were even further aggregated, due to the
paucity of firms within them.
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These tables reflect a number of important trends in Indianapolis'
economic and employment growth. To begin with, it is clear that small
firms (those with twenty or fewer employees) dominated the job genera-
tion process in Indianapolis during this period. Large firms (those
with over 500 employees) created jobs at about the citywide average
(thus still managing to show positive employment growth), while medium-
sized firms declined overall. In terms of absolute employment, this
translates into small firms accounting for nearly 71% of all net new
jobs, or a total or nearly 6000, versus 2450 for larger firms. These
findings are quite consistent with Birch's observations about the job-
creating role of small firms in the U.S. as a whole 3, and would appear
to be particularly notable in light of the fact that the period under
study (1974-76) was a recessionary one (see page for further dis-
cussion of this latter issue).
Looking in greater detail at the sources of these general patterns
of change, we find that small firms were active (albeit both positively
and negatively) in virtually every industry sector, while large firms
concentrated their growth/decline in selected industries. In addition,
the rate of change evidenced by large firms was not only sporadic, but
also much more variable than that evidenced by their smaller counter-
parts. Those large businesses which showed any change at all were
generally big winners or big losers, with about an equal change of
either being the case. This type of 'pulsating' pattern of growth and
decline is again consistent with earlier findings with respect to econo-
mic change in the U.S. as a whole.4
With respect to industry breakdowns, the general pattern indicated
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by the data was one of decline in the manufacturing, mining, and con-
struction sectors counterbalanced by strong growth in agriculture,
finance, and services. Mixed records were evidenced in trade, and
transportation and utilities, An important exception to the general
decline of manufacturing in the city lay in the strong growth of small
firms in the durable manufacturing sectors (S.I.C.s 29 through 39,
specifically), Fabricated metals (S.I.C. #34), with additional growth
among its large firms, showed a particularly strong rate of expansion.
This latter pattern -- one typified by a resurgence among small
manufacturers amid the sector's overall decline -- is one which is also
occurring nationally. As such, it may be interpreted as a sign that
manufacturing per se is not doomed -- in Indianapolis, or in the U.S.
as a whole -- but rather that the future of this sector lies in new
directions and markets which are now being developed and exploited not
by our corporate giants, but by small, more flexible and innovative
firms.5
The above analysis provides a fairly good indication of the
internal strengths and weaknesses of Indianapolis' economy. However,
it does not supply any indication of the city's performance relative
to external events. The firm attraction game is not played in isolation;
cities compete against each other for scarce investors and job creators.
At the same time, as Chapter Three indicated, different types of firms
tend to flourish in different types of places, and the key to successful
development policies lies in matching them correctly (see page 52). In
light of these considerations, the next stage of this analysis was
designed to provide us with an understanding of how Indianapolis is
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faring relative to its competitors, and more specifically how it
compares to areas which attract the same types of firms, and therefore,
growth.
In an earlier analysis, Birch developed an algorithm for identifying
"like" types of places -- ones which tend to follow similar patterns of
economic growth.6 A slightly modified version of this algorithm was
used, in this case, to identify a group of cities whose critical
characteristics most closely resemble those of Indianapolis. The
tabulationsof employment change performed for Indianapolis were then
replicated for this group, in order to identify the former's relative
strengths and weaknesses as well as its potential as a job-creator.
The cities were defined in terms of five variables which were
previously found to group areas in a logical manner. They are:
1) metropolitan vs. rural (defined in terms of percent rural population);
2) degree of remoteness (number of people within 400 miles); 3) age/
growth rate (in 1970, percent housing stock built since 1960); 4) industry
mix (percent 1970 jobs in manufacturing); and 5) skill level of labor
force (percent 1970 workforce classified as laborers). The sorting
algorithm used in this case differed from the original one in that the
age/growth criterion was refined from two categories (above- and below-
average performance) into three (old/slow, medium, and young/fast).
Indianapolis was thus defined as a metropolitan, non-remote, medium-aged,
manufacturing, skilled-labor city.
Besides Indianapolis, twenty areas (of a possible total of 317)
fell into this category, for a total of twenty-one cities "like" and
including Indianapolis. Looking at the list (Figure 11), we find that it
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Figure 11
21 Cities Like (and Including) Indianapolis
Nashua/ Manchester, NH
New Haven/New London, CT
Rochester, NY
Baltimore, MD
Roanoke, VA
Bristol, VA/TN
Louisville, KY
Indianapolis, IN
Muncie, IN
Fort Wayne, IN
Cincinnati, OH
Dayton, OH
Parkersburg, WV/ Marietta, OH
Saginaw, MI
Lansing, MI
Davenport, IL
Rockford, IL
Green Bay, WI
Kansas City, KS/MO
St. Louis, MO
Beaumont, TX
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is an interestingly diverse mixture dominated -- not illogically -- by
middle-aged, middle-sized, Midwestern cities. The Indianapolis tabula-
tions were then replicated for this group in order to a) isolate
Indianapolis' relative strengths and weaknesses as a job creator; and
b) to identify industries which might do well in Indianapolis in the
future, even if they are not doing so now, In addition, these tables
(by virtue of their much larger sample size) provided a check against
any statistical aberrations which might be present in the Indianapolis
sample.
The general patterns which were observed in the Indianapolis tables
are supported by the data in this second set of employment change tables
(see Tables A-3 and A-4 in Appendix A). These results are also consis-
tent with previous findings about job creation and the evolving form of
the American economy in general, as well as with preliminary observations
with respect to Indianapolis' performance in that respect. To wit,
Indianapolis' overall growth rate was somewhat lower than the norm for
the 21 cities (1% low), But, with a few minor modifications and excep-
tions, the overall sources of growth and decline were, in both cases,
basically the same, thereby providing support for both the validity of
the grouping algorithm, and the reliability of the Indianapolis data.
Looking at the results in greater detail, we can initially observe
that Indianapolis' proportion of small firm job creation (which was
previously pointed out as being a major source of the city's growth) was
higher than the average for the 21 cities (8.4% vs. 7.2%). This finding
is particularly interesting in light of the fact that the 21-city sample
included a number of other cities with above-average records in this
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respect (Nashua, NH; Roanoke, VA; and Cincinnati, OH).8 In the Indiana-
polis case, this trend may well be attributable to the city's small
business start-up rate, which exceeds the national average , and which
is especially remarkable given the relative geenral hardship suffered
by small firms in the tight money market of the 1974-76 recession.10*
On the other hand, Indianapolis' absolute decline in medium-sized indus-
tries and low growth rate in large firms compare unfavorably with the
21-city averages, The inference to be drawn from these findings is thus
that Indianapolis is a good place to get started, but a less favorable
environment for continued upward growth. This characteristic 6f Indian-
apolis' economy is also reflected in its unusually low rate of manufac-
turing expansion -- an important liability for a manufacturing-
oriented city.
On the more positive side, the inability of existing firms to
flourish may be no more than a sign of Indianapolis' changing economic
character, as comparison with other data would seem to indicate. For
example, the impressive growth of the city's service and financial sec-
tors produced over 14,000 net net jobs in only two years**, and is
consistent with its above-average rate of service start-ups and expansions. 12
*The mixed record of the trades, especially the retail sector, might
be attributable to the recession's effect on consumer expenditures, also.
To test for any temporal or environmental economic biases in these tabu-
lations, they were also duplicated for the 1972-76 period; 1972-74 being
an expansionary period, and thus counterbalancing the recession which
followed it. These tables, which are presented in Appendix A, do show
some interesting divergences from the 1974-76 tabulations -- stronger
growth in medium-sized (21-100 employees) firms, healthier trade, trans-
portation and utilities, and manufacturing sectors. In general, however,
the two sets of tables exhibit the same general trends, and thus indicate
that no major problems will be encountered as the result of analytical
reliance upon a 'non-normal' (i.e., recessionary) period.
**When one considers Dun and Bradstreet's tendency to underreport
employment in these sectors, the significance of this statistic becomes
even more apparent.
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And strong growth among small manufacturers may, as previously pointed
out, be indicative of corresponding adjustments in Indianapolis' more
traditional employment sector; of movement, not necessarily away from
manufacturing altogether, but towards new and different types of manufac-
turing, instead,
These findings, in sum, suggested that the industry-selection filters
of the procedure should concentrate on identifying firms in the service
and finance sectors. They also indicated that there might be merit in
including some aspects of agriculture, as well as manufacturing indus-
tries which posted strong growth among small firms, in our list of
promising industries. The final selection would, of course, depend upon
how narrowly we wished to define the filter, and what types of criteria
we could foresee using for the final process of industry selection
(e.g,, a size cutoff that would eliminate small firms). Pending such
refinements in the criteria, the following industry groups were selected
for consideration: 7 (Agriculture), 29-39 (Durable Manufacturing),
60-67 (Finance and Real Estate), 70 (Hotels and other Lodging), and
73-89 (Other Services).
6,2.2. Labor Compatibility Analysis.
The purpose of this analysis was to identify industry groups
whose labor demands are compatible with Indianapolis' indigenous supply.
Referring back to Chapter Three, we found that the overwhelming majority
of firms indicated that the availability of suitable labor was the
primary determining factor in their choice of locations.. The tabulations
which were undertaken in this phase of the process were thus designed to
answer the following three questions: What kind of labor skills does the
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Indianapolis population possess? What industries hire what kind of labor?
And, who would be likely to hire the types of worker which Indianapolis
has to offer?
An extract of the 1970 Census Public Use 5% Sample File was used
to generate tables showing the demographic composition of private sector
employment by industry (Table A-7, Appendix A). The demographic variable
was defined in terms of twelve "person types" which represent the cate-
gories of a three-by-four age-by-education matrix (Figure 12 describes
this variable in further detail),
Age and education were chosen to define the person type categories,
based on the belief that they would serve as the best indicators of
the characteristics of the city's labor force, by serving as proxies for
factors such as experience, skill, and occupation, Other definitions
of person types could easily be used, of course, just as a market area
or access-based matching process could replace, or be combined with, this
one based solely on labor compatibility. For example, race, which was
considered to be an important factor in defining the labor pools avail-
able to the Southwest Corridor site and therefore used in that analysis,
was considered to be a relatively unimportant aspect of hiring practices
in Indianapolis,
For consistency and analytical comparability of the industrial
classification systems, the Census Industrial Classification Code was
recategorized so as to conform to two-digit S.I.C. codes. This resulted
in reduction of the industry variable from 222 to a more manageable 69
categories*, In anticipation of finding an insufficient sample size
*A key to the Census and S.IC. coding systems is presented as
Appendix B.
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Figure 12
Person Type Definitions
Type Description Matrix Postion
(Age/Ed.)
1 20-24/<HS 1,1
2 20-24/HS Grad 1,2
3 20-24/ College 1,3
4 20-24/College + 1,4
5 25-34/<HS 2,1
6 25-34/ HS Grad 2,2
7 25-34/- College 2,3
8 25-34/ College + 2,4
9 35-64/<HS 3,1
10 35-64/ HS Grad 3,2
11 35-64/ College 3,3
12 35-64/ College + 3,4
<HS = Up to 3 years of high school completed
HS Grad = High School Graduate
College = 1-3 years of college completed
College + = At least college graduate
150
for the detailed person type-by-industry matrix, using only Indianapolis
records, the same table was also generated for a sample of Midwestern
SMSAs (including Indianapolis). The expectation with respect to the
insufficiency of the Indianapolis sample size proved to be true, suggest-
ing that the use of the larger sample would avoid resultant sampling
effors, and as such would indeed provide a more appropriate basis for
analysis. At the same time, enlargement of the sample appeared not to
result in any bias problems: subsequent comparison of the rankings pro-
duced for the Indianapolis and Midwestern-sample labor match distribu-
tions -- discounting in the former case for industries in which over half
of the cells were empty -- yielded very similar results, indicating that
the larger sample was quite representative of the Indianapolis case.
In the absence of sufficient data to tabulate the Indianapolis labor
force's actual person type distribution, a standardization process was
used to simulate these data.13 Age and education counts were supplied
by the client, derived from the most recently available data sources.
These marginal (i.e., single dimensional) distributions were used to
"balloon" a sample person type (i.e., two dimensional, age by education)
distribution, tabulated from the 5% Census Public Use File (Figure 13)
up to existing population levels, with a maximum likelihood/minimum
distortion result. The result was an estimated age-by-education matrix
which, in turn, enabled calculation of the city's person type distribu-
tion (see Figure 14),
To determine the labor compatibility of industry groups, the
patterns of industrial employment were then compared to Indianapolis'
person type distribution to find the "best fits" between business'
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Figure 13
TABLE - LA OR PROFILE - AGE BY EDUCATION - INDY SMSA
ROW PER CENTS
EDUCATN
AGE >HS HS GRAD >COLLEGE COLLEGE+ TOTALS
20-24 5.8 14.5 42.1 37.6 1259 0
25-34 8.5 17.7 44.3 29.5 2057 0
35-64 19.2 22.5 38 1 20.2 5005.0
65+ 54 2 15 3 17.6 13.0 1458 0
TOTALS 20.4 19.4 36.9 23 3 9779 0
TABLE - LABOR PROFILE - AGE BY EDUCATION - MARION CO.
ROW PER CENTS
EDUCATN
AGE >HS HS GRAD >COLLEGE COLLEGE+ TOTALS
20-24 4.6 15 3 42.6 37.5 582 0
25-34 8.1 19.0 37.7 35.2 1004.0
35-64 18.7 22.1 35.9 23.2 2588 0
65+ 51.0 15.5 19.9 13.6 678.0
TOTALS 19.3 19.7 34.9 26.1 4852 0
TABLE - LABOR PROFILE - AGE BY EDUCATION - OlHER COS.
ROW PER CENTS
EDUCATN
AGE >HS HS GRAD >COLLEGE COLLEGE+ IOTALS
20-24 11 0 18.2 45.9 24 9 209 0
25-34 7.4 16.5 51.2 24.9 430.0
35-64 16.6 22.6 44.0 16.8 970 0
65+ 50.4 18.1 18.5 13.0 270.0
TOTALS-18.7-20-1-42.2 -1-----------
TOTALS 18.7 20 1 42.2 19.0 1879 0
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Figure 14
STANDARDIZED AGE BY EDUCATION DISTRIBUTION FOR INDIANAPOLIS
ABSOLUTE COUNTS
Education*
<HS HS Grad College College+
20-24 12,798 40,595 18,172 23,022
25-34 29,190 77,463 29,719 28,005
35-64 145,168 215,806 56,281 42,310
Totals 187,156 333,864 104,172 93,337
Totals
94,587
164,377
459,565
718,529
ROW PERCENTS
Education
<HS
20-24
25-34
35-64
13.5
17.8
31.6
HS Grad
42.9
47.1
47.0
Totals 187,156 333,864
College
19.2
18.1
12.2
104,172
College+
24.3
17.0
9.2
93,337
Totals
94,587
164,377
459,565
718,530
<HS = Up to 3 years of high school completed
HS Grad = High School Graduate
College = 1-3 years of college completed
College + = At least college graduate
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labor demand and the city's supply. To do this, the absolute difference
between each industry's person type distribution and Indianapolis' person
type distribution was computed, and then summed to produce a measure of
each industry's appropriateness. These differences were then ranked in
ascending order (i.e., best to worst "fit") to produce a list of indus-
tries ranked for best match with Indianapolis' labor force (Figure 15).
A second match was performed, defining person types solely in terms of
educational attainment, to see if any significant differences emerged from
omission of the age variable.
6.2.3. Comparison of Labor and Growth Analyses; Selection of Industry
Criteria.
Figure 16 summarizes pertinent characteristics of the top twenty
industries from the twelve category (age by education) person type
matching process. As can be seen, the closest matches include a wide
variety and fairly even mix of business types. If we look at these
industries in terms of their growth performance, we find an equally
wide range of experiences, Those whose job creation rates were quite
high include real estate, law and finance (ranked 9th, "45% growth in
1974-76), health services (11th, 7.9%), general merchandise stores
(13th, 23.0%), business services (15th, 15.4%), and miscellaneous
repair (19th, 13.6%). Conspicuous by their general absence from the list
are manufacturers although, not too surprisingly, chemical manufacturing
(containing pharmaceuticals, and thus, Eli Lilly Co.) shows a very good
match rate. Comparison of the rankings produced by the 12-category (age
by education) and four-category (education, only) person type distribu-
tions showed remarkably similar results, underlining the importance of
INDUSTRIES RANKED FOR BEST LABOR MATCH
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3 8 44 21 58
28
61
34
3
2222
7
10
5
25
24
35
69
15 13 16
RANKED DIFFERENCES
17.5
26.2
38 5
43.0
54. 1
66 0
74. 6
17 7
27 3
40 5
43 754. 2
66 4
76 2
45
6756
37
64
19 3
27. 3
41 9
43 9
55.766 8
*79 8
4330
62
39
54
17
4
19.527 5
41.9
44 9
56 066.9
82 5
55
60
1112
20 4227 46
33 26
57 18
36 1
14 8
68 6
21.228.9
42 2
45.7
56.667 7
86.0
50
29
31
51
59 49
53
65
22.9
30 8
42.3
46 5
57.368.6
91.7
47
63
32
9
2
52
23
16 9
25 1
38 3
42.6
53, 5
62 9
73 2
CD
23. 1
36.0
42.47.5
59 5
70 692 2
23.9
36.142 4
47 7
59 7
71.7100 8
25. 0
37. 542.6
51.1
61.4
72.6
__,
66
155
Figure 16
Top 20 AGE X EDUCATION MATCHES
Rank Description Indy.# Z diff. Growth 74-76(%)
Indy 21 cities
1 Clothing stores 47 16.9 -5.1 -3.0
2 Printing & publishing 19 17.5 -13.6 -6.7
3 Electric, gas & sanitary
services 40 17.7 0.4 10.4+
4 Wholesale trade - durables 41 19.3 3.5 6.3
5 Home furnishing stores 48 19.5 -2.7 -2.4
6 House & garden supply
stores 43 21.2 -0.4 2.2
7 Chemical manufacturing 20 22.9 0.6 -0.4*
8 Wholesale trade - non-
durables 42 23.1 4.7 8.1
9 Real estate, law, & misc.
finance 55 23.9 ~45. ~45.
10 Misc. retail 50 25.0 2.9 5.4
11 Health services 63 25.1 7.9 32.6
12 Transportation services 38 26.2 0.4 10.4+
13 General merchandise stores 44 27.3 23.0 13.6
14 Oil refining 21 27.3 - - +
15 Business services 58 27.5 15.4 23.0
16 Specialty equipment mfg. 30 28.9 -11.5* -11.5*
17 Machinery mfg. (except
electrical) 27 30.8 -6.2* -1.2*
18 Car dealers & gas stations 46 36.0 -4.9 -6.2
19 Misc. repair services 60 36.1 13.6 12.1
20 Transport. Equipment mfg. 29 37.5 -12.0* -2.2*
* Significant growth in small firms
+ Aggregated group
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the role played by educational credentialism (vs. experience) in deter-
mining hiring practices.
On the other hand, if we look at the bottom third of the labor
compatibility ranking, we find some of the city's most promising growth
industries. These include educational services (69th of 69, 100+% growth),
legal services (65th, 16.4%), securities and commodities (59th, 65.0%),
insurance (46th, 41.6%), hotels and lodging (45th, 16.3%), and banking
(40th, 30.0%). The fact that other data sources (such as the Bureau of
Labor Statistics' Employment and Earnings) have indicated similarly high
growth rates nationally in these industry groups would discount the
possibility that their apparent growth in Indianapolis was merely a
statistical aberration. Accepting the validity of these results, the
remaining issue to be answered therefore pertains to these sectors'
ability to expand at such fantastic rates, despite apparent labor
mismatches.
One explanation for this phenomenon might be that the 1970 data
are too old to be a good measure of the Indianapolis' labor pool's
current credentials, since one obvious difference between many of these
industries' and Indianapolis' labor distributions results from a
scarcity of college graduates among the city's older age groups. On
the other hand, since the employment growth tables were generated with
data only 3'1/2 and 5 1/2 years more recent than was the labor profile,
it seems unlikely that this source could be responsible for more than
marginal discrepencies.
A more likely, and provocative, explanation is that two fundamentally
different types of firm are growing in Indianapolis, and that they are
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doing so by drawing from entirely different labor pools. If banking,
for example, hires few people above the age of twenty-five who have
less than a college education, yet grows 30% in Indianapolis in a two-
year period, it is hiring someone -- but that someone is not an unemployed
auto worker. And. since firm migrations are so few, it would also appear
to be likely that most of the people being hired are, indeed, members
of the indigenous labor pool, rather than migrants who move to the city
with a new firm. On the other hand, firms in a number of the city's more
traditional sectors industries which are quite compatible with its
existing labor force - are growing just as strongly as many of the services,
small electronics and specialty equipment, and fabricated metals manufac-
turers , to name a few.
The picture which emerges from these observations is that of a
"two pronged" growth pattern; the apparent division of growth industries
into two distinct groups, that distinction being based on differential
labor demand. Again, the sources and long-term implications of this
pattern are open to debate, Those who take a more pessimistic view
of the direction in which western capitalist economies are headed would
see this as a sign of the breakdown of the "true" middle class, and of
a dichotomization of the labor force. This approach is reflected in
dual labor market theorists' view of the increased role of small and
service sector businesses as a way for the economy to adapt to uncer-
tainty by creating a class of firms which (having low capital require-
ments) can be started quickly and easily, will fail just as quickly,
and which rely on low income, unstable jobs to ensure their profit
. 14
ma rg ins.
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In contrast, those who take a more optimistic view of these trends
identify the flexibility inherent to small and new firms as a necessary
condition for ensuring continuing innovation and job creation. Taken
within the context of more general economic trends, they would thus
portray the simultaneous growth of white-collar-dominated service
jobs and blue-collar-oriented manufacturing positions as an indicator of
a basic, but positive, change in the economy, with the common denominator
being a general shift from "high-muscle-content" to "high-thought-content"
production activities, both among and within industry sectors.
Resolution of these issues, and of interpretations thereof, is
clearly beyond the scope and purpose of this analysis. But neither can
we afford to ignore the fact that the possible existence of a trade-off
between quality and quantity of jobs presents a dilemma with provocative
and pertinent implications for economic development planning.
To incorporate the "two prong" growth hypothesis into the selection
of firm filtering criteria, further computations were undertaken in order
to identify the sources of mismatch between industries and the labor
force. In short, industries were sorted into three types: 1) those
for which Indianapolis' labor force was overeducated; 2) those for
which it was undereducated; and 3) those for which there was no obvious
pattern of difference. The results of this process are presented in
Figure 17. As can be seen, the majority of industries fall into the
first category -- a reflection of the relatively high overall educational
attainment level of the city's labor force. Based on the belief that
industries which offer the city and its workers a chance for self-
improvement (i.e., those for which it was undereducated) are desirable,
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Figure 17
SOURCES OF LABOR MISMATCH
IPOLIS LABOR HIGH #
5 .3 54
1
43 LOW # 7 NO PATTERN # 19
INDIANAPOLIS LABOR UNDEREDUCATED
58 64 65 67 69
INDIANAPOLIS LABOR OVEREDUCATED
3 4 6 7 8 10 11
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 . 19 22 2:3
25 26 2728 24
.35 37 4 44 45
6068
30 31 32 33
46 49 56 57
NO PATTERN TO DIFFERENCES
5 20i 21 36 38 41 42 43 47
50 51 52 55
24
34
59
48
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while those which imply underemployment of the city's skills are not,
this sort was added as an additional criterion for filter selection.
The process by which industry groups were ultimately selected is
represented by the decision tree in Figure 18. The industries which
emerged from this analysis as site-appropriate, growth-potential sectors
(twenty, in all) are also indicated on the figure, by path of acceptance.
Two additional industry groups, banking (60) and insurance (63-64) were
accepted for further consideration, despite poor or inconclusive labor
match differences, because of their exceptionally high growth rates.*
A summary of the characteristics of these industry groups is provided by
Figure 19.
Again, the purpose of the industry identification process, and of
the labor profile analysis process in particular, was not to isolate
a few "perfect matches" between high-growth and labor-consistent
industry groups. Rather, its objective was to identify, and eliminate
from consideration, those industry types which, while growing, are
inappropriate for the special resources of the target site; resources
which were defined, in the Indianapolis application, in terms of the
characteristics of the local labor pool.
From an analytical perspective, those industries which do not
perform well in the resource matching process are therefore as interest-
ing as those which do. In the Indianapolis case, such attention made
obvious an interesting and potentially important pattern with respect to
the city's economic growth, one which should be kept in mind when consi-
dering policies designed to improve its economic future. In a more
general sense, this type of "knowledge by negation" analysis offers a
*As the following section will also indicate, further additions
and deletions were made to the industry group list, in response to
special interests of the alient.
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Figure 18
DECISION TREE FOR INDUSTRY SELECTION
Labor Match
0, Growth
Growth
-ACCEPT
33*,34,35*,36*,37*,
38*,39*,50*,51*,60,
66-7,73,76,79,80
REJECT
Educational
/ Demand
REJECT
*low or negative growth rate overall , but
high growth rate among small firms.
,ACCEPT
62,81,
82,89
'REJECT
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Figure 19
INDUSTRY-TYPE FILTER CATEGORIES
Educ ation**
Industry/SIC Growth Labor Profile Demand
# Description 74-76 Rank (if rank 40%)
25/33 Primary metals industries -9.5* 29
26/34 Fabricated metals products 32.7 28
27/35 Machinery (except electrical) -6.2* 17
28/36 Electronics -13.5* 22
29/37 Transportation Equipment -12.0* 20
30/38 Specialty equipment -11.5* 16
31/39 Miscellaneous manufacturing 0.1* 30
41/50 Wholesale trade - durables 3.5* 4
42/51 Wholesale trade - non-durables 4.7* 8
51/60 Banking 30.0 40 NP
53/62 Securities & commodities 65.0 59 H
54/63-64 Insurance 41.6 46 NP
55/66-67 Real estate, law & misc.
finance "Q45 9
58/73 Business services 15.4 15
60/76 Miscellaneous repair services 13.6 19
62/79 Amusement & recreation
services 13.4 26
63/80 Health services 7.9 11
64/81 Legal services 16.4 65 H
65/82 Educational services 124.9 69 H
69/89 Miscellaneous services 23.1 54 H
* High growth in small firms
** H = Higher than Indianapolis labor force
NP = No consistent pattern
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useful, but often-ignored, approach to understanding the development
process. As was pointed out in Chapter Three, the ability to "know
thyself", which can be so critical to the success of a development effort,
is as much one of knowing what a site does not have to offer to potential
locators, as it is of recognizing what it does possess. By adjusting
the focus of emphasis in this manner -- from concentration on absolute
to relative strength and weakness,,- governments and development agencies
can begin to collect the knowledge and expertise upon which rational and
realistic development policies can be based.
6.3. Identification of Potential Relocators.
The objective of this analysis was to develop our model of locational
behavior, tempered by a basic understanding of the assets and liabilities
of Indianapolis as a location site, into the profile of a high-potential
locator, and to derive operational definitions of this archetypical firm
which can then be incorporated into the firm-selection filters. To
reiterate, it is an attempt to answer three basic questions -- Which
firms are the most dynamic job creators? Which firms are the most
dynamic locators? And which firms are likely to have an interest in
doing either of these things on the project site? -- and to use the
results to define firm-specific filtering criteria. As can be inferred
from the first two questions, the emphasis of this portion of the analysis
is on the characteristics and performance of individual firms. Yet,
as the third question indicates, it is not an analysis which is totally
devoid of geographic sensitivity. In contrast to Path A's generic
industry-type analysis, howeyer, Path B's interest in geographic
concerns lies purely in any regional biases which may be observed from
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a firm's locational history,
The answers to the above questions, as provided by the model of
location behavior which was developed in Chapter Three, were then used
to select firm-oriented criteria, This selection was aided by the wide
array of highly disaggregate microeconomic data which is provided by
the various versions of the Dun and Bradstreet files, and was predicated
upon four basic premises: 1) that firms with rapid employment growth
will have expanding space needs; 2) that the decision to open a new
branch bears implications which are very different from that to expand
an existing facility; 3) that firm migrations play a negligible role
in regional investment patterns; but 4) that regional patterns and
preferences do, to a measurable extent, exist and influence locational
behavior.
How these data and premises translate into firm-selection criteria
is perhaps best seen by example. For instance, the first premise led
to the decision to demand certain rates of employment growth from
prospective locators. Sales growth could also have been used as an
indicator of expansion, but was omitted from this analysis because this
data item is missing from a large proportion (at least 1/3) of.the
records. The second premise was incorporated into a criterion which
demanded that a firm have opened a certain number of new branches (in
this case, at least one) in the 1974-76 period, thereby demonstrating
a willingness to expand by relocation, rather than by reinvestment in
an existing physical plant. The third premise entered the analysis by
means of omission; by the absence of any attempt to track potentially-
migratory firms. And the fourth was operationalized through the stipu-
lation that the firm have not indicated a locational bias against the
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North Central region; hence, that it had not only shown a history of
opening new branches, but of locating them within this region,
In sum these, and a combination of other criteria, became the
operational definition of the high-potential locator profile which was,
in turn, based upon Chapter Three's model of locational behavior. Having
been translated into data file variables, these criteria were thus
ready for incorporation (along with the industry-type parameters) into
the filtering algorithms.
6.4. Design and Implementation of Filtering Programs.
Figure 20 illustrates the flow of tasks involved in the filtering,
or firm selection, stages of the finding-firms methodology. For purposes
of simplification, these tasks can be grouped into four series of actions:
1) design and implementation of initial filtering algorithm; 2) procure-
ment and preparation of data for updated analysis; 3) design and imple-
mentation of updated filtering algorithm; and 4) preparation of final
firm lists for delivery to the user. Each of these tasks will now be
examined.
6.4.1. Design and Implementation of Initial Filtering Algorithm.
In this step, the industry-identification criteria derived from the
Path A analysis were combined with the firm-identification criteria from
the Path B analysis, through the construction of a filtering program
designed to identify high-potential locators for the city of Indianapolis.
The preceding sections have discussed the analytical processes which
culminated in the selection of filtering criteria (by which the charac-
teristics of a "high-potential" firm would be defined). In addition
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to the parameters selected in this manner, a number of industry groups
(at the four-digit S.I.C. level) were added for consideration, at the
client's request.*
The initial series of criteria which firms were required to fulfill
was thus the following;
1. Multi-unit organization;
2. Headquarters was established prior to 1974;
3, At least one new branch established in 1974-76 period and
located in Midwest;
4. New Midwestern branch continued to exist in 1976;
5. Headquarter or branch S.IC. code in proper range;
6. Total family employment >100;
7. Total number of family "members" (headquarter plus branches)
increased during period;
8. Total family includes at least two branches;
9. Family employment growth >25% in 1974-76; and
10. Midwestern branch employment growth >25% during same period.
A filtering program was designed, using the 1974-76 Headquarter/
Branch "Squashed Hierarchy" file of the Dun and Bradstreet data, to
*These industries, which were for various reasons, of particular
interest to the city, lay in the trucking and membership organization
sectors. Earlier in the analysis, the former had been eliminated from
consideration because of its modest (1,8%) overall growth rate (although
it did indicate a high growth rate among small firms), while the latter,
althougn exhibiting good growth, failed to meet the educational matching
criteria (via its demand for less-educated labor).
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Figure 21
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identify only those firms which met all of the above criteria. These
firms were then selected, on the basis of each one's unique identifying
number ("Duns Number"), from within the mass of firms which failed to
fulfill the stringent demands of the criteria. These numbers were
then matched to the firms'-original 1976 D.M.I. records to procude a
list of the highest-prospect firms, a disguised copy of which is presented
as Figure 21.
The extreme stringency of the above set of filters is illustrated
by the fact that only twelve firms -- of a possible 600,000+ multi-unit
headquarter/branch organizations existing on the 1974-76 file -- succeeded
in passing them. To test the sensitivity of the output to the filter
parameters, subsequent revisions of the algorithm (which relaxed one or
more of the criteria) were performed, and produced correspondingly larger
lists of firms (see Figure 22). For example, loosening the family
employment growth criteria to 10%, and that of branches to 15%, produced
34 firms, while the version of the algorithm which was used to identify
the firms which were ultimately sent on for further consideration
(family growth >0%, branch growth >5%) produced a list of 84. In
contrast, a second version of the filtering program, which dropped all
filters on branch characteristics and performance, produced a list of
over 4500 "high potential"* firms.
A number of conclusions about the firm-identification procedure,
the filtering algorithms,and about firm growth processes in general can
be drawn from the above examples, At the very least, these results
illustrate the wide range of list sizes which the filtering programs
*Exactly how high the potential of firms which are identified by
filters which are as lax as those used in this latter case is, however,
suspect.
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Figure 22
SENSITIVITY TESTS OF EMPLOYMENT GROWTH CRITERIA
HQ
Growth
>25%
10
5
0
5
# of HQs
Filtered
12
34
55
67
77
0 84
# Total
Establish-
ments (1976)
237
593
1112
1296
1673
2028
Midwest
Branch
Growth
>25%
15
10
10
7
5
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through the selection of more or less rigorous criteria. Of greater
consequence, however, is the inference which is to be drawn from the size
of the lists produced by the initial (ire., stringent) Indianapolis
filters; to wit, that for any particular site, at any particular time,
there exists only a minute portion of the corporate population which we
would expect to be considering relocation thereupon. Whether or not the
algorithm succeeds in correctly identifying the members of that elite
group is quite another issue, But, methodological specifics aside, if the
algorithm and its analytical subcomponents do nothing else, they do succeed
in indicating exactly how complex the location decision is, how few really
"good" external locators (as opposed to local entrepreneurs) exist for
a given site, and thus, how random the successes of economic development
programs are likely to be, as long as they rely on non-targeted, general-
promotion-oriented firm attraction strategies.
6.4.2. Procurement and Preparation of Updated Data.
Following completion of the first round of filters and the selection
of an initial list of firms, raw 1982 D.M.I. records were acquired from
Dun and Bradstreet, and prepared for use in the second, and final,
round of filters. As Figure 20 indicates, several tasks are involved in
this process, most of which are of a technical nature and of little
interest or consequence to those who are not completely familiar with
the Dun and Bradstreet data (in both its raw and edited forms). On the
other hand, the preparation of new data entails, as a matter of course,
quality control issues and actions which, due to their ultimate effect
upon the outputs which they produce, are significant enough to warrant
discussion here.
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In order to perform a time series analysis of the type implied by
the algorithm, the data must beavailable in a longitudinal form. For
the initial analyses and filters, such data already existed, in the form
of the Dun and Bradstreet U.S. file, and extracts of it such as the Head-
quarter/Branch Squashed Hierarchy file. For the secondary analyses and
updated filters they did not exist, and therefore had to be created anew.
The age of the Dun and Bradstreet data, in combination with the short
time span within which location decisions are made, thus necessitated
not only the procurement of more recent data, but also the preparation
of this data into a form which enabled cross-temporal comparisons to be
made. This, the second task of the filtering processes, was therefore
comprised of two flows of operations: 1) that which involved preparation
of the 1982 updated data; and 2) that which involved preparation of 1976
data for comparative uses.
Upon receipt of 1982 data for the filtered firms and their families
(about 2000 records, in all), a series of quality control procedures
was performed. The data were first checked (manually and computationally)
for "bad" records -- i.e., those which contained data items which, for
one reason or another, appeared to be incorrect or illogical. Problems
of this sort which were encountered in the Indianapolis case included
one firm whose Canadian affiliate records were mixed in with those of
its American branches, and branches whose headquarter Duns Numbers were
incorrect or not recorded. Any records which were flagged as containing
inconsistent or illogical data items were manually corrected (when
possible), or deleted from the file altogether.
To prepare the 1982 data for cross-temporal comparison, its
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consistency with the 1976 data had to be ascertained. Most particularly,
it was necessary to identify firms (especially headquarters) which
existed in only one of the two years, in order to later be able to
tabulate; 1) headquarter deaths; and 2) branch births. The former
task was thus the next to be performed, through a tabulation which
identified any headquarter establishments which disappeared* from the
file during the period in question. All in all, these operations
resulted in ten headquarter records (8 disappearances and two status
changes) and a number of branches being dropped from the file. The
final filters were therefore performed on 74 headquarters and their
families (although the two families of indeterminant status were included
as addendums).
In a simultaneous string of tasks, 1976 data for the filtered firms
and their families were extracted from the Headquarter/Branch file and
prepared for analysis. Specifically, these records were used to create
the basis for a two-period, six-variable longitudinal extract file.
Branch records underwent particular scrutiny during this process.
Records for both years (1976 and 1982) were first screened for non-
reported employment variables (an omission of fairly common, although
decreasing, occurence). Secondly, since the year started is not reported
*A firm whose legal status changes due to acquisition sometimes
receives a new Duns Number, Under such circumstances, it is virtually
impossible to distinguish between an acquisition and a "death" (let
alone between a bankruptcy and a simple closure). While the records
received for the Indianapolis analysis proved that there are, fortunately,
exceptions to this rule, it is often true that the sources of a firm's
disappearance from the file cannot be easily identified.
However, even if we assume that all of the firms which disappeared
from this subset during the period (1976-82) were, indeed, deaths, they
still represent only 10% of the population (8 of 84 headquarters) -- a
result which can be. taken as an indicator of the success of the filter
in identifying particularly healthy firms,
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for these firms, an algorithm had to be developed to protect against the
inference of spurious births,
The final output of these preparations were edited 1976 and 1982 files
for the filtered headquarters and their families, which could then be
merged, through the final filtering program, into a form supportive of
time series analysis.
6.4,3. Design and Implementation of Final Filtering Algorithm.
The second round of filters provided a final screen on firm per-
formance and location potential. Its basic objective was to test for
the consistency of the filtered firms' growth, i.,e., to eliminate
any firms which proved, in the long run, to have been merely one-period
(1974-76) "flashes in the pan
Non-time-sensitive criteria (such as multi-unit status) having
already been met by these firms in the first round of filters, could
be eliminated from the second. The following criteria were thus incor-
porated into the second filtering algorithm:
1. Headquarter or branch S.I.C. code in proper range;
2. Total family employment >100;
3. Total number of family members increased, 1976-82;
4. Total family employment change >25% in period;
5. Midwest branch employment change >25% in period.
Sensitivity tests were again utilized to gauge the relative potential
of the filtered firms. The three growth variables (criteria 3, 4, and 5)
were set in four combinations and used to categorize the remaining 76
firms into six "filter tiers" of increasing stringency. As Figure 23
indicates, only twenty of the firms passed the above (i,e,, most stringent)
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Figure 23
Distributions of 'Filter Tiers'
Tier Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
Absolute
# of Firms
23
3
7
5
36
2
Cumulative
# Firms % Total
23
26
33
38
74
76
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34.2
43.4
50.0
97.4
100.0
Definitions of Tier Groups
Tier Number
1
2
3
4
# Branches
Increased?
Yes
Yes
No
No
Total Midwest Branch
Emp. Change Emp. Change
Positive(>0) >25%
"I Positive
>25%
Positive
5 - - Failed to meet all of above criteria.
6 - - Reported status change (although still consisted
of Headquarter and Branches); performance
unmeasurable.
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set of criteria and therefore fell into the first tier; 32 passed the
least demanding combination of parameters, while the remaining 44 failed
al together.
6.4,4. Preparation and Delivery of Final Firm Lists.
The final task of the filtering process was purely mechanical in
nature, Here, the tiered lists of firms and families were sorted
(alphabetically, by headquarter S.I.C. code, and by tier number);
their records edited (adding, for example, computations of employment
change rates, deleting confidential, redundant, or non-useful data);
formatted; and printed out for delivery to the user, The final product
was thus a rigorously selected group of presumably high-potential firms
and their branches -- complete with detailed data on their characteristics
and performance -- ready for incorporation into an economic development
strategy.
In this case, the final list consisted of 76 firms and their fami-
lies. As prior discussions have indicated, however, this number can be
adjusted (through the selection and design of the criteria) to suit the
user's needs. The format and content of the final printouts (particularly
with respect to thechoice of sorting variables, and content of data
included) can be similarly adjusted to meet the user's data and analytical
needs.
6.5. Some Issues with Respect to Implementation.
As the Indianapolis experience made only too clear, the importance
of the role which is played by the user during the process of design and
implementation of the algorithm cannot be underestimated. The firm-
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identification process is a relatively technical and structured mode of
problem-solving, Yet it is one which'must be made sensitive to the issues
and characteristics which do, and will continue, to affect development on
or in the project site, In short, it.must'be able to incorpQrate into
its design an awareness-of the unique array of conditions surrounding the
process of development within a particular economic, social, political,
and physical environment, In order to achieve this, a high degree and
quality of client participation in the implementation process is
required,
As a result, not insubstantial demands are placed upon both the user
and the provider of the technology, On the one hand, those involved in
the technical aspects of the procedure must be able to understand and to
incorporate into its form and substance a number of often-intangible
factors which are more or less critical to the development of the site.
On the other hand, the user must develop an understanding of the theore-
tical and empirical bases of the procedure which is sufficient to enable
him to foresee and to furnish the types of information and guidance which
can only be provided through first-hand knowledge of the local situation.
The algorithm is an inherently iterative, adjustive process; one
which thereby requires an almost pre-emptive understanding of its own
demands and products for its maximum powers to be exploited to their
fullest. Sensitivity to this circumstance, combined with the expertise
which can only be gained through practical experience, are necessary
before this goal can possibly be achieved,
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CHAPTER SEVEN:
CONCLUSION
The ultimate measure ofthe "success" of a planning technique,
such as the firm-identification procedure which has been described in
thepreceding chapters, lies in its ameliorative abilities. From the
practitioner's persepctive, academic concerns, such as the theoretical
purity or philosophical integrity of its premises, or the grace of its
computer code are quite secondary to the practical concerns attendant
upon the tool's problem-solving potential. The standard against which
the promise of the finding -firms methodology can be weighed is thus tri-
partite: defined by way of its usefulness, its appropriateness, and its
effectivenss as a development tool. The schooling of development planning
thus lends itself to a redefinition of the proverbial "3Rs"; for it is
against its relevance, its realisticness, and its results that the
feasibility of policies within this field will, for practical purposes,
be gauged.
As previous discussions have indicated, current approaches to
location planning have, on the whole, failed to fulfill these necessarily
rigorous criteria. Partial responsibility for this failure is attribut-
able to the inc6mpleteness of our theoretical and empirical understandings
of the economic forces underpinning the urban fabric. For, only with
a complete and accurate perspective on these forces, can policy and
planning officials and agencies begin to focus their attention on real,
as opposed to perceived, aspects of the urban development process. This
aside, however, it remains true that a significant portion of the respon-
sibility for the failure of economic policy lies not in the practitioners'
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inability to comprehend the relevant problems, but rather in their
failure to devise policies which can be used to solve these problems in
an appropriate and effective manner.
The firm identification procedure is designed to serve as a useful,
appropriate, and effective means for improving upon this unfortunate
situation, by providing a technique which can supplant or augment current
approaches to development planning, Such lofty objectives are, to be
sure, commendable; the critical question which therefore remains to be
answered pertains to the procedure's ability to achieve them. At this
point, the method's success in doing so can be evaluated in two respects:
1) in terms of its apparent ability, through the prior (Southwest Corridor)
and present (Indianapolis) applications, to identify high-potential
locators; and 2) in terms of its adaptability to a wider range of uses,
specifically with respect to the problem of occupant identification in
joint development planning. And examination of the procedure's per-
formance in these two respects, and in terms of the three criteria men-
tioned above, will enable conclusions regarding its overall potential as
a development-enhancing tool to be drawn.
7.1. Prior and Present Indications of the Procedure's Performance.
The results of the two applications of the process to date are
sufficiently preliminary and/or limited in scope that it would be unreason-
able to base an assignment of the method's "success" or "failure" upon
them. The Southwest Corridor application did foresee the location of
one of the identified firms upon the project site, But it is impossible,
at this juncture, to ascertain whether or not the branch might have been
located there anyway, regardless of the procedure's results. The impact
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of the Indianapolis application is similarly inconclusive, because this
project has only recently begun to enter the final (i.e.,, marketing)
stages of implementation.
While these rather sketchy and preliminary findings do not provide
any very good indication of the process's ability to identify the "right"
firms, they do provide the basis upon which a first major conclusion
regarding the methodology's performance can be drawn; that is, that the
usefulness of the finding-firms approach is as much a function of the
user's ability to utilize the data in an appropriate and effective
manner, as it is of the characteristics of the procedure and its product.
The firm-identification methodology is quite specific in terms of its
premises and its promises: failure, on the part of the user, to understand
the implications thereof with respect to the output and its best uses
thus bodes poorly for the ultimate usefulness of the filtering process
in a particular situation. In short, the method provides the development
planning with a tool, but one which cannot help but be impotent, if
ineffectively used.
Of particular importance is the user's grasp of the rationality
and specificity underlying the procedure's output; i.e., the analytical
and computational processes and structure which are implicit in the
selection of a miniscule proportion of existing firms as potential
occupants of a particular location. That is to say, users must under-
stand how and why it is that certain firms emerge as being more likely
candidates- than others, Even more importantly, they must be able to use
that understanding as the basis for incorporating the filtered lists
into a marketing and development strategy. The strength of the firm-
identification approach derives from i.ts explicit rationality, and its
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translation of this rationality into a highly-specific, data-rich
prospecting tool. The list of filtered firms is therefore not simply a
glorified mailing list, and the user's strategy must reflect this con-
dition if the process's true potential (as limited or expansive as it
may be) is to be realized.
There are, of course, ways of getting around this problem -- of
separating analytical from implementational effect. For example, follow-
up surveys or interviews could (if carefully designed, so as to avoid
"leading" problems of the type Mentioned earlier) be used to determine:
a) if the identified firms were considering the establishment of a new
branch, in the near future; and b) whether they would, indeed, consider
location a facility in the project area. The findings related to these
questions could provide a good basis from which to evaluate the effective-
ness and accuracy of the firm- and site-related analyses, respectively.
Unfortunately, neither the time nor the resources were-available
to enable the performance of an (obviously costly) evaluation of this
sort in the previous applications of the procedure. From an analytical
viewpoint, however, the incorporation of a follow-up procedure of this
type into the finding-firms process would appear to be a useful and
appropriate step to take, in order that the credibility of the process's
results may be better ascertained.
7,2. The Procedure's Potential as a Joint Development Tool.
The prospects for more generalized use of the firm-identification
procedure would appear to be quite good. To begin with, there is nothing
inherent in the process's structure or approach that would preclude its
application to a potentially vast-array-of scenarios. The flexibility of
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the location-specific component of the analysis allows for incorporation of
a relatively wide range of factors into the identification of promising
industries, and thus lends itself to a kaleidescopic range of focuses.
For example, a third application of the-method, which is presently being
undertaken to identify potential tenants for a real estate developer,
will base its locational analysis on a profile of existing tenants (rather
than upon the local labor force), thus implying greater reliance upon a
market-area (rather than labor-based) model to locational behavior.
Again the purpose of the location analysis segment of the process is
to capture the essence of an area's unique locational resources, through
the selection of industries which can best exploit this set of attributes.
In the case of transit joint development, it is difficult to define, in
abstract terms, the extent to which the relevant resource (that is, the
transit system) impacts the locational potential of a particular develop-
ment site; this will depend upon a number of factors, including distance
from the facility, improvements, transit technology, etc. This notwith-
standing, it is from its ability to identify and analyze the relative
importances of a wide range of location-influencing factors -- transit
access, among them -- on a location-by-location basis, and then to include
these factors in the identification of site-appropriate locators, that the
true potential of the firm-finding process, as a joint (or general)
development tool derives.
The fact that generalized use of the firm-identification procedure
is possible does not, in itself, indicate that its widespread use is
either desirable or forthcoming, howeyer, To speculate upon the pro-
cedure's more general potential, we therefore turn again to the three
critical eyaluative variables -- i.e., usefulness, appropriateness, and
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effectivenss -- in order to gauge the process' performance in their
respect,
Turning first to the issue of usefulness, it is clear that the prob-
lems associated with attracting and maintaining health local economies are
of paramount concern to planners and politicians, alike. It is thus
apparent that any technique which can aid in their development efforts is
apt to be of substantial use. Beyond that, it would appear to be the case
that existing approaches to private sector investment attraction planning
and policy are, at best, misguided and, at worst, outright misuses of
scarce physical and fiscal resources, The firm-identification procedure
offers an alternative approach to the far-flung strategies typical of
current development practices, through, its ability to target the area's
resources in a precise and rational manner. The ultimate usefulness of
the procedure derives from its structured and explicit incorporation of
empirically-supported observations into a list of target firms. In
doing so, it therefore provides the user not only with a very specific-
purpose marketing tool, but also with a unique source of informational
power, in the form of the tabulations and analyses which.underlie the
final output of the process,
The appropriateness of the procedure can be evaluated in two
respects; 1) in terms oflocal capabilities; and b) in terms of local
need. As prior discussions have indicated, the accuracy of the procedure's
final output depends, in large measure, upon the user's ability to provide
support and guidance for the locational analysis. This quality of the
procedure places a not-insubstantial demand upon the capability of the user
to caputre, and to communicate to the analyst, the essential qualities of
the place's location potential. On the other hand, these are not
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unreasonable demands to place upon local development officials. In
addition, fulfillment ofthem is facilitated by the presumed competence
(or at least, coopeartion) of local officials, and the inherently
iterative, give-and-take nature of the procedure's implementation process.
In terms of need, the opportunities available through improved
public management of private and public investment patterns have already
been ascertained, with respect to joint development planning in partic-
ular. The firm-identification methodology -- or any similar procedure --
is thus of equal relevance to young, growing areas as it is to those
facing the consequences of age and decline. The only economy for which
it would be inappropriate is that characterized by total stability --
a possibility which the inherent disequilibrium of market systems,
such as ours, would appear to effectively preclude. Need is therefore
a function of change: determination of the appropriateness of the firm-
identification process thus hinges upon its ability to ease the pain
of transition, through its highly targeted approach to development
planning.
Finally, we encounter the issue of effectiveness. In theory,
the firm-identification procedure offers an unprecedented level of
detail and information to the development planner; in reality, it is,
at this point, difficult to determine how well it succeeds in fulfilling
its own, admittedly lofty objectives. As the discussion of the previous
section indicated, a larger sample of applications combined with more
extensive follow-up analysis, is necessary before the approach's effec-
tiveness as 'a predictor of locational behavior can be ascertained.
The issue of effectivenss is not singularly one of accuracy,
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either. Preceding sections have also demonstrated the critical role
which the user's method of implementation plays in the procedure's
ability to achieve the anticipated results. Implementation is, of
course, a problem by which virtually all planning efforts are plagued;
the firm-finding process is hardly unique in this respect. Nor is it
unique in the magnitude of unfulfilled potential which is the inescapable
(though unquantifiable) product of poor or ineffective utilization of a
well-designed tool.
The rationality underlying its analytical process, the demand for
and sensitivity to user concern embedded in its iterative nature, and
the specificity of its results may, in combination, serve to mitigate
the opportunities for mis-implementation of the firm-identification
procedure. In general, however, the long-term solution of the
"implementation problem" lies in continued development of planning
skills, per se, and thus,far beyond the scope of this analysis.
Suffice it to say, at thispoint, that the greater degree of immunity
to implementational irregularity which can be incorporated into planning
techniques and policies, the greater is their promise for general
purpose use and success.
In sum, while it would be premature to draw conclusions here with
respect to the overall effectivenss of the finding-firms methodology,
its usefulness in, and appropriateness for the problems confronting
efforts at development coordination would appear to be substantial.
The continuousness and complexity of the process by which an economy
evolves has tehded to leave planners in abeyance to the dynamics of the
systems whose destinies they would endeavor to portend. Planning is,
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at its absolute minimum, a field in which everything seems possible
but nothing appears probable. The real value of the firm-identification
procedure, or any other planning tool, lies in its ability to turn
probability into result. It is against this standard that the merit
of the finding-firms process stands, through continued application and
improvement, to be assessed.
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191Table A-1
TABLE - % NET EMPLOYMENT CHANGE IN INDIANAPOLIS. 74-76
COUNT BY - AEMPL?'4
EMP SIZE
SIC # 0-20 21-100 101-50 0 >50 0 'IOTALS
AG -7
MIN8-14
CONST15
16
17
MFG 20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29-32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
TR&U 40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47-49
TRADE 50
51
52
53
44
:z56
57
r,8
59
FI&RE60
61
6 2
6 3-64
65-66
67
SRVC 70
72
73
75
76
78
80
81
8 2
83
84
86
88
89
4. 2
-8 9
-5 5
16.9
-5.1
-14 2
0.
-16.1
6.2
13 9
-4. 7
30
-9.4
-5 6
72. 5
5.1
18.7
8.6
58.2
14 7
38.2
8.9
4.0
3.2
39.8
0.
-20.0
-18. 4
0.
44.2
11.6
21 5
5.2
-18.8
-2 1
-4. 3
-3.2
-0.5
-2. 5
3.4
30 0
27. 3
120 0
86.7
18.5
-3.2
26 9
0.3
26.8
1.7
14.3
47 9
43.8
43.5
30. 3
86.2
250.0
85 6
0.
28.2
14 7
-9 4
-28 3
-12 't
-15.6
-6.1
0.
-17.5
-1 6
-10 6
0.8
5.3
-8 3
-9 0
-4.0
-13.2
-7.4
-8.9
3.4
-3.5
10.5
-4.5
-50 0
-35 5
-5.1
0.
0.
0.0
175.0
8.2
-1 4
0.2
2.8
-2.6
-2.8
-52.6
-0.7
-4.1
6.4
0.
12 7
9.2
25. 6
24.4
-24 5
68.5
-3.0
35.1
10.2
-8.3
37. 7
-2. 5
64. 2
63.5
0.
2 2
0.
-l. 0
TOTALS 8 4 -0.8
0
0
-37 8
-2. 4
-27 6
-9.2
0
0.
-5.7
7.1
28.0
-19.3
-9,3
37 9
7.9
-11. 5
-12 5
-16 3
19.3
4.7
-56 8
0.3
60.6
7.0
-13 6
0.
0.
146 3
0.
-35.0
-2. 2
-17.2
-50 0
27.2
0.
-30 0
36.7
-19 7
60.7
-3.5
0.
-100.0
87.0
7.2
0.
-26 3
-19 5
-25 6
24.0
0.
0.
0-.
23.2
0.
-10 7
134 4
-100 0
0.
0.
190 0
0.
0
0.
0.
0.
-4.4
0
0.
0.
-42.9
-100 0
0.
-21.8
0.
-13.1
0.
150 9
-19 0
-14 1
0.
0.
0.6
0.
- .4
0.
0.
0.
0.
2.2
0.
0.
0.
18.5
-30.6
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
19 2
-7 2
-17.2
-2 1
-11 6
-8.1
0.
-17. 0
-2.1
-13 4
-31 1
-11 1
-13 6
0.6
4.2
-9 5
32.7
-6.2
-13 5
-12 0
-11. 5
0.1
4.5
0.0
1.8
0.
-20 0
44.2
175.0
0.4
3.5
4.7
-0.4
23 0
-19 .
-4.9
-5 1
-2.7
0.3
2.9
30.0
-50 8 -22 2
0.
78.1
0
46.8
0.
0.
10.3
0.
0.
0.
-2.6
0.
631. 3
0
0.
0
0.
0.
65. 0
41. 6
18.0o
26.8
16.3
-7.4
15.4
7.7
13.6
13.4
7.9
16.4
1.24. 9
101. 0
-80.5
36.4
0.
23 1
-2.1 2.1 2 2
Table A-2
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TA3-E - ABS. NET EMP. CHANGE IN INDIANAPOLIS, 74-76
COUNT BY - AEMPL74
EMP. SIZE
SIC # 0-20 21-100 101-500
55.0 145. 0AG 7
MIN8-1 4
CONST15
16
17
MFG 2 0
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29-32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
TR&U 40
41
42
4 3
44
45
46
47-49
T RADE 5 0
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
FI&RE60
61.
62
63-64
65-66
67
SRVC 70
72 -
73
75
76
78 P
80
81
82
84
6 6
>500 TOTALS
36. 0
-29. 0
-205.0
106.0
-335. 0
-44. 0
0.
-5. 0
15. 0
53. 0
-13.0
4. 0
-141. 0
-25.0
640. 0
9. 0
228. 0
155. 0
206. 0
36. 0
78. 0
36. 0
1 . 0
5.0C,
607. 0
0.
-3. 0
-29.0
0.
28e,0. 0
899.0 l
667. 0
85. 0
-98. 0
-46.0C-
-188. 0
-56. 0
-11. 0
-154. 0
189.0 l
6. 0
107.0
120.0
4 0-3.-0
265.0
-8. 0
90.0
5. 0
5 89 . 0
30.0
133. 0
263. 0
167. 0
-37. 0
44.0
81.0
5. 0
387.0C,
0.
22?-,. 0
-15.0 0.
-643.0 -350. 0
-144.0 -4.0
-785.0 -394.0
-58.0 -349.0
0. - 0.
-10. 0 0.
-6.0 -3 e
-55.0 30.0
3.0 142.0
50.0 -410.0
-185.0 -177.0
-61.0 146.0
-56.0 90.0
-57.0 -60.0
-200.0 -473.0
-337.0 -535.0
29.0 243.0
-24.0 110.0
39.0 -230.0
-34.0 1.0
-50.0 303.0
-75.0 69.0
-180.0 -190.0
0. 0.
0. 0.
0. 234.0
105.0 0.
68.0 -445.0
-97.0 -67.0
7.0 -288.0
15.0 -110.0
412.0 630. 0
-43.0 0.
-106.0 -129.0
-174.0 110.0
-4.0 -75.0
-269.0 475.0
76.0 -40.0
0. 0.
64.0 -250.0
19.0 240.0
519.0 218.0
281.0 0.
-81.0 -126.0
717.0 -219.0
-21.0 -220.0
113.0 245.0
132.0 0.
18.0 0.
-55.0 0.
372.0 627.0
-3.0 0.
122.0 -299.0
47.0 168.0
0. -125.0
10.0 0.
0. 0.
-11.0 247.0
0.
0.
0.0
0.0
0.
-50.0
0.
0.
-300. 0
-712.0
0.
-710.0
0.
-400.0
0.
3772.0
-210.0
-2800.0
-3391. 0
0.
0.
0.0
0.
500. 0
-80.0
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.0
0.
500. 0
-1700. 0
0.
0.0
.
0.
0.0
0.
-310.0
0.
2460.0
0.
1170. 0
0.
0.
220.0
0.
0.
0.
-210.0
0.
5050.6
0.
0.
0.
0,.
0.
236. 0
-44. 0
-1198. 0
-42. 0
-1514. 0
-501. 0
0.
-15. 0
-26b.0
-272. 0
-580.0r
-356. 0
-1213. 0
60. 0
274. 0
-108. 0
3327. 0
-927. 0
-2322. 0
-3269. 0
-113. 0
3. 0
254. 0
- 1. 0
157. 0
0.
-3. 0
2 05. 0
105. 0
38 ,. 0
735. 0
386. 0
-10.0(
1444. 0
-1789. 0
-423. 0
-120. 0
-90. 0
52. 0
225. 0
6. 0
-389. 0
379. 0
3600. 0
546. 0
955. 0
588. 0
-236. 0
1167. 0
162. 0
151. 0
208--. 0
956.0(
3 4. 0
4917. 0
296. 0
-120. 0
397. 0
0.
464. 0
TOTALS 5 00 -566. 0 -127. 0 2 434 .0 b6-66. 0
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Table A-3
TABLE - % NET EMPLOYMENT CHANGE IN CITIES LIKE INDY 74-76
COUNT BY - AEMPL74
EMP SIZE
SIC 4 0-20 21-100 101-500 >500 TOTALS
AG 7 9.7 0 3 27 9 0 8 7
MIN8-14 10 8 2 1 -44 5 70.8 3 5
CONST15 4.0 -14.0 -5.6 -12.8 -3.4
16 5.5 -6.6 -5.0 37.5 -0.9
17 -2.7 -12.4 -11.2 -8.8 -7.0
MFG 20 5.0 -4.1 -5.2 1.6 -2.4
21 -39.4 -22.6 -100 0 28.0 22 9
22 4.3 -7.6 -11 2 -6.9 -8.5
23 12.8 -8.3 -10 4 -6.4 -7.8
24 9.0 -15.8 -17 3 -41 1 -14 5
25 8.8 -8.1 -14 0 6.7 -5.6
26 34.6 -3.6 -6.7 3.9 -1.3
27 2.2 -2 2 -4.4 -16.0 -6.7
28 9.3 4.5 -0.3 -2.1 -0.4
29-32 14.0 -6.5 -4.4 -11 4 -5.8
33 12.8 -1.9 -6.9 -1.0 -2.2
34 5.2 -3.8 -6 5 -3.1 -3.7
35 3.9 -3.4 -6.0 0.9 -1.2
36 22.5. 0.5 0.6 0.4 1.0
37 16.2 4.1 -3.2 -2.6 -2.2
38 13.0 7.8 -9.3 -18.7 -11 5
39 6.5 -5.0 -12 1 -14 1 -7.6
TR&U 40 27.1 -3.2 25.0 35.0 32.2
41 14.3 -0.5 -4.5 -36.3 -4.6
42 9.3 -0.4 0.0 -3.0 2.1
43 960.0 0. 0. 0. 24.6
44 16.8 -3.9 0. 0. 2.9
45 30.8 5.1 2.5 4.0 8.3
46 19.8 26.9 -1.4 0. 17.3
47-49 21.7 5.6 23.2 -0 3 10.4
TRADE50 10.4 0.0 0.6 21.5 6.3
51 13.5 3.9 0.5 35.4 8.1
52 4 1 1.5 -17.4 0. 2.2
53 -3.4 14.0 19.7 10.0 13.6
54 -1.8 9.7 5.5 24.9 5.6
-8.7 -3.6 -2.4 -0.6 -6.2
56 -0.2 -9.8 -12 0 5.3 -3.0
57 0.5 -3 7 -35 7 0. -2.4
58 2.1 8 9 8.6 19.6 5.9
59 4.2 1.9 16.3 27.8 5.4
FI&RE60 229.6 54.3 47.7 0. 33.0
61 24.5 -6 0 -22 1 -19.3 -0.9
62 34.3 18.7 3 4 0. 17.7
63-64 63.9 16.4 9.9 24.4 20.0
65-66 49.2 7.9 3.9 0. 32.2
67 65.6 -5.5 -0.9 16.2 14.7
SRVC 70 21.9 20.4 16.9 -11 9 17.8
72 -0.6 -14.0 -6.7 0. -5.2
73 33.3 19.0 8.3 43.8 23.0
75 0.9 4.8 -100.0 0. 1.0
76 8.2 17.8 60.2 0. 12.1
78 38.2 6 8 48.5 0. 24.0
80 60.8 72.2 35.7 24.6 32.6
81 105.6 10.0 0. 0. 52.9
82 72.7 59.5 15.1 13 5 16.6
83 - 160.8 96.2 26.5 0. 77.6
84 39.3 37.9 -100 0 0, 5.6
86 52.9 9.6 7.0 -11.0 15.7
88 225.0 0. 0. 0. 225.0
89 21.4 15.8 59.6 119 1 37.8
1.6 0.3 3.0 3.2TOTALS 7.2
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Table A-5
TABLE - % NET EMPLOYM"ENT CHANGE IN INDIANAPOLIS 72-76
COUNT BY - AEMPL72
EMP SIZE
SIC # 0-20 21-100 101-500 >500 TOTALS
AG 7 . 21 9 483 0 0. 49 3
MIN8-14 16 8 3 6 -56 1 0 -18 6
CONSTl5 15.7 -34 0 -44 2 0. -12.1
16 22.3 -7.9 -36 3 0. -3.6
17 9.9 -9.3 -48 1 0 -5.3
MFG 20 -26.6 -10 1 -10.3 -40.3 -18.9
21 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
22 -72.2 -39 0 0. 0. -45.3
23 -2.3 -6.5 -7.3 0. -6.2
24 31.4 50.0 -31 7 -25 5 -2.8
25 3.1 17.5 83.1 0. 36.6
26 55.4 12.1 -34 3 0. -18.3
27 -5.5 -2.7 7.0 -218 -9
28 7.4 -2.0 52.1 27.8 19.9
29-32 36.3 16.7 2.6 -11.7 2.6
33 34.0 -3.8 6.4 0. 8.2
34 12.5 -5.9 -7.0 150 9 35.0
35 17.9 7.1 -14.9 -19.6 -9.8
36 107 4 39.0 34.4 -20 4 -12 3
37 18.6 7.3 5.0 -12.6 -9.9
38 86.2 44.4 -45 7 0. 0.2
39 20.5 3.4 3.7 46.7 22.4
TR&U 40 44.4 0. 60.6 0. 1034 9
41 40.0 -22 R -33.6 0. -28.9
42 86.8 4.4 0.2 -3.4 13.5
43 0. 0. 0, 0. 0.
44 350.0 0. 0. 0. 350.0
45 19.8 26.0 0. 0. 127.4
46 0. 175.0 0. 0. 175.0
47-49 77.7 3.2 -27.8 2.2 1.2
TRADE50 28.1 10.5 8.1 0. 15.0
1 26.4 2.6 -22.9 0. 3.8
52 6.1 15.2 -50 0 0. 2.3
53 -18.0 212.3 138.1 45.5 76.6
54 -5.3 3.5 -22.0 -19.8 -12.1
55q-12.5 1.5 -41.6 0. -8.9
56 8.6 -38.5 120.0 -57 1 -7.9
57 20.4 -0.2 0. 0. 15.9
58 10.8 23.0 174 9 0. 61.1
59 18.5 -5.4 38.4 0. 16.2
FI&RE60 0. 0. 0 0. 0.
61 112.0 50.8 -74 3 -70 6 -41 7
62 97.8 83.0 0. 0. 360.2
63-64 361.0 85.4 29.1 71.5 66.3
65-66 142. 90.5 -47 1 0. 84.8
67 39.3 -85.0 16 7 0. 243.8
SRVC 70 50.7 253 8 -18.2 0. 53.6
72 0.4 -8.5 -56 8 -41.2 -22.1
73 6.0 18.3 -32 5 116 7 44.1
75 23.5 7.8 0. 0. 20.0
76 32.0 73.2 0. 0. 36.3
78 144.6 90.7 0. 0. 87.1
80 160.9 246 8I 63.4 -32 8 -7.8
81 0 0. 0. 0. 0.
82 890.0 170 9 0. 0. 4397
83 0. 324.0 0. 0. 1180 0
84 133.3 -100 0 0. 0. -93.2
8 6 621.9 0 0. 0. 778.1
8 8 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
89 77 0 0.9 238.9 0. 53.9
T OTALS 21.9 11.2 -0.3 12.2 12. 0
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Table A-6
TABLE - ABS NET EMP CHANGE IN INDIANAPOLIS, 72-76
COUNT BY - AEMPL72
EMP.SIZE
SIC # 0-20
AG 7 114.0
MIN8-14 36.0
CONST15  475 0
16 141.0
17 531.0
MFG 20 -95.0
21 0.
22 -13.0
23 -5.0
24 96.0
25 10.0
26 87.0
27 -69.0
28 29.0
29-32 281.0-
33 68.0
34 152.0
35 310.0
36 .392.0
37 44.0
38 131.0
39 71.0
'IR&U 40 8 0
41 42.0
42 968.0
43 5.0
44 7.0
45 23.0
46 0.
47-49 313.0
TRADE-0 1937 0
51 649.0
52 109.0
53 -109.0
4 -110 0
-514 0
56
57
58
- 9
FI&RE60 (
61
62
63-64
65-66
67
SRVC 70
72
73
76
-7 8
80
81
82
83
84
86
8 8
89
129.0
425.0
551. 0
850. 0
26 0
187.0
89. 0
592.0
805.0
57.0
113 0
6.0
906.0
309.0
227.0
4 1 5.0
185.0
83 0
89.0
46. 0
4 0
199.0
0.
25 1. 0
21-100 101-500 >500 TOTALS
114 0
5.0
-611 0
-80.0
-430 0
-127 0
0
-30 0
-29 0
129 0
53.0
108 0
-68.0
-16.0
194.0
-14 0
-147 0
227.0
267 0
72.0
111 0
19.0
50.0
-26 0
121.0
0.
0.
25.0
105.0
28.0
621 0
78.0
56.0
775.0
55.0
54.0
-119 0
-1.0
1096 0
-70.0
0.
94.0
83.0
919 0
343.0
-153.0
1155 0
199..0
29.0
60.0
224.0
506 0
0.
188.0
-100 0
0.
5.0
145 0
-160. 0
-615 0
-134 0
-707 0
-362.0
0.
0.
-45 0
-130 0
295 0
-829 0
74.0
137.0
43.0
28.0
-269.0
-435 0
309 0
110 0
-240 0
14.0
303 0
-562 0
3.0
0.
0.
222.0
0.
-372.0
213 0
-449 0
-110 0
1710 0
-33 0
-286 0
180 0
0.
600 0
305.0
0.
-303.0
516 0
671 0
-124.0
50.0
-229.0
-486.0
-190.0
0.
0.
0.
545. 0
0.
0.
168 0
0.
0.
0.
301.0
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
-725 0
0.
0.
0.
-137.0
0.
0.
-710 0
500 0
-350 0
0.
3772 0
-1760 0
-3050 0
-2675.0
0.
350 0
5000 0
0.
-80.0
0.
0.
0.
0.
135. 0
0.
0.
0.
1000 0
-950 0
0.
-400 0
0.
4000 0
0.
0.
-720 0
0.
2298.0
0.
1570 0
0.
4-'245 0
700 0
0.
0.
0.
-1740. 0
0.
5000 0
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
373 0
-119 0
-751 0
-73. 0
-606 0
-1309 0
0.
-43. 0
-79.0
-42. 0
358 0
-634 0
-773.0
650 0
168. 0
82.0
3508.0
-1658 0
-2082 0
-2449 0
2.0
454 0
5361. 0
-546 0
1012 0
5.0
7.0
270.0
105.0
104 0
2771. 0
278.0
55.0
3376 0
-1038 0
-746 0
-210.0
4& .d
6247 0
1085 0
26.0
-742.0
688.0
4480. 0
1024 0
1524 0
1039 0
-776. 0
1615 0
338.0
287.0
639.0
-504 0
83.0
5277. 0
295.0
-96. 0
249. 0
0.
557.0
IOTALS 12658 0 6227 0 -128 0 10783.0 29540 0
TABLE - PERSON-TYPE EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRY
Table A-7TABLE -
ROW PER CENTS
P TYPE
SIC # 24<HS 24 ITS 24COLL 24COLL 34<11S 34 HS 34COLL 34COLL 64<H
3.1
7.7
6.6
7
8
9
10
1 1-12
13
14
16
17
20
21
22
24
25 '
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
521
53
54
55
56
57
58
60
61
62
63-64
65-67
70
72
73
76
78
79
80
81
82
84
86
2.6
.2
4.9
0
2.9
2.9
6 4
3. 3
5.4
3.8
.6
5.9
.3
8.0
9.6
5.9
10 1.
7.4
7.9
6.7
7.8
8.4
10 1
9
6.3
6.3
7 7
9.8
6.3
7.9
7.4
5.6
3.9
5.0
4. 0
9.9
14.3
6.7
15 1
5.8
7.6
5. 3
6.3
10 2
8.8
9.0
8.4
5.9
7.5
8.1
13 5
16 1
8.6
14 1
3.0
.3
11 7
7.3
8.0
6.2
10 7
5.4
8.0
7.4
1.7
1.7
3.9
1.8 0.6 6.0 7 5 1.3 0.9 46.8
6.
4.
0.
8.
0.
3.
2.
3.
3.
2.
2.
1.
2.
1.
1.
3.
4.
3.
4.
2.
1.
2.
3.
3.
3.
2.
2.
4.
3.
2.
2.
2.
11
14
4.
6.
3.
3.
3.
3.
5-.
4.
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7.
19.
15
9.
25
18.
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22
29.
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21
23
35.
23
7.
4.
7.
24.
40.
30
16
36
30
16
27
19
2.
8.
12
15
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APPENDIX B
INDUSTRY GROUP
NUMBER
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
268,
CENSUS INDUSTRIAL
CLASSIFICATION CODE
17
18,19
27
28
47
48
49
57
67
68
69
269, 278, 279, 287-89,
299
307-309, 317, 318
319, 327
107 -109
118
328, 329, 337
338, 339
347-49, 357-59, 367-69
377, 378
379, 387
388-89, 397
119, 127, 128, 137,. 138
297, 298
139, 147-49
157-59, 167-69
177-79, 187-89, 197, 198
199, 207-209
219, 227-29, 237, 238
239, 347-49, 257
SIC#
1, 2
7
8
9
10
11,12
13
14
15
16
17
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
DESCRIPTION
Agricultural Production
Agricultural Services
Forestry
Fishing, hunting & trapping
Metal mining
Coal Mining
Oil & gas extraction
Non-metals mining (except
fuels)
Building construction
Other construction
Special trade contractors
Food manufacturing
Tobacco mfg.
Textiles mfg.
Apparel mfg.
Lumber & wood products mfg.
Furniture & fixtures mfg.
Paper products mfg.
Printing & publishing
Chemicals
Oil refining
Rubber & misc. plastics mfg.
Leather products mfg.
Stone, clay, glass &
concrete products
Primary metals industries
Fabricated metal products
Machinery (except electrical
Electronics
Transportation Equipment
Specialty equipment
-2-
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INDUSTRY GROUP
NUMBER
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
CENSUS INDUSTRIAL
CLASSIFICATION CODE
258, 259, 398
407
408-9
417-18
419
427
428
429
447-49
467-69, 477-79
507, 529, 537-39,
508, 509,
609,
628,
557-59, 569, 587
527, 528, 567, 568
607-8
617-19,627
629, 637, 638
639, 647-49
657-58
667-68
669
677-79, 687-89,697-99
707
708
709
717
718
779,
727-29,
777-78
787-89, 797-98
737-39, 747-48
749, 757
758-59
SIC#
39
40
41
42
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63-64
65-67
70
72
73
75
76
DESCRIPTION
Misc. mfg.
Railroad transportation
Transit operators
Trucking & warehousing
Shipping
Air transportation
Pipelines (exceptnaturalgas)
Transportation services
Communication
Electric, gas & sanitary
services
Wholesale trade-durables
Wholesale trade-nondurables
House & garden supplies
dealers
General merchandise stores
Food stores
Car dealers & gas stations
Clothes stores
Home furnishing stores
Eating & drinking places
Misc. retail
Banking
Credit agencies other
than banks
Securities & commodities
Insurance
Real estate, law & misc.
financial
Hotels & other lodging
Personal services
Business services
Auto repair services
Misc. repair services
-3-
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INDUSTRY GROUP
NUMBER
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
CENSUS INDUSTRIAL
CLASSIFICATION CODE
807
808-9
828-29, 837-39, 847-48
849
857-59, 867-68
869
877-79, 887
769
888-89, 897
SIC#
78
79
80
81
82
84
86
88
89
DESCRIPTION
Movies
Amusement & recreation
services
Health services
Legal services
Educational services
Museums, zoos, galleries
Membership organizations
Private households
Misc. services
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